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The University of Kentucky, College of Law, Office of Continuing Legal Education, was organized in Fall of 1973, as the first permanently
staffed, full-time continuing legal education program in the Commonwealth of Kentucky. It endures with the threefold purpose of assisting
Kentucky lawyers: to keep abreast of changes in the law resulting from statutory enactments, court decisions and administrative rulings;
to develop and sustain practical lawyering and litigation skills; and to maintain a high degree of professional competence in the various
areas of the practice of law.
An enormous debt of gratitude is owed to those who contribute their time, expertise and practical insight for the advance planning,
the instructional presentations, and the written materials that make our seminars possible.
The Office of Continuing Legal Education welcomes correspondence and comment regarding our overall curriculum, as well as our in-
dividual seminars and publications. We hope the seminars and the materials distributed in conjunction with them provide attorneys with
the invaluable substantive and practical information necessary to resolve society's increasingly complex legal problems in an efficient
and effective manner. To the extent that we accomplish this, we accomplish our goal.
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EMPLOYMENT LAW '88
UK7cL~
r
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND THE NLRA
Review and Up-date
r
ALVIN L. GOLDMAN
Professor, U.K. College of Law
A. Notice requirements
Procedural Requirements of Good Faith Bargaining
statutory Backdrop
A. Sections 8(a) (5) and 8(b) (3) of the National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA) respectively require employers and unions to
negotiate in good faith. Breach of this duty is an unfair
labor practice subject to injunctive and restitutional type
remedies.
The duty to bargain in good faith as defined in NLRA §8(d)
has procedural and substantive dimensions.
Within thirty days thereafter notice to FMCS and state
mediation agency. (60 day period in health care indus-
try. )
Notice requirements do not apply to first contracts
except for health care institutions where 30 day notice
must be given to FMCS and state mediation agency re-
garding such contracts.
1. Sixty day written notice to other side of proposed
termination or modification. (90 day period in health
care industry.) Time period is based on the time of
the proposal or the expiration of the collective agree-
ment, whichever is later.
2.
3.
B.
I.
II.
r
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4. Cannot resort to unilateral changes or work stoppage
until notice requirements are satisfied. (In health
care industry, per §8(g), cannot resort to picketing or
strike unless at least 10 dys written notice is also
given to the employer and FMCS stating the date and
time such action will begin.) In essence this is a
statutory no work stoppage provision.
The duty to notify the FMCS and any state agency
is upon the party that gave the sixty day notice.
Failure of the initiating party to notify the FMCS
does not preclude the other side from proceeding
as though the statutory notice has been satisfied.
United Artists Commun., 274 NLRB 75 (1985) (Upon
r
A-l
5.
impasse, not a ulp for employer to implement its
most recent proposal where union had failed to
notify the FMCS that the cba was being renegoti-
ated. )
Special rules for those construction industry contracts
that were negotiated when the union did not represent a
majority of bargaining unit workers.
A construction industry employer that enters into
a prehire agreement with a union has a duty to
bargain respecting the administration of that
agreement unless the majority of employees, in an
NLRB election, vote against continued representa-
tion by that union. John Deklewa & Sons, 282 NLRB
No. 184 (1987). -----
...
B. Must meet with the other side at reasonable times.
However, duty is not violated if one leaves a meeting,
in response to abusive language, or if one insists on a ~
recess in order to deliberate and put proposals into J
writing. Embossing Printers, 268 NLRB 710 (1984).
C. Cannot by-pass or denigrate other side's bargaining agent.
J.P. Stevens & Co. v. NLRB, 623 F.2d 322 (4th Cir.
I"9"81Y) •
J
D. Must be reasonably prompt in responding to demands for
relevant information; any delays must be justified.
Financial Inst. Employees of America ~ NLRB, 738 F.2d
1038 (9th cir. 1984). --
E. Must commit the agreement to writing upon other side's
request.
III. Substantive Requirement of Good Faith Bargaining
A.
B.
Not required to make concessions.
Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. NLRB, 638 F.2d 1221, 1226 n.7
(9th Cir. 1981) (bad faith-Cannot be inferred solely from the
content of lawful proposals). Compare, J.P. Stevens & Co.
v. NLRB, 623 F.2d 322 (4th Cir. 1980) ("adament adherence"
to unreasonable positions can be used as corroborative evid-
ence to show bad faith). See, also, part E(l), p. 5.
Mandatory subjects of bargaining (notice requirements apply;
can insist on position to impasse; cannot unilaterally
change until bargain to impasse).
A-2
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2.
3.
Can waive the duty to bargain by expressly dealing with
the sUbject in a collective agreement or by foreclosing
further bargaining by means of a Management Rights
provision and a Zipper provision.
Emery Indus., 268 NLRB 824 (1984) (union waived
right to bargain about new absentee policy where
employer frequently changed policies in past with-
out union objection and where collective agreement
reserved employer's right to discipline for
neglect of duty)
American Oil Co. v. NLRB, 602 F.2d 184 (8th Cir.
1979) (provision calling for posting of work sche-
dules did not waive union's right to bargain over
employer's authority to modify those schedules,
especially where there was a history of such con-
sultation) •
Questions arising under collectively bargained
agreements. (Grievance-arbitration process)
Questions concerning wages, hours and other terms and
conditions of employment.
r
r
r
r
r,
r,
r
r
r
r
a. Decisions that result in the loss of bargaining
unit work--or, the new runaway shop cases.
First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. ~ NLRB, 452 U.S.
666 (1981).
" [B]argaining over management decisions that
have a substantial impact on the continued
availability of employment should be required
only if the benefit, for labor-management
relations and the collective bargaining pro-
cess, outweighs the burden placed on the
conduct of the business."
NLRB requires bargaining if the employer's
decision turns on labor costs. [Known as the
Otis II standard, based on the Board's plur-
ality-aecision in Otis Elevator Co., 269 NLRB
891 (1984).] See also, Arrow Automotive
Indus., Inc., 284 NLRB No. 57 (1987) ~ Litton
Microwave-Prods., 283 NLRB No. 144 (1987)
(waiver of duty not inferred from general
management's prerogatives and zipper provi-
sions); Kroger Co., 273 NLRB No. 70 (1984) (no
duty to bargain-about decision to bUy eggs
from processors rather than continue own
processing where the decision was based on
lack of adequate egg supply)
Steelworkers Local 2179 ~ NLRB, 822 F.2d 559
A-3
b.
(5th Cir. 1987) approved the Board's Otis II
test.
Must bargain about the impact of losses of bar-
gaining unit work even if the decision was not
bargainable.
c.
First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S.
666 (1981) ("bargaining over the-e11eCts of a deci-
sion must be conducted in a meaningful manner and
at a meaning time"); Signal Commun., Inc., 284
NLRB No. 54 (1987) (must give union advance notice
of decision to shut down so that it will have a
meaningful opportunity to bargain over effects)
other subjects
,...
Duty to bargain violated by employer's unilateral
elimination of Christmas bonus given customarily ~
and based on formula for determining amount.
Woonsocket Spinning Co., 252 NLRB 1232 (1980)
Expiration of collective agreement does not excuse
unilateral termination of medical insurance, re-
tirement contributions or severence payments.
Taurus Waste Disposal, Inc., 263 NLRB 309 (1982)
Hiring hall arrangement is mandatory subject of
bargaining. NLRB ~ Southwest Security Equip.
Corp., 736 F~1332 (9th eire 1984), cert. denied
470 U.S. 1087 (1985)
Reimbursement of employees for wages and expenses
while serving on bargaining committee is a manda-
tory bargaining topic. Midstate Tel. Corp. v.
NLRB, 706 F.2d 401 (2d cir. 1983)----
Although a "most favored nation provision" (con-
tract will be modified to give employer any ad-
vantages later negotiated with competitors) is a
mandatory subject of bargaining [Dolly Madison
Indus., Inc., 182 NLRB 1037 (1970)], lt was an
unfair labor practice for a company to insist on a
provision prohibiting the union from negotiating
with other employers terms that conflict with the
parties' collective agreement. Associated General
Contractors ~ NLRB, 637 F.2d 556 (8th Cir. 1980).
Decision to layoff is a mandatory bargaining
topic. NLRB ~ Sandpiper Conv. Ctr., 107 eCH Lab.
10,107 (4th Clr. 1987)
Although cafeteria prices are a mandatory bargain-
ing topic, an employer may put a price change into
A-4
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E.
effect prior to negotiating regarding the change.
Dupont, 269 NLRB 24 (1984)
Mere rejection of proposals does not constitute
bargaining impasse. Impasse is when further bar-
gaining would be futile. Good GMC, Inc., 267 NLRB
583 (1983) -- -- --
Permissive subjects of bargaining (notice requirements don't
apply; cannot insist on position to point of impasse; can
unilaterally change at any time).
A provision for resolving future bargaining impasses through
interest arbitration is a permissive sUbject. Sheet Metal
Workers v. Aldrich Air Cond., Inc., 717 F.2d 456 (8th C1r.
1983) - -- ---
Contributions to industry promotion fund is permissive sub-
ject. McDonald v. Hamilton Elec., Inc., 666 F.2d 509 (11th
Cir. 1982) --
Unfair labor practice to demand unlawful prov1s10n (e.g.,
provision that violates NLRA or other federal law).
Bargaining table conduct.
r
r
I
r
r
r
r
r
,..
{.,,
•
1. Must make a bona fide effort to reach agreement.
Duty to bargain arises beginning on the date of the NLRB
election. NLRB v. Sandpiper Conv. Ctr., 107 CCH LC
10,107 (4th Cir.-r987)
Employer violated duty of good faith bargaining where
it insisted on provisions that would leave it with
unilateral control over virtually all terms and condi-
tions of employment. NLRB v. A-I King Size Sandwiches,
101 CCH LC 11,050 (11tn-cIr-.1~)----
Failure to make counter-proposals can be used as evid-
ence of lack of good faith. Taurus Waste Disposal,
Inc., 263 NLRB 309 (1982)
Insisting on rollbacks in benefits during negotiations
for first contract is evidence of bad faith bargaining.
Palestine Bottling Co., 269 NLRB 639 (1984)
Withdrawal of pre-strike offer does not violate duty to
bargain in good faith where strike altered the
bargaining strength. Times-Herald, Inc., 249 NLRB 13
(1980); Barry-Wehmiller Co., 271 NLRB 471 (1984)
A-5
2. Verbatum records.
Cannot insist to impasse upon recording negotiating
sessions NLRB v. Bartlett-Collins Co., 639 F.2d 652
(10th Cir:-I98IT, cert. denied 452-O:S. 961. Accord re
verbatim tape recording of grievance meetings. NLRB v. ~
Pennsylvania Tel. Guild, 104 CCH LC 11,940 (3d Crr:-
1986). --
3. Requests for information.
Parties must comply with requests for information that
is relevant and useful to carrying out the representa-
tional function. Probable or potential relevance is
sufficient to require production of the information.
Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301 (1979) ~ NLRB
~ Acme Indus. Co.,~8S-U:S. 432 (1967). ----
Information must be supplied if needed for "intelligent
representation". This includes employee medical his-
tories and lists of chemicals to which employees are
exposed. The Board may require reasonable efforts to
protect trade secrets respecting such information.
Moreover, the division of cost of providing information
a sUbject of bargaining. Oil, Chern. & Atomic Workers
~ NLRB, 711 F.2d 348 (D.C:-crr. 1983T~ KellY-Springfield
T1re Co., 266 NLRB 587 (1983).
Union is entitled to wage information regarding non-
bargaining unit workers if their skills are similar to
those of bargaining unit members. NLRB v. Brazos Elec.
Power Co-op., 615 F.2d 1100 (5th Cir:-I980)
When an employer pleads inability to pay, it must
supply requested corroborating financial information.
Mashkin Freight Lines, inc., 272 NLRB 427 (1984)
Employer cannot condition providing wage rate informa-
tion upon receiving employee authorization. Keco
Indus., 271 NLRB 634 (1984)
Fact that union has alternative sources for obtaining
information does not excuse employer's duty to comply
with request. Jolie Belts Co., 265 NLRB 1130 (1982)
A-6
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PRACTICING A WAGE-HOUR CLAIM
Matthew R. Westfall
Westfall, Talbott & Woods*
r I . FEDERAL LAW
A. Fair Labor Standards Act. The FLSA is the major
federal wage hour law. In general, it regulates four
areas: minimum wages, equal pay, overtime and child
labor standards.r
1. Coverage. Employees covered by the FLSA, other
than those specifically exempted, include those:
a. engaged in interstate commerce;
b. engaged in the production of goods for commerce;
c. employed in "an enterprise engaged in commerce
or the production of goods for commerce."
2. Requirements Of FLSA
r
!
r
f
r
I
r
a. Minimum Wages: As of January 1, 1981, the
minimum wage is $3.35 per hour. Under the
Minimum Wage Restoration Act, House Bill No.
1834, the minimum wage will be raised to $4.65
an hour over a three year period. The bill will
not go to the House Floor for a vote until late
Spring, 1988.
b. Minors: If minors are employed, they must be
above 18 years in age in hazardous occupations
and above 16 or 14 in all others.
* Tony C. Coleman assisted in the preparation of thisr outline. He is an associate at Westfall, Talbott & Woods.
I
B-1
r
c. overtime: An employee is entitled to be paid
1 1/2 times his regular rate for all hours
worked in excess of 40 in a week. There are
certain exemptions provided by the Act from the
overtime pay requirements. They are discussed
below.
d. Equal Pay: The Act requires that male and
female workers receive equal pay for work
requiring equal skill, effort, and
responsibility, and performed under similar
working conditions.
3. Enforcement. Two entities of the Department of
Labor share responsibility for administering and
enforcing the FLSA. The Wage and Hour Division of
the Employment standards Administration is
responsible for investigations of alleged
violations. If the Wage and Hour Division finds a
violation, the Solicitor of Labor is the branch
responsible for initiating legal action against the
employer. The following are the possible means by
which the FLSA can be enforced:
a. A suit in Federal Court by the Secretary of
Labor to collect unpaid minimum wages and
overtime pay due employees and an equal amount
in liquidated damages. 29 U.S.C. Sec. 216(c).
b. A suit by the Secretary of Labor for an
injunction to restrain an employer from
violating the Act. Back wages due employees may
be sought by the Secretary at the same time. 29
U.S.C. Sec. 217.
c. An action for criminal penalties brought by the
Department of Justice is available. The action
can be brought against any person who willfully
violates any of the provisions in 29 U.S.C. Sec.
215. If convicted, the person is sUbject to a
fine of not more than $10,000, imprisonment for
not more than six months, or both. 29 U.S.C.
Sec. 216(a). Imprisonment is reserved for
persons twice convicted of willful violations.
B-2
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d. Employees, either individually or as a class,
may bring suit to recover any back wages due
them under the Act, an equal additional amount
as liquidated damages, and attorney fees and
costs.
B. Davis-Bacon Act
1. Coverage: Covers mechanics and laborers engaged in
construction of pUblic buildings or pUblic works
whose specifications require an expenditure of more
than $2,000.00. The Act also applies to certain
other federal laws, such as the Federal Aid Highway
Act and the Area Redevelopment Act.
2. Requirements: Payment of minimum wages as
established by the Secretary of Labor.
3. Enforcement: The Comptroller General is authorized
to withhold payments to the contractor if necessary
to make good any underpayments to employees. In
addition, if the amount withheld is insufficient to
cover the back pay owing, the employee may bring an
individual action against the contractor.
4. Penalties: The names of contractors who do not
observe the requirements of the Act are placed on a
list of contractors who are barred from receiving
federal contracts, which is distributed to all
departments of the government for a period of three
years.
c. Walsh-Healy Public Contracts Act
1. Coverage: Employers who have contracted with a
government agency to manufacture or supply articles
in any amount exceeding $10,000. Only those
employees engaged in producing or furnishing the
contract articles are covered.
2. Requirements: The Walsh-Healy Act requires:
a. The payment of minimum wages as set by the
Secretary of Labor;
B-3
b. The payment of 1 1/2 times the basic rate for
hours worked in excess of eight a day or 40 a
week, whichever provides the greater sum;
c. The maintenance of sanitary and non-hazardous
working conditions and complete payroll records;
d. That any minors who are employed be over 16
years old.
3. Enforcement: The Secretary of Labor is authorized
to investigate and decide cases involving alleged
violations of the Act. Liquidated damages found due
by the Secretary may be sued for by the government
or withheld from the contractor's payments due under
the contract with the government.
4. Penalties:
a. Employers are liable for any underpayments;
b. Violations of the child labor requirements may
result in a fine of $10 for each day such a
minor is employed; and,
c. Blacklisting for three years if the violations
are found to be serious and willful.
II. STATE LAW
A. KRS Chapter 337. To an extent the provisions of KRS
Chapter 337 are duplicative of federal laws and, thus,
provide a cumulative remedy. There are, however,
several requirements imposed by KRS 337 which have no
federal parallel.
1. Payment of Wages:
a. Employers must pay its employees as often as
semi-monthly all wages or salary earned. KRS
337.020.
B-4
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b. If an employee works seven days in anyone work
week, he shall be paid at the rate of time and a
half for the time worked on the seventh day.
However, if the employee has not worked 40 hours
during the work week, the premium payment is not
applicable. KRS 337.050 .
c. Employers cannot withhold from any employee any
part of the wages agreed upon. This prohibition
includes deductions for fines, cash shortages,
breakage, losses from bad checks, or losses due
to poor workmanship. There is an exemption from
the statute for deductions authorized by federal
or state law or if authorized by the employee in
writing or by a collective bargaining agreement.
KRS 337.060.
d. Employers cannot require an employee to remit to
the employer any gratuity ( i . e. any voluntary
payment received by the employee from a
customer), except for the purpose of withholding
amounts required by federal or state law.
KRS 337.065.
e. Any employer who has ten or more employees must
provide employees with a statement specifying
the amount and purpose of each deduction.
2. Minimum Wages:
a. In 1986, the minimum wage in Kentucky was raised
to $3.35 an hour.
b. Any employee who works longer than 40 hours in
anyone week must be paid at a rate of not less
than one and one-half the hourly wage rate at
which he is employed. This provision provides
certain exemptions and incorporates the
exemptions provided by the FLSA. KRS 337.285.
c. KRS 337.320 requires employers to keep records
of the amount paid each period to each employee
and the hours worked each day and week by each
employee. The records must be retained for at
least one year. KRS 337.320.
B-5
d. KRS 337.340 gives the Commissioner of Labor
authority to enter any place of employment and
question employees as to wages paid or hours
worked.
e. Under KRS 337.355, employers are required to
grant their employees a reasonable period for
lunch. In addition, the lunch period cannot be
scheduled sooner than 3 hours after the work
shift commences or more than 5 hours after the
work shift commences. The statute, however,
provides that any provision of a collective
bargaining agreement to the contrary prevails.
f. KRS 337.365 imposes a requirement that employees
be given at least a 10 minute rest period during
each four hours worked.
g. KRS 337.405 provides that nothing in KRS 337.275
to .325, 337.345 or 337.385 to .405 shall
interfere, impede, or in any way diminish
employees' rights to bargain collectively in
order to establish minimum wages in excess of
the applicable minimum or to establish hours of
work shorter than the minimum.
h. KRS 337.385 gives employees and the Commissioner
of Labor the right to bring an action to recover
any wages or overtime compensation due by virtue
of KRS Chapter 337. However, in Early v.
Campbell County Fiscal Court, Ky.App., 690
S.W.2d 398 (1985) the Kentucky Court of Appeals
held that an employee must file a complaint with
the Kentucky Department of Labor and receive a
determination on his claim, before he can file
suit in state circuit court. After Early, any
action by an employee under KRS 337.385 would,
in effect, be an appeal of the Department of
Labor's decision.
i. KRS 337.415 prohibits an employer from
discharging an employee for taking time off
from his job to appear in court or other
hearing provided the employee gives notice to
the employer by producing a copy of the "court
or administrative certificate" demonstrating
his need to be in court. The remedy provided
is reinstatement, back pay, court co~ts and
attorney fees.
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3. Wage Discrimination Because Of Sex:
The provisions of KRS 337.423 parallel those of
the Equal Pay Act. An employer cannot
discriminate between employees in the same
establishment on the basis of sex by paying any
employee at a rate less than the rate at which
he pays employees of the opposite sex for
comparable work on jobs which have comparable
requirements relating to skill, effort, and
responsibility. Differentials paid pursuant to
an established seniority system or merit system
are specifically exempted from the statute.
Violations of the Wage Discrimination provisions
may be remedied by a suit by the affected
employees or by the Commissioner of Labor.
Unpaid wages as well as an equal amount in
liquidated damages (if a willful violation is
established) can be recovered. The statute also
provides for other affirmative relief such as
reinstatement and injunctive relief.
KRS 337.427.
c. Any court action under this section must be
commenced within six months after the cause of
action accrues. KRS 337.430.
4. Public Works: KRS 337.505 to .550 gives the
Commissioner of Labor power to set "prevailing
wages" for employees who are engaged by an employer
to perform work under a contract with the state to
construct pUblic works.
5. Penalties: KRS 337.990 to .993 provides a criminal
penalty for violations of the substantive rights and
obligations set forth in KRS 337. The only part of
Kentucky's Wage and Hour law for which no criminal
penalty is provided is that concerning the
prohibition against wage discrimination because of
sex. All of the criminal penalties are fines
(ranging from $10 to $500), except one. KRS 337.992
prohibits the discharge or discrimination against
any employee because of his making a complaint,
initiating an action, or testifying under the Wage
and Hour laws, and provides as a penalty a $500 fine
or imprisonment for six months.
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III. PRACTICING A WAGE HOUR CLAIM
A. Investigatory Stage. The Wage-Hour law gives the
Administrator and his inspectors the power to
investigate and collect facts on wages, hours and
working conditions in any industry which comes under
the FLSA. All Wage and Hour claims begin at this
stage. Such inspections are most commonly prompted
by a complaint to the Wage and Hour Division that an
employer has violated the Act.
1. Right Of Inspection. Sec. ll(a) of the FLSA gives
the Administrator and his inspectors almost plenary
power to enter onto employers' premises, inspect
records, and question employees in order to
determine if any person has violated the Act.
There are, however, several defensive steps an
employer can take at this stage.
a. Subpoena: Although the Wage and Hour Division
is given the right to inspect records under the
Act, an employer can refuse to allow such an
inspection. The inspector is then forced to
secure a subpoena from the Wage and Hour
Administrator. The subpoena can still be
ignored, forcing the Division to seek
enforcement of the subpoena through a federal
district court. The district court will, as a
matter of course, enforce the sUbpoena even
though the Division has not even demonstrated
that the employer is covered by the Act.
Oklahoma Press PUblishing Co. v. Walling, 327
U.S. 186 (1946). The subpoena may be
completely ignored if it is signed by any
official other than the Administrator of the
Wage and Hour Division. E.g., a Regional
Director has no authority to issue a sUbpoena.
Minnesota Mines, Inc. v. Holland, 126 F.2d 824
(10th Cir., 1942).
b. withholding of Records: The Wage and Hour
Division's authority to inspect records is not
without limitations. An employer is not
obligated to produce general business records
for examination if they are not relevant to a
determination of wages paid, hours worked, or
tasks performed by employees. See, McComb v.
Hunsaker Trucking Contractor, Inc., 171 F.2d 523
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(1948), where the First Circuit upheld the
company's refusal to provide records of customer
transactions, interstate purchases, and
transportation of goods.
c. Discovery of Investigatory Materials: Employers
do not have the right to review statements or
other information gathered by the Wage and Hour
Division during the course of an investigation.
Frequently, courts have required that the
Division at least furnish the employer with
"some particular instances of misconduct."
E.g., Fleming v. Stillwell, 37 F.Supp. 236 (D.C.
Tenn., 1941). An employer's right to
information obtained by the Division is
substantially greater once a wage suit has
actually been initiated.
B; Settlement: After the Wage and Hour Division has
completed its investigation, the employer is in its best
position to settle any claimed violations of the Act.
After investigation every compliance officer
theoretically has the option of either litigating or
settling a violation of the FLSA. However, as a
practical matter, internal pressures normally force the
officer to pursue a settlement. Some of the
considerations prompting the Division to pursue
settlement are:
(a) A decision to recommend litigation to the Solicitor
of Labor is time consuming. It often takes as long
as a year from the date litigation is recommended
to a decision by the Solicitor of Labor to file
suit. In the meantime, the two year statute of
limitations continues to run cutting off back wages
for the affected employees, and
(b) Once the Compliance Officer recommends litigation,
he effectively loses control over the case to the
Area Director or the Solicitor of Labor, who may
settle the case on their own terms.
Whatever the reason, recent statistics indicate that
settlements of Wage and Hour claims at this stage, on
the average, result in only 53.5% of the employees being
found underpaid. The settlement also usually results in
an agreement by the employer not to violate the Act in
the future. Minimum Wage Study Commission, Minimum Wage
Study Report, (1981), at p. 90. Those statistics
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demonstrate, however, that an employer can escape a J
significant portion of its statutory obligation through
an advantageous settlement at an early stage.
Especially in cases where the violation is clear, J.'
settlement of the case at an early stage is often the
best resolution.
J
C. civil Actions
1. Employee Wage suit: The most important method of
enforcing the Wage-Hour laws is an action by an
employee in "any federal or state court of competent
jurisdiction."
a. Jurisdiction: Federal and state courts have
concurrent jurisdiction to adjudicate claims
under the FLSA. The majority view is that an
action under FLSA filed in state court may be
removed as a matter of right to federal court.
Anthony v. West Coast Drug Co., 331 F.Supp. 1279
(D.C. Wash., 1971, and Hill v. Moss-America,
Inc., 62 LC Para. 32,303 (D.C. Miss., 1970).
Several district courts have held, however, that
an FLSA action filed in state court cannot be
removed to federal court since Sec. 216 of the
Act provides that an action may be
"maintained ... in any federal or state court."
Neal v. Record Data, Inc., 26 WH Cases 853 (N.D.
Ala., 1983), and Carter v. Hill & Hill
Trucklines, Inc., 259 F.Supp. 429 (D.C. TX.,
1966) .
b. Employee's Burden: An employee who brings a
suit for unpaid minimum wages or overtime under
the FLSA must be able to prove that he was doing
work connected with interstate commerce; the
number of hours he worked; and the amount of
wages or overtime which the Company owes and has
failed to pay him. Warren-Bradshaw Drilling Co.
v. Hall, 317 U.S. 88 (1942).
(i) The first requirement of the employee's
proof does not often enable an employer to
escape liability. The 1961 amendments to
the Act provides for coverage of all
employees in a business, if the business
or two or more of the employees are
engaged in interstate commerce or
production of interstate commerce.
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(ii) As to the second and third requirements, an
employee must definitely prove how much
work he did for which he was not paid and
how much is due him. However, if an
employer's wage records are inaccurate or
incomplete (which the employee is entitled
to inspect), the Supreme Court has held
that the employee only needs to produce
enough evidence to show the amount and
extent of that work as a matter of just and
reasonable inference. The burden then
shifts to the employer to disprove the
claim. Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery
Co., 328 U.S. 680 (1946).
2. Injunctive Action: In addition to an employee's
wage suit the Secretary of Labor is also empowered
to bring an action on behalf of the employee. In
such an action, the Secretary can recover back wages
and liquidated damages and can seek an injunction.
A suit by the Secretary precludes an action by the
individual employee. As in an employee suit, the
Secretary has the burden of proving coverage and
entitlement to back wages. The employer has the
burden of proving exemptions.
a. Requirements of an Injunction: To show
entitlement to an injunction, the Secretary
must prove that the company has employees
covered by the law; that it has been violating
the law with respect to those employees; and,
that without an injunction there is a good
chance the violations will continue. Holland
v. U. S. Bedding Co., 2 WH Cases 331 (W. D.
Tenn., 1942).
(i) An employer can effectively avoid the
issuance of an injunction by correcting
the violations before the Secretary
requests an injunction before the Court.
The purpose of an injunction is to prevent
future violations, not to punish past
violations. If present violations have
ceased, an injunction will be issued only
upon a showing that the Company has had a
long record of past violations. Holland
v. Amoskeag Machine Co., 44 F.Supp. 884
(D.C. N.H., 1942).
B-l1
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(ii) An injunction should be avoided if at all
possible since once entered the injunction
technically continues indefinitely.
Accordingly, if future violations occur,
the employer has not only violated the law
but also the injunction, sUbjecting itself
to civil contempt. Tobin v. Barreda, 9 WH
Cases 534 (D.C. P.R., 1950).
(iii) Some courts have, however, dissolved the
injunction after a lengthy period of time
and no further violations by the employer.
Brennan v. Thor, Inc., 22 WH Cases 259 (4th
Cir., 1975).
b. "Hot Goods" Provision: Section 15 (a) of the
FLSA gives the Secretary of Labor the authority
to seek an injunction banning the shipment
across state I ines any goods which have been
produced or worked on by employees whose
employment conditions violate the law. An
inj unction against the movement of the goods
can be granted against the violating employer
or any other person who receives the goods.
The threat of a ban against the shipment of
such goods, in order to pressure the employer
to settle, is more I ikely than an actual
attempt to receive such an injunction.
( i) "Hot Goods" Insurance: A company can
protect itself against the innocent
purchase of "hot goods" by obtaining
written assurances from the seller that
the goods were obtained in compliance
with the law. If such written assurance
is obtained and the buyer has no reason
to believe that the supplier was not
complying with the law, it cannot be
enj oined from shipping its goods in
commerce if it is later established that
the supplier was violating the law.
Defenses To A Wage-Hour Claim:
(a) Industry Exemptions: A complete defense to any
claim for unpaid wages or overtime compensation
is that the affected employees are not covered
by the FLSA. The FLSA provides certain
statutory exemptions to employees in certain
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industries. The industrial exemptions provided
are partial and complete depending upon the
industry. For example, under the FLSA,
employees engaged in agricultural operations
are exempted from the Act's minimum wages and
overtime pay requirements. Agriculture is
broadly defined by the Wage and Hour
Regulations. It includes "farming in all its
branches" as long as the work is performed by a
"farmer or on a farm as an incident to or in
conjunction with such farming operations." See
Sec. 780.103. Section 780.122 of the
Regulations specifically exempt employees
"engaged in the breeding, racing, training, and
care of horses on farms for racing purposes."
On the other hand, employees engaged in
"racing, training, and care of horses ... off the
farm" are not exempted. A racetrack is not a
farm. Kentucky has a similar definition of
agricultural employees but does not
specifically exempt employees involved in
activi ties relating to race horses. See,
KRS 337 . 010 (2) (b) .
(b) Exemption by Type of Employee: There are three
maj or so-called "white collar" exemptions
which if proven preclude an employee's recovery
of any unpaid minimum wages or overtime
compensation. The three classes of employees
exempted from coverage of the FLSA are
executive, administrative, and professional
employees.
,.
I
,.
,
,..
i
( i )
(ii)
Executive Employee: To prove this
exemption the employer must demonstrate
that the employee's primary duty (50%
or more of his time) is to manage an
enterprise or department thereof: that
he customarily and regularly exercises
discretionary power: that his non-exempt
work does not exceed 20% of his weekly
hours: and, that his salary is more than
$155 a week. The regulations provide a
shorter test for employees who make more
than $250 a week. In the latter case,
the employer only has to prove
supervision and the primary duty test.
Administrative Employees: An employee
falls within this exemption if it is
B-13
shown that his primary duty (50% or more
of his time) involves performing office
or non-manual work relating to management
policies or general business operations
of employer or employer's customers; that
he regularly and directly assists a
proprietor, or an executive or
administrative employee, or works under
only general supervision along
specialized or technical lines, requiring
training, experience or knowledge, or
executes under only general .supervision
special assignments and tasks; that he
customarily and regularly exercises
discretion and independent judgment; that
he spends no more than 20% of his weekly
hours performing non-exempt work; and,
that he receives more than $155 a week in
salary. Again, there is a shorter test
for employees who receive more than $250
per week. In the latter case, it only
has to be shown that the employee's
primary duty is as described above and
that he exercises discretion and
independent jUdgment.
(iii) Professional Employees: To establish that
an employee is exempt as a professional
employee , it must be proven that his
primary duty (50% or more of his time) is
spent performing work requiring specific
or specialized study, as distinguished
from apprentice training and training for
routine work, or performing original and
creative work in a recognized artistic
endeavor depending primarily on the
invention, imagination or talent of the
employee, or performing the work of a
teacher, tutor, instructor, or lecturer in
the activity of imparting knowledge; that
he performs work predominantly
intellectual and varied which cannot be
standardized in point of time; that he
consistently exercises discretion and
judgment; that he does not spend more than
20% of his weekly hours performing non-
exempt work; and, that he receives more
than $170 a week in salary. The short
test requires a showing of the primary
duty described above; the consistent
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exercise of discretion and jUdgment with
respect to scientific, specialized or
academic work, but not with respect to
artistic endeavors, and a salary of at
least $250 a week.
All of the exemptions under the Act are sUbject
to a rule of "strict construction." Any doubt
must be resolved in favor of the employee.
Calaf v. Gonalez, 127 F.2d 934 (1st Cir.,
1942) .
(c) statute of Limitations: The FLSA provides a
two year statute of limitations on the recovery
of unpaid minimum wages or overtime
compensation. The statute of limitations
continues to run until a complaint based on the
alleged violations is filed in court. Thus,
liability can be sUbstantially reduced by
correcting the violations at the time of
investigation and delaying the Division's
filing of an action for as long as possible.
There is a three year statute of limitations
for proven willful violations of the Act .
(d) Good Faith Defenses
(i) Reliance on Wage-Hour RUling: Liability
for unpaid minimum wages, overtime
compensation, and liquidated damages can
be avoided by a showing that the employer
relied in good faith on written rulings by
the Wage and Hour Administrator, even if
the rUling is later found to be invalid.
Marshall v. Baptist Hospital, 25 WH Cases
232 (6th Cir., 1981). An employer must
prove that he relied on the written
interpretation, and that the reliance and
conformance were in good faith. This
defense applies only to past violations.
It cannot be used to defend against a
request for injunctive relief.
(ii) Liquidated Damages: Liquidated damages
can be recovered by employees or by the
Secretary of Labor on behalf of the
employees. The Act provides for a
recovery of liquidated damages in an
amount equal to the amount of unpaid
wages and overtime compensation
B-15
recovered. However, courts have been
given the discretion to not award any or
only a part of the damages if the
employer shows to the satisfaction of the
court that the act or omission was in
good faith and was based upon reasonable
grounds for believing that he was not
violating the FLSA. What constitutes
good faith and reasonable grounds is
largely dependent upon the facts of the
particular case, since the ultimate
decision rests in the discretion of the
court. Some particular factual
situations found to establish "good
faith" and "reasonable grounds" are
violations stemming from:
(A) Reliance on advice by Wage-Hour
Inspector as to compliance with the
Act. Burke v. Mesta Machine Co.,
79 F.Supp. 588 (D.C. Pa., 1948).
(B) Failure of Wage and Hour Division to
take enforcement action with respect
to certain employees of dredging
companies treated by employer as
being excluded from coverage by seamen
exemption. Brown v. Dunbar & Sullivan
Dredging Co., 189 F.2d 871 (2nd Cir.,
1951).
(C) Employer in good faith belived that
employee was exempt under the FLSA's
definition of executive employee,
employee never worked overtime
except at her own request, and
employer consulted accountant who
stated that employee was exempt.
Lane v. MIs Pub « Inc., 435 F. Supp.
917 (D.C. Neb., 1977).
Mere ignorance of the law is not
sufficient to establish a "good faith"
defense. Barcellona v. Tiffany English
Pub.« Inc., 24 WH Cases 201 (5th cir.,
1979). Likewise, reliance on the
erroneous advice of counsel is not a
B-16
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"good faith" defense. Gustofson v. Fred
Wolferman, 73 F.Supp. 186 (D.C. Mo.,
1947) .
"Regular Rate" Problems: Section 207(a) (1) of the
FLSA provides that no employee shall work more than
40 hours in a week "unless such employee receives
compensation for his employment in excess of the
hours above specified at a rate of not less than
one and one-half times the regular rate at which he
is employed .... " (Emphasis added). This provision
requires employers to average certain payments into
an employees' hourly rate for purposes of
determining an employee's "regular rate" for
overtime purposes. The majority of employer's
overtime problems concern the proper determination
of an employee's regular rate.
Pay normally included in "regular rate"
computation:..
~.
(a)
(i) Pay for time worked-wages, salary,
commissions or piece rates:
..
,.
..
,..
•
(b)
(ii) incentive bonuses;
(iii) cost-of-living allowances;
(iv) premiums for "dirty" work: and
(v) other payments considered by the
employee as part of his regular
compensation.
Pay normally excluded from "regular rate"
computation:
(i) premium pay under collective bargaining
agreement, for work on Saturday, Sunday,
or Holidays:
(ii) pay for time not worked - e.g. vacation,
holidays, and sick leave:
(iii) pension or health insurance
contributions;
(iv) outright gifts;
B-17
(v) bonuses completely within discretion of
employer;
(vi) distribution from profit-sharing plans
which satisfy regulations of Wage-Hour
Administrator; and
(vii) contributions to bona fide thrift or
savings plan which satisfy the Wage-Hour
regulations.
(c) Bonus Payments Under a Collective Bargaining
Agreement
A recent development in this area concerns the
Wage and Hour Division's treatment of
"signing" or "ratification" bonuses that
companies often use as an incentive to ratify
a collective bargaining agreement. Annual
bonuses during the life of the contract are
also common in order to keep employees' base
wage rates lower. The issue is whether the
bonuses should be averaged into an employee's
normal hourly rate for determining the
employee's regular rate.
(i) One-Time, Lump-Sum Payment Upon
Ratification
Such payments are not counted as
compensation for overtime purposes
provided that the bonus is given to all
employees on the payroll at the time of
ratification and is unrelated to the
quality or quantity of the employee's
past or future service. Under these
circumstances, the bonus falls within
section 7(e)2 of the FLSA which excludes
from the "regular rate" any "payments to
an employee which are not made as
compensation for his hours of
employment."
(ii) Annual Bonuses: If the contract provides
that employees will receive an annual
bonus during each year of the contract
payable to employees on his payroll at
the time the bonus is due, then, the
bonus has to be included in the
employees' "regular rate."
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According to the Wage and Hour Division if an
employee has to be on the payroll in order to
receive the annual bonuses, then, the bonuses
are an inducement for the employee to continue in
his employment and is considered compensation
for his hours of employment. Accordingly,
such bonuses do not fall within Section 7(e) (2)
of the FLSA.
Annual bonuses under a collective bargaining
agreement are not compensable only if the
contract provides that all employees on the
payroll at the time of ratification receive
the bonuses each year, regardless of whether
they are still employed .
5. Arbitration v. Wage Suit Under FLSA: Another
affirmative defense to be raised in any action under
the FLSA by an employee covered by a collective
bargaining agreement is that any claim for unpaid
wages or overtime is a proper sUbject for
arbitration. The Ninth Circuit has held that an
action under the FLSA should be stayed pending the
outcome of arbitration. Beckley v. Teyssier, 332
F.2d 495 (9th Cir., 1964). The Supreme Court has
held, however, that an employee's submission of a
wage claim to arbitration does not preclude a
subsequent suit under the FLSA. Barrantine v.
Arkansas-Best Freight System, U.S. , 24 WH
Cases 1273 (1981).
6. Neglect By Employee: A further possible defense is
that the employee is estopped from claiming either
unpaid wages or overtime compensation on the ground
that the employee by his action or inaction misled
the employer into not paying the proper wages. For
example, in Brumbelow v. Quality Mills, Inc., 69 LC
Para. 32, 766 (D.C. Ga., 1971), an employee was held
not entitled to recover overtime where he falsified
his time records to indicate no overtime work due to
an unjustified fear of discharge.
B-19
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
j
j
J
j
J
J
J
j
J
J
j
J
,..
,.
i
,.
,.
,..
...,
,.,
,.
,.
r
WRONGFUL DISCHARGE,
UNJUST DISMISSAL,
AND
EMPLOYME~AT WILL:
Development of National and Kentucky Law
Jon L. Fleischaker
Wyatt, Tarrant and Combs
Louisville, Kentucky
©Copyright 1988
Jon L. Fleischaker
and
Stephen R. Price
SECTION C
J
J
j
J
j
j
J
J
J
j
J
J
J
j
j
j
J
J
,..
I
".
,.
,.
,.
,.
I
,..
,.
,.
WRONGFUL DISCHARGE, UNJUST
DISMISSAL, AND EMPLOYMENT AT WILL:
Development of National and Kentucky Law
TABLE OF CONTENTS
A. Employment At Will
B. Terminable For Cause Only
C. Outrageous Conduct
D. Wrongful Discharge - A Tort
E. Discharge Under Contract for Definite Duration
F. Defamation In The Workplace
G. Preemption
H. Pendant Jurisdiction
I. Summary Judgment
Page
C-l
C-l
C-4
C-4
C-6
C-7
C-8
C-9
C-9
J
J
J
J
j
J
J
j
J
j
j
J
J
J
j
J
j
j
J
,.
,.
,..
A.
r-
r
r B.i
flit
!
"..
1988 EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION SEMINAR
Wrongful Discharge/Unjust Dismissal/Employment-at-Will
Development of National and Kentucky Law
Jon L. Fleischaker
Stephen R. Price
WYATT, TARRANT &. COMBS
2700 Ci tizens Plaza
Louisville, Kentucky 40202
(502) 589-5235
EMPLOYMENT AT WILL. Kentucky is an employment-at-will
state. Production Oil Co. v. Johnson, Ky., 313 S.W.2d
411, 413 (1958); Scroghan v. Kraftco Corp., Ky. App.,
551 S.W.2d 811 (1977); Louisville &. N.R. Co. v. Mar-
shall, Ky. App., 586 S.W.2d 274, 281 (1979). An
at-will employee may be discharged "for good cause, for
no cause, or for a cause that some might view as
morally indefensible." Firestone Textile Co. Div. v.
Meadows, Ky., 666 S.W.2d 730, 731 (1984).
TERMINABLE FOR CAUSE ONLY. Where parties clearly state
their intention to enter into a contract of employment
terminable only pursuant to its express terms, ~,
"for cause," a definite term of employment is created
and the employee is not terminable at will. Shah v.
American Synthetic Rubber Corporation, Ky., 655 S.W.2d
489, 492 (1983).
1. The duration of an employment contract must be
determined by the circumstances of each particular
case.
a. Understanding of the parties as inferred from
wri tten or oral negotiations and agreements.
b. Usage of business.
c. Situation and objective of the parties.
d. Nature of the employment.
,.
,.
e. All circumstances surrounding the transac-
tion.
Id. at 490; Putnam Producers' Livestock
Marketing Ass'n, 256 Ky. 196, 75 S.W.2d 1075,
1076 (1934).
C-l
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Specification of a salary for a certain period of
time raises a rebuttable presumption of fact that
the contract of employment was for the time
specified. Id. at 1077. For example, a letter
confirming oral negotiations and stating the
salary to be paid as a specific amount per annum,
combined with the fact that the employee had
rej ected another offer, was sufficient to estab-
lish a contract for a fixed term of one year.
Humana, Inc. v. Fairchild, Ky. App., 603 S.W.2d
918, 920 (1980).
Labelling the employment as "permanent" or "em-
ployment as long as the employee does honest and
faithful work" or "employment as long as he
performs his duties in a successful or satisfacto-
ry manner" without additional consideration wi 11
not give rise to more than an at-will contract of
employment. Shah, 655 S.W.2d at 491.
a. But a contract for employment "so long as the
employer is 'satisfied' with the work of the
employee" was sufficient, at least when
coupled with third party beneficiary status
to a coal land lease agreement, to create a
contract of employment for a definite term in
Crest Coal Company, Inc. v. Bailey, Ky., 602
S.W.2d 425, 426 (1980).
b. Where the duration of the employment contract
is defined in this manner a subjective test
applies which allows the employer's
evaluation of employee's work to control as
long as the employer acts in "good faith."
Id.
EMPLOYEE HANDBOOKS. Whether policies and proce-
dures contained in an employee handbook establish-
ing due process procedures for the termination of
employees can serve to alter the at-will status of
an employee's employment is not clear.
a. Disclaimers in employee handbooks are valid
and binding. Nork v. Fetter Printing Co.,
Ky. App., 738 S.W.2d 824, 827 (1987); see
also Dell v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 811 F.2d
970, 972-74 (6th Cir. 1987); Reid v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 790 F.2d 453, 460-62 (6th Cir.
1986) .
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Many jurisdictions have recognized that
employee manuals are mere unilateral expres-
sions of the employer that can be altered at
any time. Particularly where the handbook in
question was issued to the employee after the
start of employment. Heideck v. Kent General
Hospital, Inc., 446 A.2d 1095, 1097 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1982); Johnson v. National Beef
Packing Co., 220 Kan. 52, 551 P.2d 779, 782
(1976); White v. Chelsea Industries, Inc.,
425 So.2d 1090 (Ala. 1983); Muller v.
Stromberg Carlson Corp., 427 So.2d 266 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Mead Johnson & Co. v.
Oppenheimer, 458 N.E.2d 668, 671 (Ind. App.
1984); Gates v. Life of Montana Insurance
Co., 196 Mont. 178, 638 P.2d 1063, 10-66
(1982); Mau v. Omaha National Bank, 207 Neb.
308, 299 N.W.2d 147 (1980); Walker v.
Westinghouse Electric Corp., 77 N.C. App.
253, 335 S.E.2d 79, 83-84 (1985); Martin v.
Capital Cities Media, Inc., 354 Pa. Super.
199, 511 A.2d 830 (1986); Darlington v.
General Electric, 350 Pa. Super. 183, 504
A.2d 306 (1986); Richardson v. Charles Cole
Memorial Hospital, 320 Pa. Super. 106, 466
A.2d 1084, 1085 (1983); Reynolds
Manufacturing Co. v. Mendoza, 644 S.W.2d 536
(Tex. Ct. App. 1982).
Statements in employee manual that "the
employment would become permanent after
ninety days, or conditioning the employment's
duration upon continued successful
performance" are insufficient to alter the
at-will status of the employee. Nork, 738
S.W.2d at 827. --
5. Implied duty of good fai th dealing.
filii
;
,..
,..
,
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a.
b.
Long tenure with the employer does not create
an implied duty of good faith dealing. Wyant
v. SCM Corporation, Ky. App, 692 S.W.2d 814,
816 (1985); Harvey v. ITW, Inc., 2 IER Cases
597,599 (W.D. Ky. 1987).
Concept of at-will employment is "anti-
thetical to the concept of an implied cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing." Satter-
field v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., Inc.,
617 F. Supp. 1359, 1363-64 (S.C. 1985), and
should not be allowed to circumvent the law
C-3
C.
D.
on at-will employment. Neighbors v.
Kirksville College of Osteopathic Medicine,
694 S.W.2d 822, 824 (Mo. App. 1985); see
also Comerio v. Beatrice Foods Co., 600
~upp. 765, 769 (E.D. Mo. 1985).
OUTRAGEOUS CONDUCT. Kentucky has recognized the tort
of outrageous conduct causing severe emotional
distress. Craft v. Rice, Ky., 671 S.W.2d 247 (1984).
Where the employee is terminable-at-will and the
employer is merely exercising this right, there is no
claim for outrageous conduct. Reid, 790 F. 2d at 462;
Harvey, 2 IER Cases at 600. --
WRONGFUL DISCHARGE - A TORT. An exception to termina-
ble at-will doctrine exists where employee is dis-
charged contrary to a fundamental and well-defined
public policy as evidenced by existing law. Firestone
Textile Co. Div. v. Meadows, Ky., 666 S.W.2d 730,
732-33 (1984); Pari-Mutuel Clerks' Union v. Kentucky
Jockey Club, Ky., 551 S.W.2d 801 (1977).
1. This exception is narrowly defined. The concept
of an employment-related nexus is critical. Grzyb
v. Evans, Ky., 700 S.W.2d 399, 402 (1985).
2. This exception, and the court's power to provide a
remedy, appears to have its origins in KRS
446.070. See Pari-Mutuel, 551 S.W.2d at 803;
Firestone, 666 S.W.2d at 732; Grzyb, 700 S.W.2d at
401. Therefore, statute in which the public
policy is enunciated must be either penal in
nature, or must not by its terms prescribe a civil
remedy for its violation. Otherwise the civil
remedy prescribed by the statute will be preempt
the field of its application. Id.; Pike v. Harold
(Chubby) Baird Gate Co., In~ Ky. App., 705
S . W. 2d 947, 948 (1986).
3. An employer cannot discharge an employee for
refusing to violate the law in the course of his
employment. Grzyb, 700 S.W.2d at 402. The
employee must show the employer directed him to
violate the law, not just that the employee acted
consistent with the law. Bushko v. Miller Brewing
Co., 134 Wis.2d 136, 396 N.W.2d 167, 170-72
(1986) .
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The Kentucky courts have found this public policy
exception to exist [i) where an employee was
discharged for pursing a worker's compensation
claim, Firestone, supra, and [ii] for authorizing
a labor union to represent him for purposes of
collective bargaining where the NRLB has declined
jurisdiction. Pari-Mutuel Clerks', supra; but see
Section F., infra.
In Grzyb, supra, the court specifically considered
and rejected the result reached in Brown v.
Physicians Mutual Insurance Co., Ky. App., 679
S.W.2d 836 (1984), making it apparent that the
public policy exception does not apply to
corporate whist1eb10wers, or at least internal
ones. The Fourth Circuit, applying Maryland law,
refused to extend this public policy exception to
protect an external whi st1eb10wer in the absence
of a state statute obligating people to disclose
knowledge of criminal acts under the peril of a
criminal penalty. Adler v. Standard Corporation,
830 F.2d 1303, 1307 (4th Cir. 1987); see also
Campbell v. Eli Lilly & Co., 413 N.E.2d 1054, 1061
(Ind. App. 1980).
Can federal law be a source of the public policy
exception? The remedy provided in Pari-Mutuel,
Firestone and Grzyb for wrongful discharge depends
in large part on KRS 446.070 which provides:
A person injured by the violation of any
statute may recover from the offender
such damages as he sustained by reason
of the violation, although a penalty or
forfei ture is imposed for such viola-
tion.
In Cincinnati N.O. & T.P.R.R. v. Gregg, 25 Ky.
L.R. 329, 80 S.W. 512 (1904) (not an employment
case) the court allowed an individual to recover
under the forerunner of KRS 446.070 [worded
substantially the same], for damages caused by the
violation of federal statutes dealing with the
interstate shipment of livestock. Therefore,
applying Gregg through KRS 446.020 to the doctrine
of wrongful di scharge would supply the precedent
needed to tap into federal law as a source of
public policy. This would be particularly
persuasive in areas where federal law has
preempted state law. But see, Pratt v.
C-5
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Caterpillar Tractor Co., 149 Ill. App. 3d 588, 500
N.E.2d 1001, 1003 (1986), where the Indiana courts
refused to find public policy of the state in the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the Export
Administration Act, since these statutes involved
exclusively Federal concerns. See also Rachford
v. Evergreen International Airlines, Inc., 596
F. Supp. 384 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (state has no
interest in enforcing federal air safety laws) .
7. Five year statute of limitation contained in KRS
413.120(2) is applicable to wrongful discharge
actions. Pike v. Harold (Chubby) Baird Gate
Company, Inc. I 705 S.W.2d 947 (1986).
DI SCHARGE UNDER CONTRACT FOR DEFINITE DURATION.
1. An employee employed under a contract for a
defini te period of time can still be discharged
before the end of the contractual period if he is
"quilty of acts or conduct which manifest negli-
gence, unskillfullness, inefficiency or unfaith-
fulness to the employer's interest, or anything
which is contrary to a faithful and diligent
performance of the services for which he was
employed." Davies v. Mansbach, Ky. 338 S.W.2d
210, 211-12 (1960); see also Watkins v. Cochran,
292 Ky. 846, 168 S.W.2d 351 (1943); Robertson v.
Wolfe, 292 Ky. 846, 283 S.W. 428, 429 (1926).
Whether the termination was justified is a
question of fact. The burden is on the employer
to justify the termination of the contract.
Davies, 338 S.W.2d at 212.
2. Where the employment contract is "for cause," the
discharge of the employee will not be wrongful if
the discharge is precipitated by the elimination
of the employee's position due to legitimate
economic business reasons, and not as a bad faith
pretext to discharge the worker. Nork, 738 S.W.2d
at 827; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. ~ 145 Ky. 667,
141 S.W. 389, 393 (1911) (implied that employment
would continue only as long as the company was in
business at that location). Generally, legitimate
economic business reasons are found to exist where
the employee's job is eliminated as a general
reduction in staff due to deteriorating business
conditions. Malmstrom v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemi-
cal, 187 Cal. App. 3d 299, 2 IER Cases 180, 189
(1986); Burdette v. Mepco/Electra Inc., 2 IER
Cases 214,218 (U.S. D. Ct. Cal. 1987).
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While the language used in Nork is quite broad, it
should only be applied to a-"for cause" contract
and not a contract for a specified period of time.
Where a contract is for a term of years and the
employee was discharged when his position was
eliminated due to the merger of the employer with
another company, then damages for the remainder of
the contract period will be recoverable. Chipman
v. Turner, Day & Woolworth Mfg. Co., 32 Ky. L.R.
680, 106 S. W. 852 (1908).
DEFAMATION IN THE WORKPLACE
1. Four elements necessary for defamation:
a. defamatory language
b. about the plaintiff
c. which is published and
d. which causes injury to reputation
Columbia Sussex Corp., Inc. v. Hay, Ky. App.,
627 S.W.2d270, 273 (1981).
2. Privileged communications.
,..
,.
a.
b.
c.
Good fai th, without malice.
Not voluntarily made, but in answer to an
inquiry.
To protect publi sher' s own interest or in
performance of a duty to society.
Baskett v. Crossfield, 190 Ky. 751, 228 S.W.
673, 675 (1920); see also Conner v. Taylor,
233 Ky. 706, 26 S.W.2d 561, 562 (1930); Baker
v. Clarke, 186 Ky. 816, 218 S.W. 280, 285
(1920).
i
..
t
3. Intra-corporate communications necessary to proper
functioning of company are privileged. Dossett v.
New York Mining & Manufacturing Co., Ky. , 451
S.W.2d 843, 846 (1970); see also Caslin v. General
Electric Co., Ky. App. , 608 S. W. 2d 69 ( 1980),
Restatement (Second) Torts §§594-596.
Intra-corporate defamation is possible. Brewer v.
American National Insurance Co., 636 F.2d 150, 154
(6th Cir. 1980) (extrapolating Kentucky law). The
C-7
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privilege can be abused by excessive publication.
Benassi v. Georgia-Pacific, 62 Or. App. 698, 662
P.2d 760, 764 (1983) (publication to 120 lower
level employees found not privileged).
4. The existence of a qualified privilege is to be
decided by the court. Baker, 218 S. W. at 285.
Common law malice will operate to destroy the
qualified privilege. Holdaway Drugs, Inc. v.
Braden, Ky., 582 S.W.2d 646, 650 (1979); Shah, 655
S.W.2d at 492-93. --
5. Some jurisdictions have begun to recognize what
has been called the doctrine of compelled self-
publication. Where an employee is compelled to
repeat the reason given for his discharge by a
former employer in a reasonably forseeable manner,
~' to a prospective employer, then the pUblica-
tion of the statement is attributed to the former
employer for purposes of determining whether there
has been defamation. Lewis v. Equitable Life
Assurance Society of the United States, 389 N.W.2d
876 (Minn. 1986).
PREEMPTION.
1. When the resolution of a state-law claim is
substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms
of a collective bargaining agreement, that claim
must either be treated as a §301 claim or dis-
missed as preempted by federal labor-contract law.
Allis-Chalmers Corporation v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202,
105 S.Ct. 1904, 85 L.Ed.2d 206 (1985); Michigan
Mutual Insurance Co. v. United Steelworkers of
America, 774 F.2d 104 (6th Cir. 1985). If the
claim is a §301 claim then the six month statute
of limitations of DelCostello v. International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 103 S.Ct.
2281, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983), will apply.
2. Even if it is not clear whether federal law
preempts a state law claim, if the federal law
provides a remedy to the aggrieved employee, then
the field will be deemed preempted under Grzyb by
the Kentucky courts. Harvey v. ITW, Inc., 2 IER
Cases 597, 599 (W.O. Ky. 1987) (employee's claim
that he was discharged to prevent his pension
rights from fully vesting dismissed since ERISA
provided a remedy); see Section D.2 infra.
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PENDANT JURISDICTION. If state law claims predominate
or cause jury confusion they should be dismissed.
United Mineworkers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715,
86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966); see also Pascoe
v. Hoyle Lowdermilk, Inc., 614 F. Supp. 546, 548 (D.
Colo. 1985); Shirley v. Brown &. Williamson Tobacco
Co., 608 F. Supp. 78, 80 (E.D. Tenn. 1984); Marquez
Velez v. David M. Puerto Rico Graphic Supplies, Inc.,
622 F. SuPP. 568, 571-72 (D.P.R. 1985).
SUMMARY JUDGMENT. Standards revitalized in Matsushita
Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
475 U.S. 574, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986);
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548,
91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986),
recognized and applied by the Kentucky Court of Appeals
in Nork, 738 S.W.2d at 827.
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EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION PROCEEDINGS
BEFORE STATE AND LOCAL HUMAN RIGHTS
COMMISSIONS IN KENTUCKY
Carl B. Boyd, Jr.
SHEFFER, HOFFMAN, NEEL, WILSON & THOMASON
Chapter 344 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes provides
for the establishment of the Kentucky Commission on
Human Rights (KCHR), for its powers, scope and
procedure, and authorizes the establ ishment of local
commissions. The basic constitutionality of the
statutory scheme was upheld in Whispering Hills Country
Club, Inc. v. Kentucky Commission on Human Rights, Ky.,
475 S.W.2d 645 (1972).
Coverage - EmploYment.
1. What.
(a) KRS 344.040 directly mirrors Federal Law,
combining the provisions of 42 USC 2000e-
2 (a) with the age provisions found in the
ADEA (Kentucky's law still states the age
coverage as "between 40 and 70").
r
r
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(b) The Kentucky Act in KRS 344.100 includes the
exemption for acts pursuant to a "bona fide
seniority or merit system" and bona fide
ability test found in 42 USC 2000e-2(h) and
(in KRS 344.110) includes the provision in 42
USC 2000e-2(j) disavowing any requirement
that preferential treatment be granted
because of racial, etc. imbalance between
percentages employed and the percentage in
the popUlation.
Who.
(a) The act is limited to "individuals", and a
class action may not be brought under the
act, at least not before the Commission.
pyro Mining Company v. Kentucky Commission on
Human Rights, Ky., 678 S.W.2d 393 (1984).
(b) "Employer" is defined as a person who has
eight or more employees in each of 20
calendar weeks in the instant or preceding
year. KRS 344.030. There are a few
religious organizations or bona fide
D-l
3 . When.
(a) Complaints must be filed within 180 days
after the discriminatory practice occurred.
KRS 344.200(1). This compares to 300 days
for Title VII and 90 days with the Louisville
and Jefferson County Commission.
C. The Agency.
D.
occupational qualification (BFOQ) exemptions.
KRS 344.090 (See section 2000e-2(e».
1. The governor appoints 11 members for staggered
three year terms. KRS 344.150. The membership is
supposed to be bipartisan and broadly
representative of business, union and civil rights
groups. KRS 344.160.
2. Powers.
KRS 344.180 and .190 set forth various "powers and
duties, " but the essential powers concern the
enforcement of Chapter 344. The agency is given
investigatory and subpoena powers in KRS 344.250
and .260.
Agency Interrelationships.
1. KCHR/EEOC.
KCHR is a "deferral agency" under which the agency
is offered but is not required to accept-
Kentucky complaints (outside of Jefferson and
Fayette Counties) filed with the EEOC. Roughly
one-half of EEOC complaints from Jefferson County
are deferred to the KCHR.
2. Local Agencies/EEOC.
EEOC defers roughly half of Jefferson County
complaints to the Louisville/Jefferson County
Human Rights Commission (L/JHRC) and all Fayette
county complaints to the Lexington-Fayette County
Urban Human Rights Commission (L-FHRC).
3. Local Agencies/KCHR.
While there is cooperation between the KCHR and
the local agencies, the KCHR will not necessarily
defer or refer cases to the local agency as
opposed to handling them itself.
D-2
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
II. Kentucky Commission on Human Rights Procedure.,..
,
IlIIII,
...
A. Initial steps.
1. Intake.
The Commission initially classifies all potential
complaints as inquiries, conducting an initial
screening before accepting complaints. Only
approximately 10% of "inquiries" become formal
complaints.
,.
2.
3.
Complaints.
Complaints must be sworn and are
Commission on the respondent.
Present Commission practice is
complaints personally.
Investigation.
served by the
KRS 344.200.
to serve ·the
r
(a)
(b)
r
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The KCHR investigation staff includes both
attorney/investigators and non-attorneys.
Information requests normally are made
shortly after the service of a complaint,
usually seeking the complainant's personnel
file, an employee roster, and documents
relevant to the particular charge. The
request letter also normally invites
respondent to set forth a response or a
"position" on the charge.
The Commission has "discovery powers"
applicable during the predetermination
period, KRS 344.250(1) and .260, but these
are sparingly used at this stage. The
Commission investigator will, on occasion,
request the opportunity to conduct an on-site
interview with company personnel and may ask
to look at certain documents at that point.
(d) There is no statutory or regulatory
prohibition against a pre-determination
settlement on a no-fault basis.
Initial Determination.
The statute KRS 344.200(2» requires a
determination of "probable cause" or dismissal
within thirty days of filing, but in reality this
D-3
B.
will not be done • Waivers mayor may not be
drafted, but no court is likely to hold a
complaint invalid because of the KCHR's failure in
this regard. See Kentucky Commission on Human
Rights v. International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers. Local 1102, Ky., 578 S.W.2d 247. (1979)
The Determination.
1. Dismissal.
If the investigation finds no probable cause for
believing discrimination has occurred, a dismissal
will be issued. In recent years, a majority of
the complaints filed with the KCHR have been so
dismissed. The claimant may seek reconsideration
within ten days (KRS 344.200(3» or seek, within
thirty days, jUdicial review by a circuit court
under KRS 344.240(1).
2. Probable Cause.
If probable cause is found, the respondent will
receive a detailed letter setting forth the
investigator's finding and the legal conclusions
based on these findings.
3. Conciliation.
The Commission is required by KRS 344.200(4) to
attempt to reach a conciliation agreement
eliminating the practice and providing relief for
the claimant. The great majority of the
complaints reaching the "probable cause stage" are
conciliated before a hearing is held. (See the
attached table.)
4. Setting of a Public Hearing.
(a) If conciliation efforts fail or are
protracted a hearing date will be set
(supposedly within 60 days of filing - KRS
344.200(1)-but much later, in reality).
Notice of the hearing, with an attached copy
of the complaint, will be served on
respondent, opening a more "formal" stage of
proceedings.
(b) An answer to the complaint must be filed, by
certified mail, no later than twenty days
before the hearing date. KRS 344.210(3).
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Beware of the "five days" stated in 104 KAR
1:020 section 6(1).
(c) Conciliation efforts may proceed during the
pre-hearing period, with the Commission being
generally receptive to continuing a hearing
date where a possibility of settlement
exists.
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(d) Discovery.
(1) KRS 344.260 and 104 KAR 1:020 section 8
provide for discovery by either party.
Either party may take depositions or
secure subpoenas. Only the Commission
is explicitly given the power to order
the answering of interrogatories, but
the general deference to the Kentucky
Rules of civil Procedure would suggest
that respondents may pose
interrogatories as well, and Commission
practice has been consistent with this
interpretation.
(2) The Commission must look to the Circuit
Court where the party to whom a subpoena
is addressed resides for enforcement.
KRS 344. 260 (3) •
Hearings.
r
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KCHR hearings are conducted at area locations by a
panel normally consisting of three commission
members, with the presiding member always being
one of the Commission's attorney members
(presently five members are attorneys).
Hearing Procedure.
(a ) Procedures are set forth in KRS 344. 210 and
(more specifically) in 104 KAR 1:020, Section
7. This is the only de novo "trial" on the
merits granted the parties. The record from
the hearing, with briefs and proposed
findings of fact and conclusions of law are
submitted to the full commission for a
decision.
(b) Evidence.
r The administrative standard of "the type
, normally relied on by reasonably prudent men
D-5..
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in the conduct of their affairs" is applied
to questions concerning admissibility of
evidence rather than the strict rules of
evidence being applied. 104 KAR 1:020
Section 7(4) (b).
(c) The Commission staff attorney presents the
case in support of the complaint, with the
investigator normally appearing as a witness.
Partly for this reason, it is normal practice
when an investigator/attorney has worked a
case during the predetermination stage, for
that attorney to be replaced by another
attorney for the presentation of the case.
The respondent may fully participate in
calling and cross-examining witnesses if. an
answer has been timely filed or a default has
been excused for good cause. KRS 344.210(5).
Remedies.
1. The Commission is given broad remedial powers in
KRS 344.230(2) and (3).
(a) Remedial powers available include injunctive
relief and affirmative action including
hiring, reinstatement and back pay. KRS
344.330(3)(a) (based upon 42 USC 2000E-
5(g». How far "back" backpay awards may go
is presently under consideration by the
Kentucky Supreme Court in City of Owensboro
v. Kentucky Commission on Human Rights, 34
K. L. S. 3 at 12 (Court of Appeals Opinion
rendered February 27, 1987).
(b) In addition, the Commission has the unique
grant of power in KRS 344.230(3)(h), allowing
compensation for embarrassment and
humiliation ("E & H"), which is not a
recognized element of damages under Title
VII. The constitutionality of the granting
of E & H damages without a jury was upheld in
Kentucky Commission on Human Rights v.
Fraser, Ky. 625 S.W.2d 852 (1981). The Court
there held that "there must be evidence of
actual humiliation and embarrassment," and
that evidence of discrimination alone is not
enough to justify an award for E&H. Id. at
856.
(c) Quotas.
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While the imposition of a "quota" remedy was
approved in Middlesboro Housing Authority v.
Kentucky Commission on Human Rights, Ky.
App., 553 S.W.2d 57 (1977), it is
problematical whether such a remedy would be
granted in an employment context. The
Commission's present view is apparently that
"race conscious remedies" are permitted by
the recent decisions in Local Number 93,
International Association of Firefighters,
AFL-CIO v. city of Cleveland, 92 LEd.2d 405
(1986) and Local 28 of the Sheet Metal
Workers' International Association v. Equal
Employment opportunity Commission, 92 LEd.2d
344 (1986).
(d) Size of Awards.
The small number of cases in which Commission
orders are issued following a pUblic hearing
means that very few awards are available in
the published opinions for comparison
purposes. Because the Commission does insist
on the right to pUblicize conciliation
agreements, the press releases issued by the
Commission provide some idea of potential
awards or settlements. Recent Commission
releases concerning employment cases show the
following:
commission Order
Sexual Harassment (3 employees of one
employer),.
,.
\
(a)
(b)
(c)
lost wages
lost wages
lost wages
$ 800
$1,600
$1,340
E&H $15,000
E&H $ 9,000
E&H $ 6,000
Conciliation Settlementsr
r
(
r
,.
,
l
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
Sex discrimination
Age discrimination
Race discrimination
Religious discrimination
Sex discrimination
Race discrimination
Sex discrimination
(10 bank employees)
Race discrimination
Age discrimination
Sex discrimination
D-7
$15,000
$ 6,000
$ 5,000
$ 1,800
$ 4,250
$ 2,000
$20,000 total
reinstatement
$ 1,500
$ 3,750
D-8
(f) Judicial Review.
Exclusiveness of Remedy.
(2) The Circuit Court proceeding is not a de
novo action, as the statute (KRS
344.240(2» provides that:
J
J
j
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
$ 1,500(11) Sex discrimination
(3) Further appeal is to the Court of
Appeals in the fashion prescribed by the
Rules of Civil Procedure. KRS
344.240(5).
The findings of fact of the
commission shall be conclusive
unless clearly erroneous in view of
the probative and substantial
evidence on the whole record.
(1) KRS 344.240 provides for review of
Commission orders, including a
dismissal, by the Circuit Court in which
the event occurred or where the
respondent resides. The complaint
appealing a Commission order must be
filed within thirty days after the
Commission order is received. KRS
344.240(6).
(e) Publicity.
The statute explicitly provides that the
COll\11lission may pUblish the names of persons
who have been determined to have been engaged
in an unlawful practice, KRS 344.230(4) and
the Commission staff insists that
conciliation agreements may not include any
provision concerning the confidentiality of
the agreement reached. The Commission issues
pUblicity releases to the news media in the
state, and a party settling should expect to
find an account of the settlement agreement
appeared in the local newspaper, at least in
smaller communities.
1. Independent Court Action.
(a) KRS 344.450 creates a civil cause of action
in Circuit Court for injunctive relief or to
recover the "actual damages sustained." The
E.
,.
!
r-
!
r
,.
r
r
r
[
statute also provides for a reasonable
attorney's fee.
(b) The statute of limitations for these actions
is probably five years, C1 i fton v. Midway
College, Ky., 702 S.W.2d 835 (1985), but City
of Owensboro v. Kentucky commission on Human
Rights, 34 K.L.S. 3 at 12, in which the Court
of Appeals held that the statute of
limitations was one year, is presently before
the Supreme Court on discretionary review.
2. Abstention.
(a) The statute - KRS 344.270 - prohibits the
Commission or Circuit Court from taking
jurisdiction while a claim is pending before
the other. It further provides that "a final
determination" by a Court or the Commission
of a claim alleging an unlawful practice
under KRS 344.450 shall exclude any other
action by the same person on the same
grievance.
(b) While a Kentucky court action may not ban an
EEOC claim, an EEOC claim prevents the filing
of a Kentucky court action under KRS 344.450
while the claim is before the federal body.
After a "right-to-sue" letter is received, a
claimant may proceed in federal or state
court. McNeal v. Armour & Co., Ky. App., 660
S.W.2d 957, 958 (1983).
(c) 11 the KCHR makes a determination on a claim
deferred to it by EEOC, then KRS 344.270
prevents any original court action in the
Kentucky Court. There must be an actual
order by the Commission to preclude the court
action or to activate the thirty day limit on
appeal time found in KRS 344.240(6).
Canamore v. Tube Turns Division of Chemetron
Corp., Ky. App. 676 S.W.2d 800 (1984).
r-
t
!
r-
f
3 • Remedies in Court Actions.
(a) The Western District of Kentucky, in dealing
with a pendent state claim under Chapter 344,
has ruled that "E & H" damages are delegated
solely to the KCHR by the statute and may not
be awarded by a circuit court (and therefore
may not be awarded on a pendent state claim
D-9
by a federal court). Ellis v. Logan Co., 543
F.Supp. 586 (W.O.Ky. 1982); Berry v. General
Electric Co., 541 F.Supp. 800 (W.O.Ky. 1982).
(b) There have been no Kentucky appellate
decisions on whether the phrase "actual
damages" used in KRS 344.450 includes liE & H"
damages.
III. Local Agencies.
A. Louisville/Jefferson County Human Rights Commission.
1. Local commissions are authorized by KRS 344.300-
.350. Louisville (by ordinance) and Jefferson
County (by resolution) have created a joint
commission (L/JHRC).
2. Coverage.
(a) Both the Louisville and Jefferson County Acts
include a prohibition against discrimination
on the basis of handicap (not included in the
Kentucky statute) but the Louisville
Ordinance does not mention age and the
Jefferson County Resolution uses 40-65 as the
covered range.
(b) Only two employees in any four calendar weeks
in the instant or preceding year are required
for coverage.
(c) Neither enabling act mentions E&H damages as
an affirmative action open to the Commission,
(Ordinance 116/139, section Five(H);
Resolution 15, Section Six(O). Such damages
are awarded, however, by the Commission. e.g.
Mason and Colemen v. Wing Construction Co.
(Public Hearing November 12, 1985).
(d) The complaint brought directly to the L/J
Commission must be brought within 90 days
(section Six(A) of both acts) but this would
not affect a deferred complaint.
3 . The Agency.
(a) There are 21 members appointed by the Mayor
and the County JUdge of, which five members
sit on a "Fair Employment Division" with five
additional appointees. This Division is a
key part in the enforcement process in the
D-10
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J
J
J
J
J
J
J
j
J
J
J
J
r
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r
r
r
r
r
r
r
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Jefferson County scheme.
(b) The Agency has investigatory powers and the
power to request access to records and
premises, with the Jefferson Circuit Court
looked to for compliance orders. KRS
344.320.
4 . Procedure.
(a) There are separate Rules of Procedure adopted
for matters brought under the Louisville
Ordinance and under the County Resolution.
The rules are almost identical, except that
the County Rules contain two rules (9 and 10)
related to "defaults", and provide that:
Default as used in these rules means
[b) any act, counsel, deliberate
omission, communication, signal, or
the like, direct or indirect, made
or done by a respondent or any of
his agents or attorneys on his
behalf, which
(1) induces or helps to induce a person
other than the respondent to
refrain from testifying before the
Commission, to refrain from
discussing the matter with the
Commission staff, to frustrate
adjustments, or to misrepresent any
fact to the Commission; or
(2) frustrates or attempts to frustrate
adjustments, or cause the
misrepresentation of a fact to the
Commission.
The resultant default allows the Panel to
reach findings without resorting to
testimony, and these findings "need only
recite that the averments of the complaint
are true because of the default." (County
Rule 11).
(b) A three member panel from the Fair Employment
Division makes an initial determination,
supposedly within 21 days after receiving a
complaint. If the complaint is neither
dismissed or conciliated, a hearing date is
D-ll
3 . The Agency.
(2) Further appeal from a Commission order
is to Jefferson Circuit Court in the
manner provided by KRS 344.240.
Lexington - Fayette County Urban County Human Rights
Commission.
2. Coverage.
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J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
J
I
J
J
J
J
J
j
Government by
the Lexington-
Commission (L-
set and a formal complaint served, which must
be answered to avoid a presumption of guilt.
Hearings are conducted before another three
member Panel of the Fair Employment Division,
at least one of whom shall be a Commissioner.
The case for the complainant is presented by
a member of the City Law Department or the
County Attorney's office.
(1) Initial appeals from the Panel decision
may be made within ten days to the whole
Commission. The Commission may affirm
the Panel decision or may conduct a
hearing limited to evidence before the
original panel.
(c) Hearings.
Lexington/Fayette Urban County
ordinance No. 190-83 established
Fayette Urban County Human Rights
FHRC).
(d) Appeal.
section 2-31 of the ordinance adopts most
provisions of KRS Chapter 344 as they were in
effect on October 6, 1983. Because of this
adoption, the coverage is essentially that of the
state (See I B above):
(b) Individuals and not classes;
(a) Discrimination based on race, age (40-70),
religion or sex;
(d) 180 day filing period.
(c) Employers with eight or more employees.
1.
B.
r
r,
r
r
,.
l
r
..
I
r
r,
r
r
r
t
r
r
r
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(a) Fourteen members who are supposed to be
representative of the "social, economic,
cultural, ethnic and racial groups" making up
the population of Fayette County.
(b) staff of the agency consists of five
investigators and one attorney.
(c) The agency has the investigatory powers
granted by KRS 344.320 (1) (2) which include
the power to subpoena witnesses and documents
via the Fayette Circuit Court.
(d) In Fiscal year 1986-87 the Commission
received 252 charges of which 233 involved
employment.
Procedure.
(a) The rules of Practice and Procedure adopted
by the L-FHRC parallel and in some places
copy the regulations in 104 KAR 1:020 adopted
for the KCHR. A major difference is that
there is no equivalent of Section 8 of the
KCHR regulations which provide for discovery.
The L-FHRC rules therefore appear to limit
the power of discovery to subpoena powers of
the Commission.
(b) section 2.040 of the L-F procedural rules
allow predetermination resolutions which, if
approved by the Commission Director, would
lead to a withdrawal of the Complaint. The
agreement is enforceable as a contract
between the parties and not by the
Commission.
(c) In the event of a "no cause" determination,
Section 2.050 provides for a twenty day
period during which the complainant may seek
reconsideration under section 2.060.
(d) In the event of a probable cause
determination, the procedural regulations
provide in section 2.080 for attempts to be
made at conciliation.
(e) After the determination of probable cause,
the respondent must file an answer to the
complaint at any time not later than ten days
before the date set for hearing.
D-13
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(f) Hearings.
(1) In the event conciliation efforts fail,
a pUblic hearing is set for a date not
later than sixty days after the Notice
of Failure of Conciliation.
(2) Section 2.091 provides that a prehearing
conference may be held for the
simplification of issues, for making of
stipulations, for identifying witnesses,
etc.
(3) Hearings are held before one or more
appointed hearing commissioners, with
the commission attorney representing the
complainant • The respondent, if he has
answered, is entitled to put on and
cross-examine witnesses. Section 2.110
4 d uses the "commonly relied upon by
the reasonably prudent person in the
conduct of daily business" standard of
evidence.
(4) The hearing commissioner may receive
proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law from the parties, and
submits a report to the commission with
recommended findings of fact and
conclusions of law. The parties have
ten days in which to file objections to
this report with the Commission issuing
a final order adopting the hearing
commissioner's report or making its own
findings of fact and conclusions of law.
(g) section 2.130 of the Rules of Practice and
Procedure provides for appeal via KRS 344.240
and .340. As with the KCHR, this means that
the Commission's Findings of Fact are
"conclusive unless clearly erroneous in view
of the probative and substantial evidence on
the whole record."
Remedies.
The L-FHRC incorporates KRS 344.230 and therefore
grants E & H damages along with other affirmative
remedies. In fiscal year 1986-87 the eleven
public hearings held by the Commission resulted in
total benefits being granted of $236,000. Two of
the hearings resulted in benefits to claimants in
D-14
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excess of $50,000.
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EMPLOYMENT COMPLAINTS
KENTUCKY COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
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81 122 94
14 16 10
1 4 4
229 163 133
350 326 274
1246 1214 1250
227 128 129
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39 18
5 6
167 211 174
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ALL COMPLAINTS
D-16
1984-1985
Employment
Housing
Public Accomodation
Dismissed
Conciliated
withdrawn
Pending
Public hearing
New Complaints Filed
Inquiries
Cases Closed
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NO ADVERSE ACTION
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Process
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ORDER OF
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FINDING
DISCRIMINATION
FINDINGS
ORDER TO CEASE
AND DESIST
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
AGREEMENT
DAMAGE AWARD
APPEAL COMMITTEE
CIRCUIT COURT
REVIEW
LOUISVILLE/JEFFERSON COUNTY
HRC
Complaint
History
TOTAL COMPLAINTS
NO PROBABLE CAUSE
PROBABLE CAUSE/SETTLEMENTS
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82
61
179 TOTAL COMPLAINTS
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A.
B.
C.
D.
The passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act along with the adoption
of the Equal Pay Act in 1963 signaled the beginning of a dramatic
change fl-om "industrial self-gclvernment" tCI the depl-ivatization
of labor relations. Today, employment relations are heavily
l-egulated by public law. See, HCll-Cllo>Jitz, "The Depl-ivativazation
cd· Labclr Relaticlns Law," 49 Lalo'J and CC.l·-ltempl;.l-cH-Y Pl-c.blems 1
( 1986) .
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was the first comprehensive federal
legislation to address the multifaceted problem of race
discrimination in this country. As originally introduced, Title
VII was intended to remedy the practices and effects of only race
discrimination in employment.
Sex, as a protected classification, was added by an amendment
frc,m the floor of the House of Representatives. However, since
the adoption of Title VII, more complaints alleging gender
discrimination in employment have been filed with the EEOC [Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission], the federal agency charged
with enforcing Title VII, than have complaints alleging race
discrimination in employment.
It is worth remembering that the 1964 Civil Rights Act was
intended to be a grand remedial act to resolve the national
disgrace of pervasive race discrimination in every part of our
society. Hyper-technical interpretations of the statute defeat
the accomplishment of that purpose. See, Chambers and Goldstein,
"Title VII: The Continuing Challenge clf Establishing Fair
E-l
II. DEFINING DISCRIMINATIO~
J
J
A. Statutory Definition of Employer Discrimination J
unlawful for an employer:
1. Sectic,n 703(a) clf Title VII provides that it shall be an J
"tc. f"ail clr refuse to hire or tCI dischal-ce any individual,
to discriminate against any individual with
l-espect to his cc.mpensation, terms,
privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
I
.J
to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants
f"C.l- emp loyment in any way which would deprive or tend to
adversely affectotherwise
any individual employment
his status
opportunities or
as an employee~
2.
because of such individual's race~ color~ religion~ se>:, or
national origin."
It would be difficult to conceive of a broader definition of j
discrimination.
B. Sexual Harassment
J
1. Is sexual harassment employment discrimination?
j
.J
In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vi nsc.n, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 91 J
sexual harassment may constitute
L.Ed.2d 49 (1986) the United States Supreme Court held that
impermissible employment J
discrimination as defined in Section 703 (a)(2) of Title VII
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
E-2 j
r,
,..
r, 2. What constitutes impermissible sexual harassment?
r a. EEOC Guidelines [29 C.F.R. §1604.11.J state:
(2) submission to
an individual's
rejection of such
eff'
harassment when (1)
requests for sexual
is made either explicitly or
se>:ual
advances,
term or conditiona
and other verbal
nature constitute
"Unwelcome sexual
implicitly
employment,
se>:ual
submission to such conduct
r
r
r
employment decisions affecting such individual, or (3)
such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably
creating an intimidating~
individual's work performance or
or offensive work
is used as the basis forindividual
interfering with an
ce.nduc t by an
r
{
r
environment."
b. Hostile Work Environment
recognized that in addition to the quid pro quo type of
,. In the case~ 475 U.S. 1043~
se>:ual hal-assment the hostile work environment type
also may violate Title VII even though there are no
direct adverse economic consequences to the employee.
,.. See~ a I SCI C. Se>:ual Hal-assmel-!..t cli: Wel',-king
,.
f c.
Women (1979).
Unwelcome Advances
If the se>:ual advances are welcomed~ a claim of sex
r
discrimination is defeated.
In the Meritor case~ 475 U.S. 1043~ the plaintiff had
acquiesced
e.ccasions.
in the supervisor's advances on a number of
The Court, however~ rejected the idea that
voluntary acquiescence always defeats the plaintiff's
E-3
The issue~ it held~ was not voluntariness~ butclaim.
whether the sexual advances were unwelcomed. The CClurt
J
J
d.
acknowledged the difficulty of proof on the issue of
"unwelcomeness." It concluded that evidence clf the
plaintiff's sexually provocative speech and dress was
relevant to the issue of unwelcomeness.
Favorable treatment
.~..
j
opportunities or
EEOC guidelines pl-clvide
benef"its
that: "where emp lClyment
are granted because of an J
individual's submission to the employer's requests for
sexual the employer may be held liable for J
unlawful sex discrimination against other persons who
were qualified but denied that employment J
The developing case la....1 is i ncclnsistent. Compc\l-e ~
e. g. ~ King v. Palmer~ 778 F.2d 878 (D.C.Cil- • 1985) ~
reh'g en banc denied~ 782 F.2d 274 (D.C.Cil- • 1986)
(pl-clmel t i cln of one female nUI-se whcl was se>(Llall y
involved with the supel-v i SCtl- ovel- anclthel- bettel-
qualified female nurse whcl was nClt se>:ua 11 y involved
J
J
with the supervisor was a violation of Title VII) and J
DeCintio v. Westchester County Medical Center~ 807 F.2d
304 (2dCir.
l-esp i ratory
1986) (hiring of a female assistant chief of
therapy who was registered with the
j
unregistered male respiratory therapist was not a
violation of Title VII even though the registration
requirement was
National Board of Respiratory Therapists instead of an
initiated so as to secure the position
J
J
for the employer's woman friend).
3. When is an employer responsible for the sexual harassment of
an employee by others?
E-4
j
J
j
,.
f
r
r a. Supervisory employees
The Supreme Court did not resolve this question in
Court agreed with the EEOC position that Congress
intended traditional agency principles to guide the
r
,..
t
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vi nscln ~ supra. although the
in determining
the Court stated
emp lc.yel-
that employers were not
automatically liable for sexual harassment by their
supervisors. There must be an examination of all of
relationship.
,.
I
f
the c i l-cumstances the pal-ticular employment
absence of notice to the employer nor an employee's
failure to exhaust grievance procedures automatically
insulates the employer from liability.
,.
f
Nonetheless~ the Court did hold that neither the
~clope!l- TI-anSp., 597 F.Supp. 537 (!"I.D.Ala. 1983)~ aff'd.
749 F.2d 732 (11th Cir. 1984).
Harassment by a same-sex supervisor is actionable if
the acts complained of would be actionable if committed
r
r
r
by an opposite-sex supervisor. See~ JClynel'- v. AAA
,..
I
b. Non-supervisory employees [co-workers]
Emplc.yers who have actual kne.wledge e.f se>:ual
harassment by co-workers and who fail to take remedial
action have been found liable under Title VII. See~
an employer who takes prompt remedial action
e • g . ~ Ka:...:t~::=-·_~v...:.:..-....:::D:..::c"-'tl:..::e::.. ~
calculated to end the harassment by a,. Whereas~reasonably
709 F.@d 251 (4th Cil-. 1983).
co-worker has been held not to be liable under Title
VII. See, e.g., Barret v. Omaha National Bank, 726
F.2d 424 (8th Cir. 1984).
E-S
EEOC guideline pi-ovide: "With respect tCI cc......duct
between fellow employees~ an employer is responsible
for acts of sexual harassment in the workplace where
the employer (or its agents or supervisory employees)
knows or should have known of the conduct~ unless it
can show that it took immediate and appropriate
.~
j
j
J
J
j
corrective action. C.F.R. 1604.11(d).
neither an employer nor an agent of the employer. See~
e.g.~ Guyette v. Stauffer Chemical Co~~ 538 F.Supp. 857
(N.D. Ohio 1982). However~ the co-worker may be liable
to the victim in tort or under some other state law
A
VI I
nonsupe·,-vi SOI-y
fClr his acts
is not liable under Title
of sexual harassment because he is j
J
J
c.
EEOC guidelines prc,vide that: ItAn employer may also be
responsible for the acts of nonemployees~ with respect
to sexual harassment of employees in the workplace~
where the employer (or its agents or supervisory
employees) knows or should have known of the conduct
and fails to take immediate and appropriate corrective
action. In reviewing these cases the Commission will
consider the extent of the employer's control and any
other legal responsibility which the employer may have
with respect to the conduct clf such nc.n-emplc,yees." 29
C.F.R. 1604.11(e).
This position is consistent with the Supreme Court's
decision in MeritQr Savings Bank v. Vinson~ 475 U.S.
1043~ imposing liability on employers for hostile work
environment type of sexual harassment. It should not
matter if the hostile work environment is created by an
employee or non-employee if the employer is or should
E-6
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j
J
J
J
J
j
r
r
r
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be aware of the conditions, has the power to correct
the conditions, and does not do so.
Pregnancy and Pregnancy Related Issues
,.
C.
1. Pregnancy Discrimination Generally
General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S.
i
!
a. In
401 (1976) the Supreme Court held
125,
that
97 S.Ct.
that nCt
r
I
sex-based discrimination could be found in an employer-
sponsored disability plan which did not provide any
"p1-egnancy-based c I assi fica t i clnsr
benefits
disabilities because
p1-egnancy related
are nClt in themsel ves se>:-based."
b. Congress thereafter passed the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act which amended definition of discrimination in Title
VI!. It reads in part as follows:
i "The terms "because clf se>:" 01- "on the bas i s of
se>:" include, but are not limited to, because of or on
the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
the same for all employment-related purposes,
or related medical be
by
conditions shall
affectedwClmenandcClnditions;
childbirth,r
r including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit
as other persons not so affected but similar
their ability or inability to work.
2076, amendingi
j
in
Law 95-555, 95th CClngress, 92 Stat.
" Public
section 701 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
2. Mandatory Maternity Leave,. a. General mandatory maternity leave of a specified
to work is
See, e.g. ,
a violation of Title VII as
Paxman v. Campbell, 612 F.2d 848
duration unrelated wClman's actualindividual
denied, 449 U.S. 1129 (1981).
thetCI
cert.
E-7
1980) ,
ability
amended.
(4th Ci1-.
,..,
,.
It is also unlawful under the due process clause of the
Amendment. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. \l.
J
J
J
(1974) •
414 u.s. 632, 94 S.Ct. 791, 39 L.Ed. 2d 52
J
in b-.E~r:"!.9..lev v. State Farm Fil'-e t: Cas. Co., 64 f+However,b.
F.2d 1124 (5th C i"!- • 1981) the court upheld the
J
emp 1c.yer' s
employees
maternity leave pcd icies
pl-egnancies
of" requi"!-ing its
immediately upon
j
.J
3.
to discontinue work on the date suggested by
the employees' personal physician and to return to work
within 60 days following delivery if certified by their
physician as capable to do so.
Maternity Benefits
J
J
a. Employer-provided disability plan
The PDA requires that pregnancy must be treated as the
employer treats any other temporary disability for
benefits.
sick leave or temporary disability
J
Supreme Court said that the PDA made it unlawful under
Title VII for an employer to provide less medical
462 U.S. 669, 103 S.Ct. 2622, 77 L.Ed.2d 89 (1983) the
J
for pregnancy than for a female employee's
coverage fClr
hClsp i ta I i zed
a male employee's spouse who was
J
b.
spouse who was hospitalized for some other medical
reasCln.
No employer-provided disability plan
Failure to provided any disability leave for any
medical reasons is not a prima facie violation of Title
E-8
J
J
j
j
r
VII as it applies to a pregnant employee.
termination of an employee who is temporarily disabled
is available, such aleave
employment policy under which
nc,
anby
the EEOC guidelines provide that:
caused
insufficient
is
termination violates the Act if it has a disparate
impact on employees of one sex and is not justified byr
,..
I
,..
29 C.F.R. §1604.10(c).
r
business necessity.
I n Cal tff! r- "n }._iL-Eed . Sa\/. & Loan Ass"~ v. Guerr~, 107
S.Ct. 683 (1987) the Supreme Court held that the PDA
California could require by statute that employers
provide female employees with an unpaid pregnancy
withmonthstCIup
job the employee previously held
employers to give preferential
prohibit preferential treatment.
to pregnant employees, but Congress did not
not
intend tCI
dc.es
disability leave of
reinstatement to ther
r
,..,
r
unless the job was no longer available due to business
necessity.
4. Unemployment Benefits
a. In Turner v. Dep"t. of Emplovment Sec., 423 U.S. 44, 96
per curiam opinion invalidated a provision of Utah law
that made pregnant women ineligible for unemployment
benefits for a period extending from 12 weeks before
the expected date of childbirth until a date six weeks
aftel- bil-th.
249, 46 L.Ed.2d 181 (1975) the Supreme Court in a
,.
r b.
S.Ct.
In l-Jimberly
CClmm i ss i c,n clf"
v. Labol-
Missouri,
and Industrical Relations
107 S.Ct. 821, 93 L.Ed.2d 909
E-9
pregnancy to be treated like all other disabilities and
view that theadc.pted the
Act [FUTAJTa>:
the Supreme
Unemp lc.ymentFederal
(1987)
,..
f
J
I
!..
singled c.ut
the Cow-t
for unfavorable
upheld Missouri's
tl-ea tment • J
unemployment compensation benefits to a pregnant woman
who left work pursuant to the employer's "leave without
return to work~ the employer told her there
guarantee
wished tc.
of reinstatement" pcdicy. When the employee
no positions open.
unemployment benefits~
were
Missouri statute that
She filed a claim for
but was denied because of a
disqualifies any individual who
J
attributable tc, his wOI-k or to his emplc.yer."
"has left his work voluntarily without caLise j
C'
..J. Non-pregnancy BFOQ J
a. Although Title VII embodies a federal guarantee of' J
and other employment practicers that discriminate on
the basis of se>:~ the Act does contain an exception to
is called the BFOQ exception.
in employment by prohibiting hiringnondiscrimination
this general rule of nondiscrimination. Th i s e>:cep t i c...-,
J
J
b. "Nc.twi thstandi"'lg a-i1y provisic.ns this j
practice for an employer to hire and employ employees •
on the basis of his religion~ sex~ or national
in those certain instances where religion~ sex~origin
J
J
is a bona fide occupational
it shall not be an unlawful employment(1)
nationalor
subchapter~
qualification
operation of
reasonably necessal-y the nc.rmal J
42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(e).
J
c. There are now a number of cases in which the court has
to address the question of whether pregnancy or
J
J
e. g. :See~
is a
for a particulard isgual i ficat ic.n"
had
court results are inconsistent.
childbearing capacity
E-IO J
r
r
...
1
r
f
,.
!
r
,.
!
r
r
r
...
!
1
r,
,.
r
r
r
r
I
d.
CClndi.t v. United Ail- Li.nes. Inc.~ 12 E.P.D. pal-. 11,195
(E.D. Va. 1976)~ aff'd~ 558 F.2d 1176 (4th Cir. 1977):
upheld airline rule requiring female cabin attendants
to quit flying as soon as their pregnancy is known
because because they are responsible for the evacuation
of passengers during an emergency. The court said that
because it could be shown that pregnant cabin
attendants are more likely than non-pregnant cabin
attendants to have cramps~ nausea~ and dizziness and
that these disorders could affect the attendants
ability to perform her safety functions~ nonpregnancy
was a BFOQ for the position.
Cc,mpan?~ Ul·... ited Airlines. Inc. v. State HumaTI Rights
Bm?~.u.._Bd~.~ 402 N. Y. S . 2d 630 ~ 61 A. D• 2d 101 0 ~ U. S.
cert. denied (#78-414~ 27 Nov. 1978): the ability of
pregnant cabin attendants to erform airline safety
functions must be independently determined by a doctor.
Variations on the theme.
Chambel-s v. Omaha Gil-ls C~ub.~ 629 F.Supp. 925 (D.Neb .
1986), 56 L.Week 2339 (8th Cir. Dec. 3~ 1987): a girls
club that included pregnancy prevention programs among
its activities for girls between the ages of eight and
18 may lawfull y enfol-ce its " 1- c,le model l-ule" banni ng
single parent pregnancies among its staff members under
the BFOQ defense.
Hays v. She~Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir.
1984), rehr'g denied, 732 F.2d 944 (11th Cir. 1984): a
hospital violated Ttile VII by firing a pregnant x-ray
technician to protect her fetus from potentially
harmful radiation. PDA mandates that an employer treat
its workers equally when it seeks to protect their
E-11
J
offspring. No nonfertile female BFOQ. J
D. Affirmative Action Programs J
1. Voluntary Affirmative Action Plans - private employer
I
J
S.Ct. 2721, 61 L.Ed.2d 480 (1979) clearly establishes that
J
it is i"mt a violation of Title
adopt an affirmative
VII for an employer
action plan which
to
is
j
traditionally segregated
designed to elminate conspicuous racial
jc.b categctl-ies.
imbalance in
The Court reached this holding despite the provisions of J
Sectic.n 703( j) which states that:
this title shall be interpreted to require any employer. j
to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to
origin of such individual or group on account of annational
because of the race, color, religion, sex, or I
J
imbalance which may e>:ist with respect to the total number
or percentage of persons of any race, color, religion, sex, J
available work force
j
J
J
in
in the
in any community, State, section, or
sect ic.n,
religion, sex, or national origin in any
origin employed by any employer
State,
with the total number or percentage of persons of
or natic.nal
cc.mpar ison
SLICh race,
cc.mmunity,
compromise that racial imbalance of a work forcelegislative
held that §703(j) was merely a product of a
J
standing alone would not give rise to liability under Title
VII. It was not intended to proscribe voluntary affirmative J
Although Heber dealt with an affirmative action plan which
J
E-12 j
,..,
r
i
f
provided special on-the-job training for craft
minority employees, its logic would seem to apply equally to
voluntary affirmative action plans of private employers
minority employees.,..
i
which cClntained special provisions about lay-offs of
2. Voluntary Affirmative Action Plans - Public Employees
r
a. Hiring and Promotional Goals
S.Ct. 1442, 94 L.Ed.2d 615 (1987), the Supreme Court
held that a country did not violate Title VII when it
gender among other factors in promoting a
Court used Weber-type analysis and upheld the plan as a
step designed to elminate a manifest imbalance in a
traditionally segregated job category.
r
r
wc.man under a voluntary affirmative action plan. The
In an earlier decision in Wygant v. Jackson Board of
b. Protections Against Layoffs
Supreme Court held that a school board could not extend
tCI mi nccj- i ty
90 L.Ed.2d 260 (1986) the1842,
a collective bargaining
protection against layoffs
106 S.ct.Educaticln,
pl-efel-ential
emp I c.yees in
,...
t
,..
!
,.
i
i
Court-ordered Affirmative Action
,.
r
r
,.
I
3.
a.
plurality of the Court found that this layoff policy
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Hiring and Promotional Goals
In Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers International Asc.
,..
I
v. EEOC~ 106 S.Ct 3019,
1:.-13
92 L.Ed.2d 344 (1986) the
j
J
Supl-eme Court held that a court has the power under
Title VII to order a union which has been found guilty
of the widespread practice of race discrimination to
engage in race conscious affirmative action programs
which benefit nonvictims of the discrimination.
J
J
precludes a court from entering a consent degree
without a finding of discrimination which provides for
affirmative action in promotions that may benefit
individiduals who were not actual victims of the
defendant's discriminatory practices.
whether Section 706(j)
Int. Asc. of Firefighters v. Cleveland~
j
j
J
J
clf Title VII
(1986) involved the92 L.Ed.2d 4053063~
93.
of
106 S.Ct.
question
Section 706(j} provides that:
this title shall be interpreted to require any employer J
• to grant preferential treatment to any individual
or to any group because of the race, color~ religion,
se>:~ Dr national origin of such individual or group on
I
.J
account of an imbalance which may exist • II
J
The Court said that Section 706(j) does not bar a court
from entering such a consent decree because the section j
was not intended to be a limitation on the type of
relief the courts may granted~ but a limitation on what j
constitutes proof of discrimination.
In United States v. 107 S.Ct. 1053, 94 J
L.Ed.2d 203 (1987) the Supreme Court upheld a court
order which required the Alabama Department of Safety J
tCI award 50% of the prclmco t icons of state t\-clclpel-s tco
cCII-pclral tCI mi nOI- i ties until 25% of the rank was J
cClmposed of minc.rity troclpel-s. The COLIl-t held that the
requirement was permissible under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as it was justified
E-14
J
J
r
This has
frc.m the
nc.t; be an
tC'
1784 v. Stot~2~ 467
it shall
"Nc.twi thstand i ng any
minorities
the purpose or intent to
this was not a bona fide
81 L.Ed.2d 483 (1984) the
of
decree to protect minority
l)nic.n Nc•.
that
2576~
of compensation~
immune seniority systems and the
layoff unless there was a finding
this title~
that
tc.
e;·:c I us i Cll'
pj-c.vides that:
The demotions and layoff provisions of
clf
104 S.Ct.
standai-ds
and was narrowly tailored
employment practice for an employer to apply
the power under Title VII
conditions~ or privileges of employment pursuant
the seniority system under which the layoffs were
561 ~
position
purpose.
discriminatory
In fin:d~i.fl.hj::ers Lc.cal
lacked
mc.dification
positions during a
that
u.s.
by the compelling governmental interest in eradicating
E-15
the collective bargaining agreement took precedent over
the affirmative relief ordered by the court because
Supreme Court held that a court which entered a c6nsent
degree providing for certain minority hiring goals
d iscj- imi nate.
terms~
conducted was adopted with
been
to a bc.na fide senic.rity C,j- merit system."
there was no finding
seniority system.
unla\."JfuI
Sec tic. n 703 ( g )
other provision of
effects of seniority systems from attack under Title
VII unless the seniority system was adopted with the
intent to discriminate.
c. Protection Against Layoffs
Continuing Violations v. Continuing Effects of Past Violations
r
,.
!
,.
,..
r
,.
,.
\;
r
r
r
r
,.
~'
r
,...
filii
¥
I
r
r E .
,..
I
1885, 52 L.Ed.2d 571 (1977) the plaintiff had been
discharged because of an employer rule that female flight
attendants could not be married. The plaintiff did not
bring a timely action under Title VII for reinstatement. In
a lawsuit brought by other flight attendants United's
no-marriage rule was found to be violative of Title VII.
When the plaintiff was rehired by the defendant a number of
years later without seniority credit for the time she had
been employed prior to her termination, the plaintiff
brought suit alleging that the employer was guilty of a
continuing violation of Title VII by giving present effect
to its past discrimination.
1. In United Airlines. I ....IC. v. Evan~, 431 U.S. 553, 97 S.Ct.
J
J
J
.J
j
The Court rejected her argument because her termination
pLtl-Suant tel the "no-mal-l-iage" l-ule was an immediate and
complete violation which was subject to the 180-day
limitation rule for filing under Title VII. The past event
had no present legal significance because it is a
time-barred act of discrimination. Therefore, the seniority
system which gave present effect to a complete act of
discrimination no longer subject to timely Title VII charge
is immune from attack presently.
2. In
the
that
Bazemore v. Fridav, 106 S.Ct. 3006, 92 L.Ed.2d 315 (1986)
North Carolina Agricultural Extension Service argued
it had not violated Title VII when it paid Black
J
J
j
J
J
J
employees who worked for the service prior to the adoption
of Title VII less than white employees who worked for the
service prior to the adoption of Title VII. Prior to the
adoption of Title VII the extension service maintained an
all black and an all white branch. The employees in the
black branch were paid less than the employees in the white
branch. After the adoption of Title VII, the two branches
were merged. Thereafter, the service paid equal raises, but
they were added to the unequal base pay of black and white
E-16
J
J
J
J
j
r
emplc.yees
bl-anches.
in the previously segregated
r
,..
I
r
r
r
~,
r
The Supreme Court held that the Circuit Court had erred in
holding that under Title VII the Extension Service had no
duty to eradicate salary disparities between black and white
employees that had their origin prior to the date when Title
VII was made applicable to public employees. Discrimination
in pay is a continuing violation which reoccurs each time
the employer pays a black employee less than a similarly
situated white employee. It is not a single, complete act
of discrimination which is of no legal significance after it
is barred by failure to make a timely complaint. The two
year back pay period established in Title VII merely means
that Congress intended a cumulative recovery rule for
continuing violations subject to an absolute limit of two
years. See, C. Sullivan, M. Zimmer & R. Richards, Fe~eral
St-fltutf!..C{ Law clf" EIl}JUovmerl.t Discl-imil!ati,.f~!" §3.5, at 27t-J
( 1980) •
1. Preclusive Effect of Final State Court Decision
,..
I,
r
;
r,
r
a. In Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp., 456 U.S. 461
(1982) an employee filed a Title VII discrimination
charge with the EEOC. The EEOC referred the case to
the New York State Division of Human Rights, the agency
charged with administering the State's employment
discrimination laws. The state agency rejected the
employees discrimination claim, a judgment that was
affirmed bath at the agency appellate level and by a
reviewing state court. The employee then brought a
E-17
b.
J
J
Title VII acation in which the employer raised a res
judicata defense.
The Supreme Court held that the state court's judgment
affil-ming the state agency's finding
2.
discrimination was entitled to preclusive effect in the
employee's Title VII action.
Preclusive Effect of an Unreviewed State Administrative
Detel-m i nat i cln
o'f Tenn~sse~..Jllic.tt ~ 106 S. Ct. 3220 ~a. In
92 L.Ed.2d 635 (1986) a black employee of the j
administrative appeal under state law and a federal
suit alleging that the charges were racially motivated
in violation of Title VII and other civil rights
misconduct and
university,
statutes.
prclceed i ngs
informed that he was to be discharged for
inadequate work performance, filed an
The federal court allowed the administrative
It resulted in a ruling by
J
J
J
an ALJ and affirmed by a University vice president that
the respondent's proposed discharge was not racially J
mClt i vated. Instead of seeking state court review of
the administrative proceeding~ the employee returned tCI J
district court which granted summary judgment for the
University on the ground that the ALJ's ruling was
entitled to preclusive effect. J
J
to have
jThey fClund
that it is
b. The Supreme Court held that Congress did not intend
unreviewed state administrative proceedings
preclusive effect on Title VII claims.
support for this result by pointing out
settled that decisions by the EEOC do not preclude a j
that unreviewed administrative determinations by state
agencies also should not preclude such review even if
trial de novo in federal court. Therefore, it is clear
J
E-IB J
r
..
t
r
c.
such a decision were to be afforded preclusive effect
in a state's own court.
The Court specifically noted that the fact that the
plaintiff requested the administrative hearing rather
than being compelled to participate in it does weigh in
favor of preclusion. This is because the legislative
history of Title VII manifests a congressional
intention to allow an individual to pursue
independently his rights under both Title VII and other
app I icab Ie state and fedel-al statutes. AI~~n~f.:?I'.":.....:'.{_~_
,.
i
Gardner-Denver Co.,
L.Ed.2d 147 (1974).
415 U.S. 36 94 S.Ct. 1011~ 39
r B. Pendent Jurisdiction
r
i
i
r
1.
2.
The doctrine of pendent jurisdiction is invoked in federal
court by the plaintiff in a Title VII action to justify the
inclusion of state law claims in the complaint [e.g., claims
for intentional infliction of emotional distress or claims
based on exceptions to the employment-at-will ruleJ.
The principles set forth in United Mine Workers v. Gibb§~
383 U.S. 715, 86 S.Ct. 1130~ 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966) determine
whether the state claims may be appended to the Title VII
claim. Those principles for determining whether the federal
court has subject-matter jurisdiction are:
r
r
r,
a.
b.
Whether the plaintiff has stated a substantial federal
claim;
cc,mmon nucleus of opel-ative fact;" and,
r
c. Whethel- the plaintiff's claims are "such that he WC'Llld
E-19
be e>:pec ted
proceeding."
tel them all in one judicial
J
J
j
3.
4.
Federal courts trying Title VII cases usually determine that
they have the power to hear pendent state law claims.
However, as the power to hear such claims is discretionary,
the focus is usually whether the court will exercises its
discretion to hear the pendent claims.
Factors which have been relevant to a federal court's
determination of whether to exercise its discretion to hear
the pendent claims include:
j
J
iJ
J
J
j
be served by hearing the state claims. See, e.g.,
a. Whethe-... judicial economy, fairness and convenience will
J
495 (S. D. Ill. 1985).
Sardiaal v. St.Louis Nat'l Stockyards Co., 42 F.E.P.
J
the pendent claims involve unsettled matters ofb. Whether
state law. See, EEOC v. West Co., 40 F.E.P. 1024 (E.D. J
c.
Pa. 1986).
Whether the state issues will predominate during the
trial. See, St. Cyr v. Merrill Lvnch, 540 F.Supp. 889
J
J
( S • D. T e)·:. 1982 ) •
d. Whether the combination of state and federal issues
J
433 F.Supp. 1275 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
will create jury confusion. See, Cap v. Lehigh Uni v. , j
e. the plaintiff has failed to pur~ue state J
f.
administrative remedies. See, Upshur v. Lov~, 474
F.Supp. 332 (N.D. Cal. 1979).
Whether the plaintiff's state claims are superfluous in
light of the remedies available under Title VII. See,
E-20
J
J
J
r
r
r
National R.R. Passenger Corp., 564 F.Supp.
r g.
199 (E. D. Pa. 1983).
Whether the state law claims are legal rather than
equitable. See, Felley v. Unite!.=! t1ine WOl-kel"·s cd~ Am .. ~
42 F.E.P. 769 (S.D. Ohio 1986).
r
f
r
r
C"
..J. If the federal claim is later dismissed, that usually
dictates a dismissal of the pendent state claim. See~ Cohen
v. plirlCtis Inst. flf" Technc.I.Q.9Y' 524 F.2d 818 (7th Cil-.
1975). Also, the court has the power to continuously
reevaluate its decision to hear the pendent claim and change
its decisicln. See~ tiati.fHl§11 Ol-g. fCl\- L-Jc,men v. Spel"T\; F:and.
Corp.~ 457 F.Supp. 1338 (D. Conn. 1978).
The applicatic.n clf" §jbb~ tCI state claims in Title VII
actions is difficult to predict because the decision to
accept pendent jurisdiction is discretionary.
r
r
r
r
I
r
r
r
r
6.
a.
b.
Compare~ McPartland v. American Broadcasting Co.~ 623
F.Supp. 133 (S.D. N.Y. 1985): in additicln tCI hel- Title
VII charges the plaintiff alleged that the defendant
had blacklisted her which kept her from obtaining
another job. The court refused to exercise pendent
jurisdiction over the state claim because it found that
post-employment blacklisting claims and Title VII
claims do not derive from a common nucleus of operative
fact.
And, Jones v. Intermountain Power Proiect, 794 F.2d 546
(10th Cir. 1986): plaintiff appended state law claims
for tortious interference with employment contract and
breach of an employment contract with his Title VIl
claims. The court held that the district court
properly exercised pendent jurisdiction even though the
state claims required a jury.
E-21
J
J
In ti 1d i,.pger- v. Howc\l-d, 427 U. S. 1, 96 S. Ct. 2413, 49 L. Ed .2d
276 (1976) the Supreme Court did not rule out the
possibility of pendent party jurisdiction. In that case the
CClurt said that "the additicln clf" a completely new pal-ty
would run counter to the well established principle that
federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction
mal-ked Clut by CClngl-ess." The CC'Lll-t directed fedel-al CCILI\-ts
which contemplated accepting pendent party jurisdiction to
determine whether Congress expressly or impliedly negated
the e>:istence of jurisdicticln c.vel- "pendent pal-ties." The
Court went on tc. say that wheri "the gl-ant clf jLl\-isdictic.n tCI
the the federal court is exclusive. the argument of
judicial economy and convenience can be couple with the
additional argument that only in federal court may all of
the claims be tried tc.gethel-."
7.
a. In Kiss v. Tamarac Utilities. Inc., 463 F.Supp. 951
(S.D. Fla. 1978) the plaintiff alleged certain Title
VII violations against his former employer and certain
tort claims against several of his former co-workers.
The court refused to exercise pendent party
jurisdiction over the co-workers with respect to the
tort claims. See, alsc. Meye"l· v. Califcln.... ia &: Hawaiian
J
J
J
J
J
j
j
J
J
J
J
Sugar Co., 27 F.E.P. 549 (N.D. Cal. 1979), aff"d, 662
F.2d 637 (9th Cir. 1981)(Ninth Circuit consistently j
rejects the doctrine of pendent party jurisdiction).
b. Compal-e, !:0L1-iazi v. Westen.... Electl-ic CCI., 476 F.SLlpp.
335 (D. N.J. 1981). The court accepted pendent party
jurisdiction in a Title VII case over the state law
claims against the plaintiff"s co-workers. The court
reasoned that there was pendent party jurisdiction
because the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction
over Title VII claims and the claims satisfied the
"common nucleus" requirement.
E-22
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C. State Law Preemption of State Common Law Claims
1. An argument has been put forwarded recently by those who
represent employers in employment litigation cases that
state common law claims arising out of the same common
Act [KRS
nucleus
Kentucky
elf facts which
Civil Rights
gives rise tCI Title
344]
VI I and/clr
claim are
,.
preempted by those federal and state statutory actions once
the plaintiff elects a statutory remedy and states a proper
cause of action under the statute.
cited for support for this position that the common law
claims ai-e "mel-ged" intcl the statutclry cause clf actic.n.r
2. In Kentucky §rzyb v. Evans, 700 S.W.2d 399 (Ky. 1985) is
::1 • The complaint in Grzyb did 'flClt allege a cause clf acticln for
r
sex discrimination under the Kentucky Civil Rights Act which
forbids discrimination in employment on account of se>:. The
gravaman of the complaint was that the termination of the
plaintiff because of his fraternization with a female
employee was impermissible because it was an impermissible
within the wrongful discharge e>:cept ion tCI
Kentucky's terminable at will doctrine.
r 4. Kentucky law that the wrongful discharge
r
exception to the terminable-at-will doctrine is applicable
if the plaintiff establishes that:
law;and,
well-defined public
r
,.
!
r
a. the discharge was
pc.l icy as
to a fundamental and
evidenced by existing
b. the pe.l icy is evidenced by a constitutional Dr
E-23
v. Meadows, 666 S.W.2d 730 (Ky. 1984).
r
statutory provision. See, Firestone Textile Co. Div.
J
r.::"
...J. In Grzyb the plaintiff sought to meet this burden by
.~
J
cha1-acte1-izing
d i SC1- i m i na t i CIli
his
which
cIne
tCI the
based cln
prclvisic1ns
Kentucky's Civil Rights Act.
discrimination would not qualify as providing the necessary
undej- pi nn i ng fCll- a t!.I:.c1ngfu 1. Q.i.~charge SL\ it because the ScllT,e
6. The Kentucky Supreme Court held that "the c 1. a im of' se:·~
J
discrimination because
statute
emp I clyment
that ennuciates the publ ic pCII icy
clf " se >:" alscl J
structure for pursuing a claim for discriminatory acts in
cClnt1-avention of its tel-ms." J
The Kentucky Supreme Court did NOT hold that the plaintiff's
claim of wrongful discharge was preempted by Kentucky's
VII preempts state common law claims.
Kentucky's Civil Rights Act preempts state common law
claims.
J
JThe Court merely held
The Kentucky Supreme Court did NOT hold
Nor did the Kentucky Supreme Court hold that Title
F:ights Act.
that
Civil
7.
e}( istencethat the
fcq-b idd i ng gender
of the Kentucky
discrimination did
Civil
not
Rights
satisfy
Act
the J
requirements for triggering the wrongful discharge e>:ception
to Kentucky's terminable-at-will doctrine. J
8. Similarly~ othe1- cases cited fCI1- the propc1sition that state JCClmmCln law claims a1-e p1-eempted by Title VI I and/CI1- state
fair emp I Cl ymen t acts dCI nClt SUPPClj-t that Pl-CIPCIS it i cln. FCI\-
Je:·~amp Ie ~ Bi'-uffett v. (..Jal-nel- CClmmunicat iClns. Inc • ~ 692 F.2d
preemption argument.
910 ( 3d C i 1- • 1982) has been cited in support of this
J
In the Bruffet case the plaintiff alleged four causesa.
clf action: ( 1) breach of contract; (2) intentional
J
infliction of emotional distress; (3) discharge in
violation of the policy of the Pennsylvania Human
j
1:;-24 j
..
r
,.
!
r
r
b.
Relations Act; and (4) violation of an implied contract
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
The first and fourth causes of action were dismissed by
the because Pennsylvania the
r c.
terminable-at-will doctrine.
The cause of action for intentic.nal i nf·l i c tic. n c. f·
existence of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act.
Pennsylvania's two year statute of limitations for such
causes of action NOT because
as
it was barred by the
dismisseddistressemc. t i clna I
r
i
..,
r
the passage of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act did
Relations Act was also dismissed.
third cause of action for discharge in violation of
r
d. The
the pc.l icies evidenced by the Pennsylvania Human
The court held that
existed before and where that void had been filled by
that vej-y legislatic.n. II
r
r
r
r
,.
I
r
,..
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LITIGATION UNDER THE AGE DISCRIMINATION
IN EMPLOYMENT ACT OF 1967,
29 U.S.C. 5621 et. seq. (ADEA)
Broad remedial legislation of the "Great
Society" which has been narrowed somewhat
by jUdicial interpretation over the last
twenty years.
In 1967, people covered by the ADEA were
those age 40-65 (protected age group or
PAG)i by 1978, the PAG included the ages
40-70i and, finally, in 1986, amendments
to the ADEA by Congress abolished the
upper age limit altogether so it now
applies to all employees over 40 years of
age.
The ADEA had as its genesis a combination
of provisions mirroring Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938. Substan-
tively, age discrimination is prohibited
under language borrowed from Title VII,
whereas the remedies and enforcement
scheme of the ADEA borrows from the FLSA.
Civil actions may be brought by private ,.
individuals or by the EEOC.
Before a private action can be commenced,
a charge mu~t be filed and a period of
F-l
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H.
time waited to see if the matter can be
conciliated, 29 U.S.C. §626(d).
Jury trials are available to private
litigants, and any plaintiff's lawyer who
practices ADEA cases and fails to seek a
jury trial has abandoned the most power-
ful weapon in his/her arsenal.
The question of whether EEOC may have a
jury trial is still an open question as
far as the Supreme Court is concerned,
despite several decisions from Courts of
Appeals and District Courts indicating
that the agency may have a jury trial.
EEOC v. Ford Motor Company, 732 F.2d 120
(10th Cir. 1984): EEOC v. Chrysler Corp.,
759 F.2d 1523 (11th Cir. 1985); and EEOC
v. Colgate-Palmolive Company, 586 F.Supp.
1341 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
EEOC may choose to commence an action,
thus, in effect, "taking over" a private
individual's action that has already been
filed, although the frequency of this
occurring is rare unless perhaps a large
group of plaintiffs is affected. 29
U.S.C. §626(c)(1).
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Beware of signing releases for ADEA
claims prior to litigation because if it
is found that the release was voluntarily
and knowingly entered, then it may be
valid even without EEOC supervision.
Runyan v. Nat'l Cash Register Corp., 787
F.2d 1039 (6th Circ. 1986) (en banc)i and
Lancaster v. Buerckle Honda Co., 809 F.2d
539 (8th eire 1987). See also EEOC regu-
lations at 50 Fed.Reg. 40,870 (1985).
File your action in United States
District Court, as opposed to the state
courts under KRS 344, because the very
restrictive language of the Kentucky
Supreme Court in Harker v. Federal Land
Bank of Louisville, 679 S.W.2d 226, 229
(1984), would make it difficult for a
trial judge who does not handle these
cases often to see how a plaintiff can
avoid summary jUdgment in light of lan-
guage requiring "cold, hard facts."
The statute of limitations for an ADEA
action is two years unless the violation
was "willful," in which case it is three
years. 29 U.S.C. S626(e)i see Transworld-
Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111
F-3
(1985), for an understanding of what
"willful" means according to the Supreme
Court.
II. CHOOSING THE "RIGHT" PLAINTIFF'S CASE
A. Through interviewing, make sure a poten-
tial plaintiff has a good employment
record that will be well documented over
the years so the employer will not be
able to easily portray him/her as a per-
son who was a troublemaker and a person
for whom termination was inevitable.
B. Will your plaintiff be someone that a
jury can easily understand in terms of
relating their story, will he/she be the
type of person with whom a jury can
identify, and, most importantly, will the
jury like him/her? Juries do not like to
help a plaintiff whom they do not like,
notwithstanding the fact that he/she may
have been unlawfully terminated.
C. Has the plaintiff since termination
attempted to mitigate his/her damages by
seeking other alternative employment and
does proof exist that he/she has done so?
F-4
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III. DISCOVERY
A.
B.
Are the circumstances surrounding the
potential plaintiff's termination from
employment peculiar to him/her or is
he/she a member of a group of employees
terminated by a reduction in force (RIF)?
RIF cases are often most difficult
because they supply the employer an
obvious "economic" justification for the
terminations which will be perceived as a
reasonable business judgment rationale
used to defend the action. (However,
employers may attempt to weed out older
employees during an RIF.)
The strongest evidence of age discrimina-
tion usually exists in the employer's
documents, unless you are fortunate
enough to get a high-level former manager
involved in the decision to testify.
Always examine all documents filed by the
employer with the EEOC or the state
agency to see what position the employer
took there. TIP: Sometimes a company
does not have an attorney involved on its
behalf before the state or federal admi-
F-5
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D.
nistrative agency and some helpful docu-
ments may be obtained that would not be
allowed if first reviewed by company
counsel. Moreover, the reason advanced
for the adverse employee decision may
change between the original agency posi-
tion and the time of trial, which may
help the plaintiff on the proof of pre-
text.
Interrogatories and Requests for Admis-
sions are fine to help "flush out" areas
of remaining questions after depositions,
but prior to depositions, they are for
the most part less valuable since company
counsel plays such a large part in
responding to them.
Depose all decision-making officials for
the employer to understand clearly what
the criteria were that were used for the
termination decision. If possible,
attempt to take all of them at one time
to help eliminate undue coordination of
how the adverse employment decision came
about.
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Try to take the depositions of the
employer/decision makers before the
employer's counsel takes your plaintiff's
deposition, as this helps eliminate the
education of the defendant about all of
the details of your case before company
decision makers testify.
It is difficult, if not impossible, to
get present employees of a company to
testify for your plaintiff based upon
fear of job security, so you need to
investigate and try to interview former
managers/officers and employees with
knowledge of plaintiff's adverse employ-
ment decision who have left the company.
If they left the company with "bad feel-
ings," although a question of bias may
occur at trial, nevertheless, they may be
willing, as Paul Harvey says, to tell
"the rest of the story."
If part of a company's defense has to do
with its poor economic condition and a
termination based upon, for example, a
reduction in force, make sure you review
all relevant financial records for the
period of time and, if necessary, have
F-7
PROVING A PRIMA FACIE CASE
A. The proof will vary depending upon whe-
ther the adverse employment decision
involves a failure to promote, a demo-
tion, lay-off, individual termination, or
termination as part of a reduction in
force.
IV.
H.
I.
your expert, i.e., accountant or econo-
mist, review the financial data with you.
As part of the deposition process, always
try to determine if certain types of
documents exist and, if so, in whose
possession they can be found within the
company.
If you are counsel for the defendant, try
to take the plaintiff's deposition right
away, make it a very long and arduous
experience for him/her, and question the
person about each and every aspect of the
Complaint which is material. You may
also go through the Complaint and find
out about any witnesses or documentary
evidence that supports any of the allega-
tions.
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4.
Three types of proof:
Use of direct evidence of age
discrimination where a company
policy may allocate less bene-
fits based upon an employee's
age;
Circumstancia1 evidence, which
makes a difference in the
individual's treatment; and
Evidence of disproportionate
impact on older employees
flowing from a neutral policy
or practice.
Plaintiff's proof must show:
He/She was over 40 years of age
at the time of the adverse
decision;
He/She was qualified for the
position held at the time of
termination or the position
that was being sought;
He/She was rejected or dis-
charged;
Age was a determinative/motiva-
ting factor in the decision of
the employer. Coker v. Aamco
F-9
5.
Oil Co., 709 F.2d 1433 (11th
Cir. 1983): Williams v. General
MotorsCorp., 565 F.2d 120, 129
(5th Cir. 1981), for cases
showing the elements in a
reduction in force situation.
TIP: Be prepared through-
out trial to note for the
Court where each of the
elements of the prima
facie case were proved,
i.e., which witnesses
and/or exhibits, so you
can easily respond when
the defendant's counsel
makes a motion for a
directed verdict at the
close of your evidence.
usually the fourth element
involving age as a motivating/-
determinative factor is the
most difficult to prove and you
may need to resort to age bias
comments made by high-level
decision makers. Buckley v.
Hospital Corp. of America,
Inc., 758 F.2d 1525, 1530 (11th
Cir. 1985), where the hospital
administrator referred to the
need for "new blood" and the
fact that he was going to
F-IO
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recruit younger doctors and
nurses; Rose v. National Cash
Register Corp., 703 F.2d 225,
227 (6th Cir. 1983), where Mr.
Rose was deemed to be the
victim of a new "younger image"
company policy; and Mistretta
v. Sandia Corp., 639 F.2d 600
(10th Cir. 1980).
Even something which appears
innocuous, such as a supervisor
delivering a termination paper
and telling the plaintiff to
get a lawyer has been held to
give rise to an inference of
age discrimination. Graham v.
F. B. Leopold Co., Inc., 779
F.2d 170 (3rd Cir. 1986);
Contra: Chappell v. G. T. E.
Products Corp., 803 F.2d 261
(6th Cir. 196); Mitroff v.
Xomox Corp., 797 F.2d 271 (6th
Cir. 1986), where allegedly
age-related statements which
were made by people outside the
scope of their jobs or made
F-ll
D.
7.
without specific authority did
not allow for an inference of
age discrimination.
The other possible means of
proving age was a factor
involves looking at the age of
the person or persons retained
when the plaintiff is not, as
that may give rise to an infe-
rence of age discrimination.
It always helps the plaintiff
if the person retained is under
40, but it is not completely
fatal if the person retained
is, for example, in his or her
early 40s and the person termi-
nated is considerably older.
See Grubb v. W. A. Foote
Memorial Hosp., Inc., 741 F.2d
1486 (6th eire 1984).
Defendant will then be required to prove:
There was a legitimate, non-discrimina-
tory reason for the adverse employee
decision. This will inevitably involve
the employer showing business necessity
for the decision, i.e., downturn in
F-12
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business, unsatisfactory performance by
the terminated individual, a bona fide
occupational qualification, or possibly
compliance with some type of agreement
such as a union contract where seniority
may be an appropriate factor in such
employment decisions.
If successful in meeting its burden of
production, the burden then shifts to the
plaintiff to prove that the reasons
proffered by the employer for the adverse
employment determination were merely a
pretext for discrimination. LaMontagne
v. American Convenient Prods., Inc., 750
F.2d 1405, 1409 (7th Cir. 1984).
Plaintiff then must prove:
The articulated reason of
the employer for the adverse
employment decision is untrue
or, if it is true, it is a
pretext for age as the motivat-
ing factor. Texas Dept. of
Community Affairs v. Burdine,
450 u.s. 248 (1981).
This general approach to proof
in an age discrimination case
F-13
3.
essentially follows the format
set forth by the Supreme Court
in the Title VII context for
establishing a prima facie case
of employment discrimination.
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 u.s. 792 (1973).
However, the sixth Circuit does
not strictly adhere to this
approach because it has been
deemed to be somewhat inflexi-
ble and, therefore, the Sixth
Circuit considers itself to use
a case-by-case analysis depend-
ing on the type of adverse
employment decision involved.
At all stages the burden lies
with the plaintiff to show age
was the "but for" factor in the
employee's adverse treatment
and it is not up to the
employer to prove the absence
of age discrimination at any
point.
F-14
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I,....•..o
I
I
I
r
j
r
r
r
r
f
r
G.
1.
2.
3.
If you overcome the prima facie case
hurdle, proving pretext is also extremely
difficult.
Use of statistics to prove
pretext is often unsuccessful
because employers are very
smart after having worked with
the ADEA for 20 years. Employ-
ers understand that they need
to balance out the work force
and, in fact, you may find that
there is an older work force
than there was before, even
though some selected older
employees have been terminated.
You may be successful in com-
paring the records of employees
who were not terminated to the
plaintiff's record who has been
terminated in hopes that you
can find legitimate reasons why
the plaintiff should have been
retained, as opposed to one of
those other individuals.
You may also again be in a
position to consider the use of
F-15
v.
statements which reflect bias
favoring "younger employees,"
however, do not depend on the
plaintiff's own testify for
this unless it can be shown it
is based upon personal know-
ledge or written evidence.
Slaughter v. Allstate Insurance
Company, 803 F.2d 857 (5th Cir.
1986).
4. Even a radical change in the
evaluation of a long-term
employee by the employer won't
overcome clear evidence justi-
fying the change in perfor-
mance. Jang v. Biltmore Tire
Co., 797 F.2d 486 (7th Cir.
1986).
REMEDIES
A. The Courts have over the last 20 years
refined what remedies are available under
the ADEA by expanding some and narrowing
others.
B. Clearly, compensatory damages for emo-
tional distress/suffering are not avai1-
F-16
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able since liquidated damages, i.e., a
doubling mechanism where willfulness is
involved, takes care of this element.
Johnson v. Al Tech Specialties, Steel
Corp., 731 F.2d 143 (2nd Cir. 1984). The
Eighth and Tenth Circuits hold similarly.
The factor of emotional distress/suffer-
ing also causes serious problems for the
Court when a plaintiff attempts to assert
pendent state law claim for the tort of
wrongful discharge along with an ADEA
claim. Haskell v. Kamen Corp., 743 F.2d
113 (2nd Cir. 1984); Hill v. Spiegel,
Inc., 708 F.2d 233 (6th Cir. 1983). In
fact, this may lead to the Court bifur-
eating the two claims or denying the
pendent state claim altogether because of
the potential prejudice to the employer
when the jury considers both claims
together.
The majority of Circuit Courts of Appeal
say "No" to punitive damages under the
ADEA for the same reasons above, i.e.,
the role of liquidated damages. Frith v.
Eastern Airlines, 611 F.2d 950 (4th Cir~·
1979).
F-17
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prevail. Even with this, you may not get
vailing plaintiff under 29 U.S.C.
nia v. Delaware Valley Citizen's Council,
the costs of the expert to the other side
as the loser, you must seek advance Court
approval prior to hiring the expert and
explain to the Court why the person is
essential to put on the plaintiff's case
if you are going to have any chance to
tomarily keep time records, it is essen-
tial to keep contemporaneous time records
Attorney's fees are available to a pre-
S626(b). TIP: Even if you do not cus-
a lodestar increase may be appropriately
If you need an expert to help prove your
request if you prevail. Also, if the
the Court to support your attorney fee
case and expect to attempt to try to tax
represent a plaintiff in an ADEA action.
from the moment you sign a contract to
and had a degree of risk and difficulty,
case was taken on a contingent fee basis
These should be attached and filed with
sought and possibly awarded. Pennsylva-
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specific prohibition set forth in 28
u.S.C. §1920 concerning original costs.
Back pay - 29 U.S.C. §626(b) authorizes
this and defines it as unpaid minimum
wages or unpaid overtime compensation
thereby incorporating the language of the
FLSA. This has been deemed to be wages
and benefits lost due to the unlawful
termination minus any monies earned in
the interim by the plaintiff, including
severance pay from the company. A bona
fide offer of reinstatement by the
employer, if rejected by the employee,
will toll plaintiff's back pay claim.
Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC, 458 u.s. 219
(1982).
Pubiic assistance, such as Social
Security benefits, VA benefits, food
stamps, and AFDC payments are not sub-
tracted because they are collateral
benefits, however, unemployment compensa-
tion payments may be argued to be an
offset by the employer. Compare the
cases of Orzel v. City of Wauwatosa Fire
Dept., 697 F.2d 743 (7th Cir. 1983), witH
McDowell v. Avtex Fibers, 740 F.2d 214
F-19
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(3rd Cir. 1984). Lost benefits plaintiff
may seek include the value of emp1oyer-
paid life insurance premiums, health
insurance premiums, vacation and holiday
pay, and pension contribution payments.
Front pay - This is defined as money paid
for wages and benefits that are lost to
the plaintiff as a result of the unlawful
discrimination, but covering the period
subsequent to the Judgment. This is
usually awarded to a plaintiff who is in
his/her late 50s or 60s when the likeli-
hood is they will not ever get reemployed
by another company or, if reemployed,
their wages and benefits will be much
less. This remedy is not specifically
authorized by the ADEA, but the Courts
have allowed it to evolve through the
broad remedial language set forth in 29
U.S.C. §626(b). See Blum v. Witco
Chemical Corp., Civil Action No. 86-5310,
F.2d (3rd Ci~., Sept. 27,
1987), where $58,000 of lost pension
benefits were awarded as front pay, even
though no back pay was given since a
higher paying job was attained after the
F-20
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unlawful termination. See also, for a
good discussion of the sUbject of front
pay, Davis v. Combustion Engineering,
Inc., 742 F.2d 916 (6th Cir. 1984).
Counsel for the defendant employer should
argue against front pay if the plaintiff
has failed to request reinstatement ori-
ginally in the Complaint or has refused
such an offer, if made. Wehr v.
Burroughs Corp., 619 F.2d 276 (3rd Cir.
1980). A District Court, in its discre-
tion, may compel employment if the person
discriminated against due to age was not
hired; may compel promotion, if the per-
son discriminated against was held back
unlawfully; or may compel reinstatement
if fired due to unlawful age considera-
tions. 29 U.S.C. §626(b). If rein-
statement is ordered, then it obviates
the requirement of the employer paying
future benefits since, presumably, the
employee will be back at work earning
wages and benefits. Plaintiff has the
burden of persuasion to overcome the
Court's choice of reinstatement and may,-
only succeed by proving that there is a
F-21
high degree of ill will between the
employer and employee or that there is no
available position comparable to what the
plaintiff enjoyed in terms of pay and
responsibilities.
VI. JURY INSTRUCTIONS
A. Plaintiff's counsel should attempt to
make the jury instructions as short and
easily understood as possible, with each
instruction being framed to require a
"Yes" or "No" answer.
B. The defendant employer's counsel should
try to make the instructions longer, more
complete, and should attempt to make the
jury focus on each and every element
which the plaintiff must prove to make
out a prima facie violation of the act,
as well as to prove that the employer's
defense really constitutes pretext.
C. Make sure if you are the plaintiff that
the instruction on liquidated damages, if
allowed by the Court meets the test of
the Supreme Court in TransWorld Airlines,
Inc. v. Thurston, U.S. , 83
L.Ed.2d 523 (1985). This instruction
F-22
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will require that "willful discrimina-
tion" means that the plaintiff was termi-
nated in "reckless disregard" of his/her
rights under the ADEA. The employer must
have been "indifferent" to the plain-
tiff's rights under the ADEA and must
have failed to make any reasonable
efforts to determine whether the ADEA was
violated when the plaintiff was unlaw-
fully affected, be it by termination,
demotion, denial of promotion, or by not
being hired.
If you are counsel for the defendant, you
will want to prove during trial that the
company discussed termination with coun-
sel and received advice the ADEA would
not be violated by the plaintiff's termi-
nation, as this may suffice to negate the
finding of liquidated damages under TWA,
Inc. v. Thurston, supra. The defendant
may request an instruction along these
lines as follows: "In the consideration
of whether the termination was willful,
if you find that the defendant made
reasonable and good faith efforts to
determine whether the plaintiff's rights
F-23
VII. HELPFUL ADEA REFERENCES
A. Litigating Age Discrimination Cases, by
Ruzicho & Jacobs, Callaghan & Co., Will-
mette, Illinois.
B. Employment Discrimination Law, 2d Ed., by
Schlei & Grossman.
c. The Labor Lawyer, Vol. 2, No.2, Spring
1986, by American Bar Association Section'
of Labor & Employment Law.
E.
may be violated under the ADEA when
he/she was terminated, then you should
find that the violation was non-willful,
and the plaintiff would not be entitled
to liquidated damages.
Attached are instructions which were
approved by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission v.
Prudential Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n,
763 F.2d 1166 (10th Cir. 1985). The only
exception to the instructions had to do
with willfulness which was remanded back
to the District Court for reconsideration
in light of the Supreme Court's decision
in TWA, Inc. v. Thurston, supra.
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D. The Employee Advocate, by Plaintiff
Employment Lawyers Association, 414
Walnut Street, Cincinnati, Ohio, (513)
241-8137.
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DECISION OF SEVENTH CIRCUIT IN METZ v. TRANSIT MIX, INC.
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was the second most senior employee there.1 Meu's rela·
tively high salary was a ~t result of his many years
of employment by Transit Mix; Lawrence testified at trial
that Metz was given a raise each year, including years
when Transit Mix was losinJtmoney.2 Burzloff was fortv·
three and had worked for Transit Mix for seventeen years
when he replaced the fifty·four·year·old Metz as manager.
Burzloffs salary as manager was about $8.05 an hour.
II.
The ADEA prohibits employers from discriminating
against employees on the baslS of age. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a).3
Its objective in part is to promote employment of older
workers on the basis of their abilities rather than their
.age. 29 U.S.C. § 621. The statute does not, however, pre-
vent an employer from terminating an older worker based
on reasonable factors other than age. 29 U.S.C. § 623(fX1).
When, as in the present case, a plaintiff is proceeding on
a disp,arate treatment analysis, the plaintiff may recover
only if the defendant in discharging the plaintiff was moti-
vated by a discriminatory animus: that is. the Dlaintiff
may recover only if his or her age was a determining fac·
tor in the employer's decision.-
Proving intentional discrimination is often difficult, so
a plaintiff may do so by presenting either direct or indio
rect evidence of discrimination. Graefenhain v.Pabst
Brewing Co., :No. 85-3094, slip op. at 7 (7th Cir. June 26,
1987); Bechold v. IGW Sys., Inc., 817 F.2d 1282, 1284 (7th
I The most senior employee was La\\TenCe's mother.
I In response to questioning by the deCendant's attorney, Jere
Humphrey, La"ollTence testified at trial as Collows:
Q. Mr. Lawrence, }'ou testified that in '83 that you had' given
Mr. Meu a raise of a thousand dollars, yet Mr. Metz testified
that you had been losing money that year or, at least, sales
were down. Why under those circ:umstances did you rive Mr.
Meu a $1,000.00 inerease?
A. Well, it was usual Cor me to give a raise every year. I
. gave the manager at the Plymouth {'/ant, the general manarer,
a raise also. I gave Mr. Metz a J'a1S8 also. I really can't say
that I pointed a linger of blame at Mr. Metz Cor bU$ineu being
as it was. But, that the area-the Knox area business was bad,
it was very poor and it wu (etting worse and worse and
worse. But, the previous year It was nonnal Cor me to give
somebody-give both Jim and Wayne a raise each year, and
1 followed suit. , ,
Q. So. you have been doing it Cor a long time: you kept doing
it?
A. Yes. I have.
Trial Transcript at 31 (June 23, 1986).
3 The statute protects employees who are at least Corty years
old. 29 U.S.C.A. t 631(a). Transit Mix qualifies as an "employer"
"oIIithin the meaning oC the ADEA. 29 U.S.C. t 630(b).
• The present claim is one or disparate treatment rather than dis-
parate unpact. The disparate impact mode oC anal)·sis. tint applied
In Title VII cues, pennits a plaintiff' to reco\'er Cor "emplovment
practices that are faciall)' neutral in ~beir treatment of different
&TOUps but that in Cact Can more harshl)' on one group than
another and cannot be justified by bU$iness nec:essit)·... I"t~­
tiOMl Bhd. of Teamsun 11. U"ited SklU., 431 U.S. 324.336 n.15
(19m Ite also Griggs v.' Duke PO'lL'" Co.; 401 U.S. 424. 431 (19j1)
(findinr as \;olath·e. those emplo)Tnent practices that are "Cair in
Conn, but discriminatory in operation"). Unlike a disparate treat-
~ent el~. prooC oC motive II not required to sUI?ln a claim oC
dISparate Impact. Teczm.UrI. 431 U.S. at 335 n.l;). .
Before BAt:ER, Chief Jwlge, CUDAHY and EASTERBROOK,
Circuit Jwlges.
CVDAHY, Circuit Judge. The plaintiff Wayne Metz, age
fifty·four. was discharged by his employer,defendant Transit
~1ix, Inc., after twenty-seven years of employment with
the company. He alleges that he was flred in violation
of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (UADEA").
29 C.S.C.A. §§ 621·634 (West 1985 & Supp. 1987).
Follo\\ing a bench trial, the district court entered judg·
ment for Transit Mix. 646 F. Supp. 286 (N.D. Ind. 1986).
For the reasons that follow, we reverse.
I.
Transit ~nx is in the business of selling concrete to con·
struction contractors. Metz worked for Transit Mix as
manager of its plant in Knox, Indiana, a satellite of Tran-
sit Mix's princIpal offIce and larger plant in Plymouth,
Indiana. During the three years prior to Metz's discharge,
Transit Mix experienced financial problems which the dis·
trict court attributed to the decline in the local construe·
tion business. In November 1983, Will Lawrence, the pres-
ident of Transit Mix, notified Metz that due to Transit
Mix's poor sales, the Knox plant would be closed for the
\\inter starting in December and Metz would be laid off.
At that time, Lawrence had not decided whether he would
close the Knox facility permanently or only for the winter.
In February 1984, Lawrence sent the assistant manager
of the Plymouth plant, Donald Burzloff, to Knox to in.
spect the plant and make any necessary repairs. Burzloff
obtained permission to take orders from the plant's regu-
lar customers while he was there. Burzloff later requested
that he be allowed to manage the Knox facility. Lawrence
approved this request and in April 1984 discharged Metz.
At the time of his layoff in December 1983, Metz had an
annual salary of $26,000, or about $15.75 an hour. He was
among the highest paid of Transit Mix employees and,
having worked for Transit Mix for twenty·seven years,
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Cir. 1987); LaMontagne v. American' Convenienc, PToda.,
Inc., 750 F.2d 1405, 1409 (7th Cir. 1984). In order to per-
mit recovery for an ADEA claim through indireet means,
this circuit has adopted a variation of the burden·shifting
analysis set forth by the Supreme Court in the Title VII
context for establishing a prima facie case of employment
discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792 (1973). As applied to an ADEA claim, this
analysis requires that a plaintiff show that he or she: 1) be-
longs to the protected class (age forty or older); 2) was
qualified for his or her position; 3) was tenninated; and
4) was replaced by a younger person. After the plaintiff
has established a prima facie case, the defendant employer
then has the burden of presenting evidence that the plain·
tiff's discharge was a result of "some legitimate, nondis·
crimiJiatory reason." If the defendant meets this burden
of production, the burden shifts to the plaintiff' to prove
that the reasons proffered by the employer for the dis·
charge were merely a pretext for discrimination. Id. at
802-05; Graefenhain, slip op. at 7·9; Bechold, slip op. at
3-4; LaMontagM, 750 F.2d at 1409. Throughout the trial,
the burden remains with the plaintiff to prove there was
discrimination, rather than with the employer to prove
the absence of discrimination. LaMontagne, 750 F .2d at
1409.
The district court found that Metz had established a
prima facie case of age discrimination. The court further
found that a determining factor in Transit Mix's decision
to replace Metz with Burzloff' was a desire to save the
higher cost of Metz's salary and that this factor "bore
a relationship to Mr. Metz's age." 646 F. Supp. at 293.5
The court held, however, that this was not age discrimina·
tion in violation of the ADEA because it was based on
an assessment of the cost of employing an individual em·
ployee, namely, Metz, rather than an impermissible assess-
ment of the costs of employing Transit Mix's older em·
ployees as a group. The sole issue on appeal is whether.
the salary saYin"s that can be realized by replacing a
single employee In the ADEA age-protected range \\ith
a younger, lower·salaried employee constitutes a pennissi·
ble, nondiscriminatory justification for the replacement.
III.
Congress enacted the ADEA in response to the prob·
lems that the older worker faces in the job market, in·
c1uding the obstacles that the long·term employee en-
counters when he or she is suddenly without work. See
I The district court found that the decision to terminate Metz was
also motivated by the "entater tlexibility afforded by Mr. Bun·
loff," 646 F. Supp. at 289, who, in contrut to Metz, was able to
retum to the Plymouth plant provided the operations at the Knox
satellite plant did not improve. The court characterized this con·
sideration (as well as the salary/coat concern) as a "determining
factor" in the tirinR decisio!1. It!.. at 290. The dissent argues that
this finding is sut'licjent to support the court's \'erdict indepen.
dent of the issue presented by the defendant's stated $alary con·
cerns. We disarree. The district coUrt did not rind that absent
the desire to save the higher cost of Metz's salan-, Transit Mix
nevertheless would have replaced Metz because of the tlexibility
motivation. The more reasonable interpretation is that the court
found that both factors combined to provide a nondiscriminatory
reason for the dismissal. That is, in the absence of salary concern,
Metz would not have been replaced by Bunlotf, For example. the
court states that the salary Issue "penneated the eventual deci·
sion" to replace Metz. [d. at 289. Indeed, this is the only inter·
pretation which adequately explains the extended discuuion of the
salary issue by the district court. .
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gennnlly Report of Secretary of Labor to Congress, The
Older American Worker: Age Discrimination in Employ.
ment 11·17 (1965), reprinted in EEOC, Legislative Histmy
of the Age Discrimination in EmplO1f'nl1l.t Act, at 16,
28·34 (1981). These difficulties have been attributed in
large part to the worker's development of (trm·specific
skills not easily transferable to a different job setting. Na·
tional Commission for Employment Policy, 9th Annual Re·
port, Rep. No. 17. Older. Workers: Prospects, Problems
and Policies 4 (1985). Therefore, while the older employ·
ee's higher salary reflects the value of improved skills and
the increased productivity that results, it is also indicative
of one of the ve~ problems the ADEA was intended to
address: the likelihood that the employee \\ill be less em·
ployable in other settings.' .
The ADEA has consistently been interpreted by the ad·
ministrative agencies charged with its enforcement and
the courts to prohibit an emplorer from replacing higher
paid employees with lower paid employees in order to
save money. The Equal Employment Opportunity Com·
mission guidelines expressly provide that "A differentia·
tion based on the average cost of employing older em·
ployees as a group is unlawful except with respect to
employee benefit plahs which ~ualify for the section 4(f)(2)
exception to the Act." 29 C.F.R. I 1625.7(0 (1986). This
position is consistent with that adopted by the Depart·
ment of Labor when it administered the ADEA:
It should also be made clear that a general asser·
tion that the average cost or employing older workers
as a group is higher than the average cost of employ·
. ing younger workers as a group will not be recog·
nized as a differentiation under the terms and pro·
visions of the Act, unless one of the other statutory
excepti~ns applies. To classify or group em~loyees on
the basIS of age for the purpose of companng costs,
or for any other purpose, necessarily rests on the
. assumption that the age factor alone may be used
to justify a differentiation-an assumption plainly con·
trary to the terms of the Act and the purpose of Con·
gress in enacting it. Differentitds so based would
serve enly to perpetu4U end promou the wry dis·
crimination at which the Act is direcud.
29 C.F.R. § 860.103(h) (1979) (emphasis added). Courts
have also emphatically rejected business practices in which
"the plain intent and effect • • • was to eliminate older
'Worken who had built up, through years of satisfacto~
service, higher ularies than their younger t.'Ounterparts. '
uftwicA v. HerN'Stowe Sto,u College, 702 F.2d 686, 691
(8th Cir. 1983); He elso EEOC v. Chrysler Corp., 733 F.2d
1183 (6th Cir. 1984); Dace \I. ACF [MUI., 111£'1 722 F.2d
374 (8th Or. 1983), aff'd on rwa:ring, 728 F.2d 976 (1984);
Geller \I. Mar/dunn, 635 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1980), cm.
denied, 451 U.S. 945 (1981). S. generally 1 H. Eglit, Age
Diacrimination t 16.32 (1985).
Neither the district court nor Transit Mix· on appeal
takes issue with this'intetpretation of the ADEA in the
context of policies that eUminate older employees as a
·'lTOuP based on their higher salaries. Rather, they argue
for a distinction based on whether the employer's employ·
ment aetion, motivated by a desirJ to save costs, affects
• Aa Willie Loman. or' Arthur Miller's !hath of Cl Salelm4ft, ex·
dalmed to his boas upon beirw suddenly (Ired after thirty·four
yars of employment, "You can't eat the oran.re and throw the
~l away-a man is not a pieee of fnaitl" A.. Miller, Death of a
ScW",WUt 82 (l9C9). , .
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• In the context or reviewing claimI requiring a shawin&' of in·
tentional discrimination, such as equal protection claims. courts
have closely scrutinized the use .. of seemingly neutral criteria to
justify practices which have a discriminatory effect. For example.
a three-judse court in Rllbicki v. St4te Bd. of El,ttiOftl, 5;4 F.
Supp. 1082. 1109-11 (N.D. Ill. 1982), found that an Illinois redistrict-
ing plan violated the egual protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment because it diluted minority voting strength. The court
found the requisite intentional discrimination despite the offered
"neutral.. justification that the plan served to~teet the ability
or incumbents to be elected. The court stated: ''{T)he requirements
of incumbency. are 10 closely intert,.ined \l\ith the need for racial
dilution that an intent to maintain a safe, primarih' white, district
... is virtually coterminous ,.ith a purpose to practice racial dis-
crimination." 111. at 1109; lee Alto K,telu&m ~. BVrtl'. 740 F.2d
1398, 1406-10 (7th Cir. 1984).
tween Metz's higher salary and his years of satisfactory
service, allowing Transit Mix to replace Metz based on
the higher cost of employing him would defeat the intent
of the statute.I .
This position is consistent with past decisions that have
found in favor of employees' ADEA claims as well as
those that have found for the employer. In Leftwich, 702
F.2d 686, an employer defending an ADEA claim argued
that although its employment selection plan had a detri·
mental disparate impact on older employees, the plan was
justified beeause it was adopted as a cost·saving measure.
The Eighth Circuit found that this cost justification did
not establish a busines, necessity defense:
Here, the defendants' selection plan was based on
tenure status rather than explicitly on age. Nonethe-
less, because of the close relationship between tenure
status and age, the plain intent and effect of the de-
fendants' practice was to eliminate older workers who
had built up, through years of satisfactory IIrvice,
higher salaries than their younger counterparts. If
the existence of such higher salaries can be used to
justify discharging older employees, then the purpose
of the ADEA will be defeated.
ld. at 691.
Although Lejt;wich involved a disparate impact claim, the
reasoning behind its holding can apply equally to a dis·
criminatory treatment claim brought by an individual em·
ployee where, because of the high con-elation between age
and salary, it would undermine the goals of the ADEA
to recognize cost-cutting as a nondiscriminatory justifica-
tion for an employment decision. The Eighth Circuit itself
applied the reasoning in Leftwich to an ADEA claim of
discriminatory treatment brought by a single employee.
Dace v. ACF IndUl., Inc., 722 F.2d 374 (8th Cir. 1983),
affd on rehearing, 728 F.2d 976 (1984). In upholding a
jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff, the court quoted the
portion of Leftwich that we have reprinted above and
characterized Leftwich as holding "that discrimination on
the basis of factors, like seniority, that invariably would
have a disparate impact. on older em:ployees is imp~per
under the ADEA." Id. at 378. In a third case, the Eighth
Circuit found that although an employer has the right to
abolish a position held by an older worker and combine
that position's responsibilities with the duties of a younger
person, it distinguished such a situation from one in which
"tJu position. remained tJu .ame" and the emJlloyer lmew
the replacement would save money. HoI.lq v. Sanyo Mfg.,
Inc., 771 F.2d 1161, 1168 (8th Cir. 1985) (emphasis added).
. The court stated that there would be a much stronger
claim for rec~very in the latter case. Id.
a group of employees or an individual employee. The dis·
trict court held that while the fonner would be imper·
missible age discrimination, the latter is a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for replacing an employee. The court
cited a treatise for support as follows:
"The relatively higher cost of employing older work·
ers as a group is generally rejected as an RFOA
[reasonable factor other than age]. The cost of em·
ploying an older worker when considered on an in·
dividual basis, however, may constitute anRFOA." .
B. Schlei & P. Grossman, Employment Discrimina-
tion Law 506 (2d edt 1983).
646 F. Supp. at 294. We find that this statement of the
law, as interpreted by the district court, is inaccurate.
Neither the policies behind the ADEA nor the relevant
case law supports making this distinction and we find it
to be an inappropriate distinction as applied to Metz's
claim.
The ADEA is aimed at protecting the individual employ-
ee. Section 623(aXl) prohibits practices that "discriminate
against any individual ... because of such individuals's
age." (Emphasis added). The statute's language indicates
that it shares the same focus as Title VII legislation: "fair-
ness to individuals rather than fairness to classes." City
of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power 11. Manha.rt, 435
V.S. i02. i09 (1978); Bee also Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S.
440, 453-54 (1982) ("The principal focus of [Title VII] is
the protection of the individual employee, rather than the
protection of the minority group as a whole. Indeed, the
entire statute and its legislative histor;y are replete with
references to protection for the individual employee.").
The same ADEA policy concern that fonns the basis for
rejecting cost-based employer practices that have an ad·
verse impact upon older workers as a group is present
in the case of Metz's discharge: Given the correlation be-
? The treatise cites two district court cases for support, lXm'Mll'll
t·. E:r:ron Research & Eng'g Co., 12 Fair Empl. Prae. Cas. (BNA)
41i lD.N.J. 1974). affd mem., 521 F.2d 1398 (3d Cir. 1975), and
.\fastiL tt. Great Lakes Steel Crn-p., 424 F. Supp. 1299 (E.D. Mich.
19i6).
Although the court in Donnelly held that an emplover may re-
place an older worker whose less-than·satisfactol)· ser\ices do not
justify his salary, the court continued as follows:
It would be unla\l\oful and worse if an employer were to fire
an older worker doing satisfactory work who, because of his
seniority, received a certain salary because the employer wished
to replace him with someone else who would do no better
work but who, as a younger man \l\ith less seniority, would
do the work for less.
12 Fair Empl. Prae. Cas. at 421·22. lXmnell'll therefore does not
support the distinction urged by Transit Mix; rather it supports
a finding that Transit Mix violated the ADEA by replacing Metz,
a satisfactory employee, with Burzlotr, a younger man \lItho would
work {or less.
The court in Mutie did state that it "interprets the ADEA as
permitting an employer to consider employment costs where such
consideration is predicated upon an individual as opposed to a
J'neral assessment that the older worker's cost of employment
IS greater than for other worken." 424 F. Supp. at 1319. The
court, however, acknowledged that this statement was dicta and
"unnecessal)' in light of its other findings." 111. One commentator
has stated...M4StiL is both aberrational and. in any event, does not
appear to be good law in light of the ruling in (EEOC v. Chrysler
Corp.• 733 F.2d 1183 (6th Cir. 1984)1." 1 H. Eglit. Age Di&crimina-
tio'n § 16.32, at 16-82.42 (1985). See discussion of Chrysl,.,.. infra
p. 12. For the reasons discussed in this opinion, we do not lind
the quoted statement in Ma.stie to be penuasive and therefore
decline to follow it here.
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. A district court for the Eastern District of New York
si.mil~rlr held that cost·cut~ing is not a legitimate, non-
dis~nnuna~0rY reason for discharfipg an older employee
whl1e retaimng younger, lower,pald employees. Marshall
v. Arlene Knitwear, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y.
1978), affd in part, rev'd and remanded in part without
opinion, 608 F.2d 1369 (2d Cir. 1979). The court stated
that, although in the absence of the ADEA this might
have been a valid business justification, "Congress has
decreed in the ADEA that an employee may not be dis-
charged because of her age. Where economic savings and
expectation of longer future service are directly related
to an employee's age, it is a violation of the ADEA to
discharge the employee for those reasons." Id. at 728. The
court found that the plaintiff had proven her ADEA dis-
criminatory treatment claim:
The evidence compels the conclusion that the savings
in salary and the unpaid pension benefits accruing to
defendants as a result of [the plaintiff's] discharge
were the controlling economic factors behind her ter-
mination. Since such economic factors are directly
related to age, [the defendant's] reliance on them to
discharge [the plaintiff] constitutes age discrimination.
Id. at 730.
In Geller v. Mark1w.m, 635 F .2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1980), een.
denied, 451 U.S. 945 (1981), the Second Circuit held that
a school board policy that limited teacher hiring to per-
sons \\;th less than five years' experience violated the
ADEA. The court further found that the plaintiff, an older
teacher replaced under the school board's policy, could
recover on theories of both disparate impact, based on
the pla~ntiff"s me.mbership in a group unfairly affe~ted by
the polley. and disparate treatment, based on her mdivid-
ual replacement by a j'ounger teacher. The court, citing
Marshall approvingly, rejected the defendants' defense
that the policy "was supportable as a necessary cost-
cutting gesture in the face of tight budgetary constraints."
Id. at 1034.
The Sixth Circuit has held that "the prospect of immi-
nent bankruptcy" may qualifj' as a "reasonable factor
other than age" and thus justify, for example, a forced
retirement policy. EEOC v. Chrysler Corp., 733 F.2d
1183. 1186 (6th Cir. 1984). The court described two tests
that the employer must meet to establish a reasonable-
factor-other·than.age defense based on the economic needs
of a failing company. "First, the necessity for drastic cost
reduction obviously must be real .... Second, the forced
early retirements must be the least·detrimental·altemative
means available to reduce costs." Id. Even if we were
to adopt a similar economic necessity exception in the
present case, Transit Mix would not satisfy this two-part
test. We are not convinced that Transit Mix's rmancial
solvency was sufficiently in jeopardy to meet Chrysler's
first requirement. More important, Transit Mi:< clearly has
not satisfied the second requirement. Transit Mix did not
pursue obvious less-detrimental altemati\'es to replacing
Metz. such as offering Metz continued employment at a
lower salary or in a different position. The district court
expressly found that Transit Mix "did not ask Mr. Meu
to take a pay cut or to take a different job within the
company." 646 F. Supp. at 290. .
IV.
. The dissent presents a number of interesting insights
mto .t~e nature of.~ discrimination and the role of pro-
dUetlVlty as a legItimate factor in employment decisions.
But, while sweeping in its approach, the dissent fails to
come to grips with the specific facts of this case.
~etz's relatively high salary was the result of annual
falseS that were given to him by Transit Mix regardless
of how the company was doing financially. See ,upnl note
2. Me~'s salary th~refo~ reflected his twenty-seven years
of servIce to TransIt MIX. When Lawrence, the president
of Transit Mix, decided that the company's poor perror-
~ce no longer justified the salary that the company had
gwen Metz, Lawrence replaced Metz because of that sal-
ary without first asking Meu to take a pay cut. Given
these facts, Lawrence's desire to save costs was not a
~rmissible, nondiscriminatory reason for replacing Metz
WIth the younger, less·costly Burzloff; by thus replacing
Meu, Transit Mix violated Metz', rights under the ADEA.
We, of course, recognize that our use of par as a "proxy"
fOf age, although inescapabie in this particular case is
of limited application and may be empl01.ed only on a~
by-case ~asis wh~re the facts support. Its use. We do not
agree WIth the dissent that cross-sectional studies of pay
in relation to age have much value here. There are any
number of reasons why the average tifty-five-year-old
might be earning less than the average forty-year-old.
For example, as the dissent suggests, tee in.fra p. 81,
younger employees as a group may be better educated
and therefore better qualified when entering the work-
force than are older employees. Employees may also in-
vest more time and resources in improving their skills
through training and education during their early years
of employment. Employees may choose less demanding
and therefore lower paying, work as they grow older. I~
additio.n, many high-paying jobs req~e strength, speed,
dextenty, endurance and other phySIcal attributes and
may even be compensated on a piece-work basis. At fifty-
five many employees rna)' be physically disqualified from
or limited in high·speed, physically demanding tasks in
such p!aces as automobile plants or' packinghouses. They
may by that age have been down-graded to janitors. And
there are not many fJf'ty·five-year-olds playing major
league baseball. By age fifty-five many people may have
been laid-off or discharged from formerly high-paying fac-
tory or transportation jobs and may rmd work as security
guards. Finally, age discrimination on the part of employ-
ers may account for some of the decline in the average
salary of older ·workers. In any event, no matter what
the facts, only federal judges under the Constitution have
~aranteed earnings regardless of productivity until they
die.
In the case of Meu, however, the facts are much narrower.
He and Burzloff were both plant managers-apparently
of equivalent competence. Their work is of the sort where
declining physical effectiveness through aging is not ap-
parentl~' of consequence and may be more than offset by
growth in experience. The facts suggest, as is usual \\-ith
this type of work, that seniority is a factor in compensa-
tion and age and seniority are, of course, strongly corre-
lated. Meu is paid more-as are most middle managers-
because he has been there longer. There may be other
reasons for the pay disparity but certainly seniority is an
unportant one.
The dissent postulates output or productivity per wage
doUar as a legitimate factor in discharge decisIOns. The
dis~ent is then able" to equate high pa;)' with low produc-
th'1t:· per wage dollar and thereby legitimate high pay
as a reason for lay-off, The dissent maintains that since
Metz, who is senior, is paid more because of his seniority
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(age), he may be flred for that reason alone. Because of
his higher pay, awarded for seniority, he is automatical·
Iy less productive per wage dollar and therefore becomes
subject to termination. By this wa)' of thinking, seniority
(and hence age) is translated into a perfectly acceptable
excuse for firing everyone who receives seniority pay raises.
Thus, if a company has twenty foremen, all of exactly
equal ability, and the oldest ten make more money than
the others because their average seniority is much higher,
according to the dissent the employer would have a com-
plete defense to an age discrimination charge when it fires
the ten graybeards. In middle management jobs we would
expect pay to reflect seniority and hence to be something
of a proxy for age. This is how the civil service works
and private industry usually is not much different.' To
accept the approach of the dissent is to make totally vul·
nerable the employees who are paid a little more because
they have been with the company a little longer. All this
has nothing to do \\;th whether older employees across the
economy make more or less on average than younger ones
(which would presumably be revealed by cross·sectional
analysis).
Nor do we accept the view of the dissent that discharge
and reduction in pay must be regarded as equivalents
under the ADEA for the purposes of this case. After all,
discharge is "the industrial equivalent of capital punish-
ment." Complef£ Auto Transit, 1m. v. Reis, 451 U.S. 401,
421 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring
in jud~ent) (quoting Whitman, Wild Cat Strikes: The
UnUm s Narrowing Path to Rectitude?, 50 Ind. L. J. 472,
481 (1975». And, as the dissent makes clear, economic im-
peratives must be continually balanced against the re-
quirements of the age discrimination law. At least two
things are clear: most older employees (who have difliculty
getting new jobs) would prefer a wage reduction to being
fired. And many employers, lmowing of the morale prob-
lems created by wage cuts, would prefer to terminate
older employees rather than have them remain at work
with their morale in serious disarray because their pay
was reduced. For this reason, we think general pay reduc·
tions are less a threat to senior employees than termina-
tions would be (in part because employers are less likely
to cut pay unless economic circumstances absolutely re-
quire it). Certainly, however, in the case before us, we
lay down no general rules about what circumstances might
justify pay cuts for older employees. We only suggest that
the language of the statute does not require that in this
case we regard discharge or reduction in pay as the same
thing (although they may have economic similarities and,
under proper circumstances, they can both result in a suc-
cessful ADEA claim). It is common lmowledge that older
employees tend to protect their jobs at all costs-even
at the cost of a reduction in pay.so
The essential problem ,,;th the dissent's approach is
that pay for middle management jobs is, at least in the
short run and within the broad limits of competition,
under the control of the employer. The logic of the dis-
sent's position is that an employer may reward years of
service for middle management employees with raises in
the paycheck. If this is the practice, as it frequently is,
• Our dissenting eolleague is perhaps not acquainted \\;th the old
Army sa)ing that, "There are two methods of promotion: seniority
and ca'l.·oritism:'
10 We assume (and we do not understand the dissent to disa!rree)
that what aging middle managers would receive from their Tong.
time employers is not necessarily what they could expect to eom·
mand on the Street~
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when the middle manarrs reach age flftf or sixty, they
may all be terminated smce all will be making more money
than younger managers with equivalent jobs. Ifwe assume
that all managers at a given level are of equivalent pro-
ficiency, as we must for purposes of analysis· in the in-
stant ease, under the dissent's analysis the managers who
are paid the most are by definition the least productive
per wage dollar. Through its control over productivity per
.wage dollar, the management would e1fectively decide who
could be terminated as its employees reach a relatively
advanced age. ' '
The dissent's approach to "productivity" as a rationale
for discharge is inconsistent "ith the policies chosen by
C.ongress in e~acting the AOEf\. As this circuit has .pre-
. vlously recogruzed, the ADEA Imposes some costs on em-
ployers and deprives employers of some decisionmaldng
autonomy in order to treat our nation's older employees
fairly: .. .
[A]lthough the ADEA does not hand federal courts
a roving commission to review business judgments,
the ADEA does create a cause of action against busi-
ness decisions that merge with age discrimination.
Congress enacted the ADEA precisely because many
employers or younger business executives act as if
they believe that there are good business reasons for
discriminating against older employees. Retention of
senior employees who can be replaced by younger,
lower·paid persons frequently competes with other
values, such as profits or conceptions of economic ef-
ficiency. The ADEA represents a choice among these
values. It stands for the proposition that this is a bet-
ter country for its willingness to pay the costs for
treating older employees fairly.· .
Graefenhain, slip op. at 14 n.S (emphasis in original).
. The dissent mentions the higher cost of some~ ben-
efits for older employees, which is noted in the leguslative
history of the ADEA. The cost of some fringe benefits
does increase with age and it might be said that the cost
of these benefits reduces the productivity per fringe dollar
oC older employees. For example, after tifty, employees
may incur higher costs f9r the provision of health insur-
ance and health care and, under most benefit plans, more
senior employees are entitled to longer vacations. But it
has not been argued that these higher costs, and by hy-
pothesis lower productivity per dollar, should be reason
for e>..-posing older employees to discharge in the face of
the age discrimination law. There is even less reason for
fuing because oC higher salaries than because of higher
fringes. Salaries are, within a substantial range, in the
control of the employer, while fringes-medical coats, for
example-may not be. Hence, as a basis for discharge we
believe these cost factors must be evaluated critically.
We are, of course, aware that employers must control
costs if they are to remain competitIve and that this im-
perative of survival will inevitably create tension. with
the legal prohibitions against age discrimination. We think
it would be unwise, however, to translate this impe~tive
into a rule that an older employee can be fired and re-
placed by an equally proficient younger employee mere-
ly because the older employee happens to be earning more
money at the moment. There are a number of less tiurden-
some measures that can be introduced if necessary before
"industrial capital punishment" is brought into play. We
therefore reverse the judJ1'lent of the district court and
remand for a determination of the appropriate relief'.
REVERSED A~D REXANDED
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In the United States District Court for the District or"--
--Division
The Honorable--
• Plaintiff }
v.
--. Defendant
Reporter's Transcript of Instructions To Jury
--City. -- --, 19-,-- a.m.
The Court: The jury is in the box. Counsel are present.
Members of the jury: Now that you have heard the evi-
dence and the arguments ofcounsel. I have the responsibility
to instruct you as to the law applicable to the case.
As jurors it is your duty to follow the law as stated in these
instructions, and you must apply these rules oflaw I give you
to the facts as you find them from the evidence in the case.
You should not single out one instruction as stating the
whole law, but rather, you should consider the instructions as
an interrelated whole and regard each instruction in the light
of the others.
You should not be concerned with the wisdom ofany rule
of law given to you in these instructions, regardless of your
opinion ofwhat the law is. It would be a violation ofyour duty
not to follow the law as given you.
Justice through trial by jury must always depend upon
the willingness of each individual juror to seek the truth as
to the facts from the same evidence presented to all the jurors
and to arrive at a verdict by applying the same rules of law
as given to them by the court. .
While the court is the sole judge of the law, you are the
sole judges ofthe facts. And notwithstanding any supposition
you may make-if any at all-as to the views of the court as
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to the facts, it is your responsibility and not the court's to de-
termine the facts of the case. -; .
You are to perform your duty without bias or prejudice
to any party, for our system of law does not permit jurors to
be governed by sympathy, prejudice, or public opinion, and
both the parties and the public expect you to carefully and im-
partially consider all of the evidence in' this case, and follow
the law as stated by the court in the~ instructions.
You are to consider the real meaning and substance ofmy
instructions, rather than concerning yourself with specific
technical words or fragmentary expressions, because when I
get through I'll try to explain all of the governing law, both
in broad concept and in separate instructions which fit into
that broad concept.
You must consider the basic concepts to which these ex-
pressions relate and consider the total explanation or defmi-
tion these expressions are meant to convey and explain.
I have told you that you decide the case wholly upon the
evidence received in open court. Now, what do we mean by "ev-
idence"? Well, you know, but I'll formulate it and just summa-
rize it.
The evidence of the case consists of the sworn testimony
of the witnesses received in open court, all exhibits received
in evidence, all facts which have been admitted or stipulated
to, and facts which may be judicially noticed, which the court
would tell you, we have no judicially noticed facts apart from
the evidence in this particular case which the court needs to
submit to you. But I've summarized the general nature ofthe
evidence, testimonial from the lips ofwitnesses and documen-
tary represented by exhibits. '
Statements and arguments ofcounsel are not evidence in
this case except as there may be a stipulation of fact; in some
case we've had counsel 'agree, but other than that, the state-
ments of counsel by way of argument are not evidence.
But again I remind you that, examine the evidence in
view of the contending contentions of counsel, because those
views will help you understand the issues and permit you bet-
ter to select between them and come to your own judgment
as to the meaning of the evidence.
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LITIGATING AGE DISCRIMINATION CASES
Any evidence to which an objection was made and sus-
tained by the court and any evidence ordered stricken by the
court must be entirely disregarded by you.
In consideration of the evidence, you are not limited to
the bald statements of the witnesses. In other words, you are
not limited solely to what you see and hear expressly as the
witnesses testifY. You are permitted to draw reasonable infer-
ences from the facts testified to or shown by the exhibits.
You don't lose your common sense by entering the jury
box. We depend upon your exercise ofcommon sense, and you
can draw inferences from the evidence which reasonable pe0-
ple would draw under the circumstances from either docu-
mentary evidence or testimonial evidence. And those infer-
ences may be drawn in the light of your generalized human
experience in life, because your common sense is affected by
your general experiences in life, so long as you limit your con-
sideration ofevidence to that which is received in open court
and draw reasonable or common-sense inferences therefrom.
Inferences are deductions or conclusions which reason
and common sense leave a jury to draw from facts which have
been established by the evidence in the case.
Now, there is another classification of evidence that you
can consider. You can classify evidence into direct evidence
and circumstantial evidence. Direct evidence is evidence from
the testimony of witnesses or documentary testimony in the
sense of using the term -direct evidence- generally which'
tends to directly prove a fact in issue.
Circumstantial evidence or indirect evidence is a proofof
a chain ofcircumstances pointing to the existence or nonexis-
tence of a fact in issue. And you folks aren't limited in your
consideration ofthe effective evidence only to direct evidence.
You can consider the surrounding circumstances to the extent
that a chain of circumstances through reasonable inference
or deduction may establish in your mind a fact in issue.
In appraising or determining the weight oftestimony, you
are called upon to judge the credibility ofwitnesses, whether
the witnesses are telling the truth or not, or intentionally pre-
varicating, if th~re be any such instances in the case.
F-33
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But this judging their credibility, the credit and effect you
attach to their testimony, is broader than simply determining
whether they're attempting to truthfully testifY or not. Be-
cause credibility and the effect ofthe testimony ofany witness
may depend also-as I think I pointed out to you in my prelim-
inary instructions-on the opportunity of observation of the
witness, his or her memory, the accuracy ofmemory, the abil-
ity to express what was observed, and'all other factors which
reasonable people, which you are, bring to bear in determin-
ing what effect they're going to give to a particular statement
or statements, realizing that here the statements ofwitnesses
are under oath, And you are the sole judge of the credibility
of the witnesses. You can believe one witness against many,
or several, or you can believe several witnesses against one-
depending upon where you think the ultimate truth lies.
You may take into consideration the appearance and con-
duct of the witness, the manner in which he testifies, his or
her interest or lack of interest in the outcome ofthe case, the
character of his testimony, its reasonableness or unreason-
ableness, any conflict with testimony you do believe or accept,
and all other circumstances which you as reasonable people
believe should be taken into consideration in determining the
effect ofgiven testimony, but relying upon the testimony and
evidence received in open court.
You may consider each witness' intelligence, motive, state
of mind and demeanor and manner while on the stand. Two
or more persons witnessing an incident or transaction may see
or hear it'differently and be perfectly honest about it. Inno-
cent mistakes in recollection, like a failure to remember lOme-
thing at all, is not an uncommon experience for all ofus. And
so just because a person doesn't remember everything isn't
any proof in and of itself that he or she is prevaricating.
On the other hand, you may consider whether any dis-
crepancy results from intentional falsehood rather than inno-
cent p.lTor or other circumstances or motives.
And after making your own judgment, you will give the
testimony of each witness 8uch weight, if any, as you may
think it deserves.
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LITIGATING AGE DISCRIMINATION CASES
A witness may be discredited by contradictory evidence,
or by evidence that at some other time the witness said or did
something which is inconsistent with what the witness said
. during the trial. If you believe any witness has been discred-
ited, you are free to give the testimony ofthat witness 88 much
or as little credibility if any as you think it deserves.
If a witness is shown knowingly to have testified falsely
concerning any material matter, you have a right to distrust .
such witness' testimony in other particulars, and you may re-
ject some or all of the testimony of the witness to the extent
you believe that appropriate.
The test is not which side brings the greater number of
witnesses or presents the greater quantity ofevidence, neces-
sarily, but which witness and what evidence, and what combi-
nation appeals to your minds 88 being most accurate and oth-
erwise trustworthy.
In connection with the case ofa particular side or the con-
tentions, you should consider all of the evidence, whether the
evidence is produced by one side or the other, because all of
the evidence is before you.
You may consider, too, and should consider all of the evi-
dence bearing upon the situation of a particular claimant.
And just because the evidence isn't testified to by that particu-
lar claimant doesn't mean that you don't consider all of the
evidence received in open court including documentary evi-
dence to the extent you think it bears upon the claim of the
particular claimant is true, that you have to weigh the claim
ofeach particular claimant one by one, 88 we have on the form
of verdict.
And that doesn't mean that you can't consider all of the '
evidence to the extent it bears upon his particular situation
and irrespective of which side the evidence comes from.
The rules ofevidence ordinarily do not permit witnesses
to testifY simply as to their opinions 88 distinguished from
facts. An exception to this rule exists with respect to those who
we refer to as expert witnesses; witnesies who have been
shown by education and experience to have become expert in
some art, science, profession or calling, may state an opinion
F-35
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as to relevant and material matters. These expert witnesses
are allowed also to state reasons for their opinion.
As with all other witnesses, you may give the expert's tes-
timony such weight as you believe it deserves. You are entitled
to consider his appearance, the manner in which he testifies,
the character ofhis testimony and the evidence, ifany, in con-
flict with his conclusions. .
You should consider such expert opinion receivt!Ci in evi-
dence in this case and give it such weight as you think it de-
serves. If you decide that the opinion of an expert witness is
not based upon sufficient education or experience, or if you
should conclude that the reasons given in support ofthe opin-
ion are not sound, or that the expert witness has not suffi-
ciently considered thingS that he should have considered, you
may disregard the opinion entirely, or you may accept it in
part.
In other words, you give the expert opinion such weight
as you believe it entitled to in view of these instructions.
During the course of the trial I occasionally have asked
questions of a witness in order to bring out facts which I
thought might not have been fUlly covered in the testimony.
Do not assume that I have held any opinion on the matters
to which my questions may have related.
Remember at all times that you as jurors are at liberty
to disregard any comments ofthe court as to the facts in arriv-
ing at your own fmdings offact, because as I've indicated, you
are the sole judges ofthe facts. Any comments the court may
have made are not intended to affect the significance of the
testimony ofexpert witnesses or others or express an opinion
concerning their qualifications as experts and the effect of
their testimony, because those matters are for your judgment
and not the court's.
The court has ruled with regard to the two experts who
testified that it was proper for you to consider their testimony,
and as I've indicated, the weight you attach to it is a matter
for your determination.
In conducting a trial, it becomes the duty of the court at
times, in the interest ofexpedition or good order, to sometimes
make a comment to counsel, or maybe to a witness, to keep
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LITIGATING AGE DISCRIMINATION CASES
parties or counsel within the court's idea of the rules. And
that's just a common matter in any litigation; it has no bearing
on what the facts of the case are for your determination. And
you are to draw no inference against the side to whom anyad-
monition of the court may have been addressed during the
trial of the case.
In connection with the testimony of witnesses, charts or
summaries have been admitted into evidence fot the'purpose
of illustrating facts that are claimed to have been disclosed
by books, records and other documents. The weight which you
choose to give to such charts or summaries should reflect how
accurately the charts or summaries portray the material they
. purport to illustrate or explain. If such charts or summaries
do not correctly reflect the facts or fIgUres shown by the evi-
dence in the case, you should disregard them to the extent that
they are not bome out by the evidence, and again give them
such weight as you think they are entitled to in view of the
instructions of the court.
Now let's proceed from these general matters of the na-
ture of evidence and the rules with regard to credibility and
the evaluation of evidence, and come more directly into the
law pertaining to this particular type of case.
The generalized rules are very important, should be con-
sidered in connection with everything else. There has been an
act ofCongress passed, which I will refer to specifically a little
later and give you the requirements, in which act Congress
found and declared that in the face ofrising productivity and
affiuent older workers find themselves disadvantaged in their
efforts to retain employment, and especially to retain emplol-
ment when displaced from jobs; that the setting of arbitrary
age limits, regardless ofpotential for job performance, had be-
come a common practice, and certain other undesirable prac-
tices that might work to the disadvantage of older persons.
And it was therefore the purpose ofthe legislation to pro-
mote employment of older persons based on their ability
rather than their age, and to prohibit arbitrary age discrimi-
nation in employment, among other things.
And 80 Congress passed a statute or act in view of those
general considerations which provided specifically as follows,
F-37
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to the extent pertinent here and with exceptions which don't
apply:
wit shall be unlawful for an employer (1) to fail or refUse to
hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discrimi-
nate against any individual with respect to his compe11l&-
tion, terms, conditions or privileges ofemployment because
ofsuch individual's age, or (2) to limit, segregate or clUBify
his employees in any manner which would,deprive or tend
to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee be-
cause of such individual's age.w
Thus, the law applicable to this case prohibits an em-
ployer from discharging or otherwise discriminating against
an employee because of that employee's age. .
In this case, the plaintiff represents seven complaining
employees, six ofwhom were terminated by the defendant and
one of whom was reassigned.
And thus the plaintiff. to sustain its burden ofproof, must
establish certain elements to prove a violation ofthe Age Dis-
crimination Act separately for each of these employees.
In line with what I have already said, this does not mean
that evidence presented'with respect to one employee cannot
be considered with respect to other employees ifyou believe
the evidence is relevant and material for that purpose.
You may consider all of the evidence as you decide
whether discrimination occurred. However, you must be satis-
fied by a preponderance of the evidence that discrimination
occurred with respect to a particular employee before you
would be authorized to fmd in his favor.
If you find that the evidence shows age discrimination
against one or more of the complaining employees, therefore
you need not find necessarily age discrimination against all
of the others unless the evidence supports that fmding also.
Rather, you must consider each ofthe complaining employees
individually in deciding whether a case ofage discrimipation
has been established. .
Now proceeding more directly into the issues here, and
your form of verdict which is before you, I am going to take
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LITIGATING AGE DISCRIMINATION CASES
sufficient time and do it methodically, so that you will under-
stand what the form of verdict means, what the rules of law
are applicable to it. But I proceed from the general into the
more specific now, all of which you should consider as we go
along, and as you consider this case.
The purpose ofthis case then in general is to determine-
and by the way, I'll get back specifically to the form ofverdict,
so I'll relate these instructions to the form of verdict a little
later. This is to orient you and give you prelude to that.
The purpose of this case in general is to determine
whether the preponderance of the evidence has shown that
the defendant violated this statute by discriminating against
any of the complaining employees because of age, and if so,
the amount of past damages up to the time of trial, any such
employees are entitled to, and whether and in what amount
if the discrimination was willful, any additional liquidated
damages beyond the past actual damages should be awarded
by the jury.
And you have before you a form ofverdict which mentions
all of these expressions, but in the particular context ofqUe&- '
tions.
I want now, before we go to the specific form itself, to de-
fine some of the expressions or terms used in the form and
used in my statement of the general issues of the action, so
that when we come to the form you can understand these ex-
pressions.
You'll be interested in the definition of"discrimination be-
cause ofage" What is discrimination and what is discrimina-
tion because ofage, because that's used in the form ofverdict
and used in my statement of the issues of the case.
You'll be interested in what are past damages, why do we
say "past damages." And you'll be interested in how that is dis-
tinguished from future damages, ifany, which aren't involved
in this case, there being no question about them.
You'll be .interested in what "liquidated damages" are
which you're called upon to consider. Ifyou award past dam-
ages, then you'll also consider whether liquidated damages
should be awarded, and you'll be interested in a definition of
those, and how you fix the amount of those.
F-39
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And in that connection you will be interested in what
"willful" means, because it's only ifdiscrimination because of
age is willful that liquidated damages can be awarded.
And I'll proceed now to explain these terms and the re-
lated law with respect to them.
You will be interested first in what preponderance ofthe
evidence is, because you will notice in' the form of verdict,
every question is prefaced or conditioned·by the expression,
"Do you find by a preponderance ofthe evidence." What is the
difference between fmding and finding by a preponderance of
the evidence? Well, we start out with no evidence at all, and
in general-and it's not particularly applicable to this case-
but in all of the affairs of life unless and until outweighed by
evidence to the contrary, the law presumes that private trans-
action has been fair and regular, that ordinary course ofbusi-
ness has been followed, and that the law has been obeyed. That
is a general assumption where we have no evidence.
In any case where a party relies upon the establishment
of a claim, the party having the affirmative of that has the
burden of proof to show by a preponderance of the evidence
that claim. That is why we have evidence, to see if the one
seeking relief in court can establish a claim by a preponder-
ance ofthe evidence. And thus the plaintiffcarries the burden
in this case ofproving each and every essential element ofits
claim against defendant by a preponderance of the evidence.
Ifthe plaintiffshould fail to establish anyone ofthe essen-
tial elements of a claim by preponderance of the evidence, it
would have failed to establish that particular point because
it requires the preponderance of the evidence.
Now I'll tell you what "preponderance of the evidence"
doesn1t mean, because some ofyou have heard the burden of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
In a criminal case a defendant's guilt must be proved be-
yond a reasonable doubt. We are not talking about proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt. We are talking about proofby a pre-
ponderance of the evidence, which may be far short of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt.
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LITIGATING AGE DISCRIMINATION CASES
To establish by a preponderance of the evidence means
simply to prove that something is more likely the case than
not. That's all it means; something is more likely than not.
So when you are asked the question; Has it been estab-
lished by a preponderance of the evidence, a certain fact you
inquire, does the evidence show that t~t fact in dispute is
more likely than not? Thus if there is a question, Was there
discrimination because ofage? if the plaintiffh,as shown that
it's more likely than not that there has been such discrimina-
tion, they have fulfilled their burden ofproofofshowing it by
preponderance of the evidence. .
If they haven't fulfllled that burden of proof, then they
fail on that particular point or question.
You might consider in connection with this concept ofpre-
ponderance of the evidence, a set of scales. I don't know that
this will help you at all, because the concept itselfis quite sim-
ple, there's a fact shown to be more likely than not. But ifyou
can visualize a set of scales and place on one side all of the
evidence, not by way of number, favoring a given question or
proposition, and on the other, all that disfavors it or goes
against it, if the scale tips to a substantial degree ever so
slightly in favor of the probability or likelihood of that being
so, then the preponderance ofthe evidence shows that it is so,
the greater weight, not in terms of number, or anything, but
in terms of its convincing force.
If the scale remains balanced and doesn't tip in favor of
the probability, or ifit tips the other way, then the proposition
hasn't been established by a preponderance of the evidence.
Ifafter considering all ofthe evidence, regardless ofwhich
party produced it, and the reasonable inferences that may be
drawn from it, you find that the evidence is equally balanced
or tips against the claim or proposition in question, you must
find that proposition or question has not been answered affir-
matively by a preponderance of the evidence.
If, on the other hand, after considering all ofthe evidence,
that imaginary scale, in terms of more convincing force, tips
in favor of the proposition or an affirmative answer to the
question, then the question can be answered aftlrmatively by
a preponderance of the evidence.
F-41
Now we turn to this question of discrimination because
of age, and there are a few general explanations that I will
make, and then I will go directly to that point.
The law does not permit the court or the jury to sit in judg-
ment of the business decisions made by the defendant. If they
haven't, within the definition I'll later give you, discriminated
because of age, the Age Discrimination Law is not intended
to permit business decisions to be reviewed in court simply as
such.
The question you must decide is not whether defendant
made sound business judgment or whether its decisions to dis-
charge or reassign the complaining witnesses were merely er-
rors in business judgment. The question for you to decide is
whether in making their business judgment the defendant dis-
criminated against the complaining employees because of
their age.
The law, by the same token, does not require an employer
to make employment decisions on the basis of an employee's
seniority as such, or to transfer or reassign a complaining em-
ployee to another position within the company, to a position
already filled by another employee, whether or not that em-
ployee was younger than the complaining employee; or to re-
hire a particular employee, or to give preference ofany kind
to older employees over younger employees, or younger em-
ployees over older employees; or act with entire fairness in its
emploYment decision regarding its employees, or to avoid ter-
minating an employee for business reasons, no matter how
convincing or unconvincing those business reasons are.
The law does not require those things unless the action
taken is because ofage. But the law does require that in mak-
ing those business judgments the employer not take the action
because of age, apart from other reasons.
In order to prove that the complaining employee in ques-
tion was discriminated against because of age, the plaintiff
must prove that age was not merely a factor, but it must prove
that age was a determinative factor in the defendant's decision
to discharge or reassign the complaining employees.
In other words, the plaintiffcannot prove merell' that the
defendant considered age as one of the factors in its decision
JURY INSTRUCTIONS
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LITIGATING AGE DISCRIMINATION CASES
unless age was a determinative factor, without which the ac-
tion would not have been taken; that is the bottom line.
In any of these decisions, would the action have been
taken if it weren't for the fact that the employee in question
was within the protected age, that is between 40 and 70 years
of age?
Now I will state that in a little different way; but to the
same effect: to satisfy the burden ofproofin an ~e discrimina-
tion action, the plaintiff must show that the age of the em-
ployee in question was a determinative factor in defendant's
decisions to discharge him. That is, must show that the age
was in operation, because ofhis discharge or transfer, and that
but for his age, he would not have been so treated.
Now, what about the situation where there are various
reasons given for discharge, and that the reasons given by the
employer are expressly for other than age, and yet the reason
claimed by the employee being the claim that it was for age?
And suppose, well, if you find that there was not a dis-
charge because ofage, that is, that age wasn't a determinative
factor, then that ends it.
But in order to prevail where you have possible multiple
reasons for discharge, the plaintiffdoes not have to prove that
age was the only reason for the termination or the demotion,
ifage is proved by a preponderance ofthe evidence to be a de-
terminative cause of the discharge in question, and that the
discharge would not have occurred if there had been no age
discrimination. And that would be true no matter whether
you think there are also financial reasons or reorganization
reasons. ,
But again, the bottom line is it: despite other reasons and
despite age being considered, if the preponderance of the evi-
dence doesn't show that age was the determinative factor in
the sense that apart from other reasons there would have been
no discharge or demotion in question, if there had not been
consideration ofage as such, then ofcourse age would not have
been a determinative factor.
In making this judgment as to whether age was a determi-
native factor in the discharge, you will consider various mat-
ters, I'm sure, because they will appeal to you, as they would
F-43
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to reasonable minds, in evaluating all ofthe evidence in terms
of asking yourselves; Was age, irrespective of any other rea-
sons, a determinative factor in bringing about the discharge
or demotion?
You will ask yourselves whether there is some substantial
evidence that age was a determinative factor or whether there
wasn't substantial evidence to that effect. And before you
come to a judgment as to whether the preponderance of the
evidence so shows, you will inquire into the reasons given by
the defendant as to why the discharges or demotions occurred,
and inquire whether they have expressed some legitimate,
reasonable reason apart from age in justification of the dis-
charges or demotions.
And then you will ask yourselves ifyou think there have
been some reasons expressed which are legitimate and reason-
able, you'll ask yourself, Are those reasons merely a pretext,
or were they reasons which tended to obscure the determina-
tive, real reason, ifany, apart from them; or were they reasons
which did operate to bring about the acts complained ofwith-
out control as a determinative cause ofdiscrimination because
of age?
And again you will ask yourself the overriding question
in view ofall ofthe reasons given, in view ofall ofthe evidence,
in view ofyour analysis of the reasons and the part they play
in being responsible entirely for bringing about the dis-
charges, or partially played; or whether there were other rea-
sons or not, was age discrimination itselfa determinative fac-
tor without which the discharges or demotions would not have
occurred?
And in coming to that judgment as to what the preponder-
ance ofthe evidence shows or fails to show, you will consider,
among other things, the statistical data and opinions of the
experts in question, any expression or language of manage-
ment, ifany there were, indicating an intent to discriminate
because ofage, or the absence ofany such statements accord-
ing to your fmdings, the circumstances ofthe discharge or de-
motion in question in view of the individual situations of the
employee in question, and all other circumstances which rea-
sonably throw light in your judgement 80 far as shown by the
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LITIGATING AGE DISCRIMINATION CASES
evidence, upon whether the complaining employees, or any of
them, were discharged because of their ages.
Ifyou find that the plaintiffhas met its burden ofproving
age discrimination involving any or all of the charging em-
ployees, then you must decide whether the complaining em-
ployees are entitled to recover damages, and ifso, the amounts
of such damages. .
I will instruct you now concerning the rul~ oflaw appli-
cable to the determination ofdamages, and particularly defme
"past damages," and then afterwards "liquidated damages," as
referred to in the special verdict.
The fact that you receive from me instructions regarding
damages does not mean that you must award damages be-
cause I give you instructions concerning damages, simply in
the event you decide that damages are proper to award. That
is up to you.
But if they are, then these instructions will direct you as
to the law with respect to the matter ofdamages. You should
not understand anything that I say with respect to damages .
to be any reflection one way or another ofany opinion on the
question of whether age discrimination has occurred or
whether damage should be awarded.
Ifyou find the complaining employees should be awarded
damages of some amount-I hesitate to mention this because
you won't do it anyway-but it is unlawful to use the so-called
"quotient system" in flXing the amount. It would be improper
for you to use that quotient method.
In other words, each of you are not to submit what you
think is a proper award, add up those fIgUres, and then divide
the total by the number ofjurors. That is not the way jurors
reach their judgment.
You won't do that anyway, but that doesn't mean that you
can't consider the viewpoints-of each ofyou, and in the light
of the opinions of the others, review your own judgment.
And ifyou can arrive at a fIgUre which represents, after
full discussion, the unanimous judgment as to the amount,
and you think that's established by a preponderance ofthe evi-
dence after full discussion, why, that's perfectly proper. In
fact, that's the only way a jury can operate, because the test
F-45
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ofa ju~'s verdict isn't what the individual member's ideas are
as they commence their deliberations; it's what, after full dis-
cussion and consideration of views of others, they arrive at
unanimously in the course of jury deliberations.
Now all of the complaining employees who were termi-
nated have claimed damages for lost pay. The burden ofprov-
ing such damages is on the plaintiffs. Unless the plaintiff es-
tablished damages based upon a reasonable appraisal of the
evidence, you should not award such damages. .
If you find that damages should be awarded, you should
begin by determining for each ofthese employees the amoimt
of salary which you find that such employee would have re-
ceived except for his termination, beginning at the date ofhis
termination.
You must also determine the value of any benefits that
each ofthe complaining employees would have received ifthis
emplOYment had continued. And when I say "you must deter-
mine that," you must consider that in the process of determi-
nation.
You won't be asked in the verdict to break those down,
but these are the things that you must consider in arriving
at the net amount. In making these determinations oflost sal-
ary and benefits, you must make your findings on the basis
of the evidence that has been presented. The law does not ex-
pect you to have a specific amount to the dollar. Reasonable
estimates are permitted, so long as those estimates represent
your combined judgment, and you can say that by a prepon-
derance ofthe evidence that amount represents Past damages
within the rules of law here.
Sometimes jurors think that they have to arrive at a pre-
cise amount that is reflected in some document or by some par-
ticular testimony, and they may spend literally hours some-
times in determining whether an amount on a rather
substantial verdict should be a particular cents or a particular
amount ofdollars, rather than a few dollars offor otherwise.
I am simply saying that your judgment of the amount, if
you fmd damages, should be based upon the evidence in your
judgment, and such an amount as you can .yby fair determi-
nation to represent the collective view as to the amount shown
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LITIGATING AGE DISCRIMINATION CASES
by the preponderance of the evidence, the particular defend-
ants suffered in loss of back wages.
Pursuing the amount in this determination for those indi-
viduals who were terminated unlawfully, if you so find, the
appropriate measure of past damages or the amount of lost
salary from the date of their termination until today, in-
creased by the value ofpensiOll benefits and other fringe bene-
fits that would have accrued but for the unlawful termination,
and decreased by any severance pay, because if they have re-
ceived pay after termination, it wouldn't be right to give them
judgment for pay that they had actually received in severance
pay, decreased by any severance pay and the salary and fringe
benefits actually received by other employment.
Fringe benefits include but are not limited to the follow-
ing items: any insurance payments by an employer, any vaca-
tion pay, any sick pay, and finally any stock bonuses, to the
extent that you find those considerations should affect the
amount by a preponderance of the evidence.
Any damages sustained by Mr. Smith, the individual who
was demoted, would include an appropriate measure of past
damages, the amount of lost salary from the date ofhis demo-
tion until today, increased by the value ofpension benefits and
other fringe benefits that would have accrued but for the un-
lawful demotion, if any, and decreased by salary and fringe
benefits he actually received from the defendant.
Bear in mind that we are talking about past damages-
that is, damages sustained from the time oftermination or de-
motion up to the present time. We don't have before us any
claim for future damages. You disregard that entirely. That
is why I referred to past damages in the inquiry to distinguish
it from any speculation concerning future damages.
Now in two instances at least the defendant claims that
the claimants could have obtained or received other employ-
ment, and therefore they shouldn't be entitled to the full
amount or any amount of their claim by reason of that fact,
because the employment income that they could have received
would reduce or offset damages to which they might otherwile "
become entitled.
F-47
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And I say in that connection that the law imposes upon
every injured person a duty to mitigate or attempt to reduce
his damage by reasonably seeking and maintaining other em-
ployment. That doesn't mean that he has to seek or maintain
the type ofemployment or under circumstance ofemployment
which would be unreasonable and which would not have been
pursued or accepted and maintained by "a reasonable man.
But it does mean that a claimant is obliged to reasonably
mitigate or reduce his loss by seeking and maintaining other
employment, and that any reduction that should have been
reasonably achieved by that effort should be deducted from
or offset against any award that might otherwise have been
proper.
In the present case, you must determine whether the em-
ployees in question could, through reasonable effort, have ob-
tained other employment and maintained it, the acceptance
of which would have been reasonable under the circum-
stances, and you must reduce any damages that you may
award by the amount, ifany, that such employees might have
reasonably reduced their damages in that way.
On that latter matter, however, you must note this: Apart
from the usual burden of proof which is built into your form
of verdict on the question of reduction of damages in mitiga-
tions, it's not the plaintiff's burden, the employee's burden,
to show that they reasonably sought employment; it's the bur-
den of the defendant to show, by preponderance of the evi-
dence, that the damage otherwise recoverable should be re-
duced by the failure of the particular employees to mitigate
or reduce those damages.
Unless the defendant has shown by a preponderance of
the evidence the failure to reasonably mitigate or reduce the
damages, then you shouldn't deduct anything for failure to re-
duce or mitigate.
Ifyou find that back pay is awardable, you must also find
what period such damages should be awarded. I have already
stat4!d that the back pay period should begin as ofthe date the
employee was terminated, but considering any additional leV-
erance payment that would have been received, it was re-
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LITIGATING AGE DISCRIMINATION CASES
.
ceived so that in those cases where it was received you are re-
ally considering the date that the pay was terminated.
. And I've instructed you that the back period cannot ex-
tend beyond the date upon which your verdict is rendered.
Now, we pass this question ofback payor past damages which
is based upon the actual damages you find, and we come to
the question of liquidated damages. .
[Liquidated damages instruction deleted.].
Now let's tum to your form ofverdict, because that's the
thing you will take into the jury room.
You will have the original. Use your copies as references,
but your judgment will become meaningful only as it permits
you to answer the particular questions here:
-We the jury, duly impaneled in the above entitled case
unanimously make the following answers to the questions
submitted to us: (1) Do you fmd by a preponderance of the
evidence---
,
and I have defined -preponderance--
--do you fmd by a greater weight and convincing force,
that the defendant discharged John Jones because of his
age?-
And I have defined that term now. I am sure the thing is begin-
ning to fall into place now as you look at this.
These terms used, when you first looked at it, were more
or less mysterious and undefmed. But now we have defmed
that, because of his age, that is just by way of summary and
without intending to repeat my instructions, was he dis-
charged because age was the determinative factor without
which the discharge wouldn't have been accomplished inde-
pendent of any other reasons.
All right. After discussion of that with regard to him,-if
you think it's established by a preponderance of the evidence
that that was so, say so by your answer, the answer is ·yes"
Then if you think that hasn't been eetablished by a pre-
ponderance ofthe evidence in that the evidence is evenly bal-
anced and you can't tell which is more likely or ifthe evidence
F-49
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preponderates or weighs the other way, then your answer is
~~ .
Then going to the next question: If your answer to ques-
tion number one is "yes: what do you find from a preponder-
ance ofthe evidence in the amount ofpast damage John Jones
sustained by reason of such discrimination? And ifyou have
answered "yes," that there was age discrimination in the sense
contemplated by question one, then you fiX the amount ofpast
damages in accordance with the rules I have given you.
Now, ifyour answer is "no," there was no age discrimina-
·tion within the contemplation of that question, or no prepon-
derant proofof that, then you say "no." Then there is nothing
further to decide about John Jones' claim, because ifthere was
no age discrimination, he's entitled neither to past damages
nor liquidated damages. That is responsive to his claim. And
that is why it says, "If your answer to question number one
is 'yes,' what do you find from preponderance," and then fi-
nally ifyou answered "yes" to question number three above-
Well, let's look at number three first.
"Do you fmd from a preponderance ofthe evidence that the
defendant willfully discriminated against John Jones?"
If you've already answered in one that they discrimi-
nated, yes, then we want to know, and you have awarded past
damages because of that discrimination, then we want to
know, was discrimination willful, so that we can determine
whether liquidated damages should also be awarded. And I
have defined what "willful" means, and you will answer that
"yes" or "no" ifyou've answered question one ·yes.·
And then if you've answered question three, ·yes, it was
willful," then you fIX the amount of liquidated damages in ac-
cordance with the rules I have given you in response to ques-
tion four.
I can run over, similarly, all of this other series of ques-
tions, but you are way ahead ofme on that. You have already
done in your own mind and you know the same series ofques-
tions, except for the numbers of the previous inquiries apply
to the other sequences, inquiries concerning the remainjng
claim amounts.
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LITIGATING AGE DISCRIMINATION CASES
It is proper to add the caution, as I have reviewed the form
of verdict given you, the instructions, that nothing said in
these instructions and nothing in any form ofverdict prepared
for your convenience is meant to suggest or convey in any way
or manner an intimation as to what verdict I think you should
find. I am leaving that up to you in view of the instruction of
the law which I have given you.
Upon retiring to the jury room, you will select one ofyour
number to act as your foreperson. The foreperson will preside
over your deliberations and will execute the form of verdict
on your behalf after you have reached a unanimous verdict
with regard to each inquiry.
Your foreperson has the same voice or vote as each ofthe
others in deciding the case, but will preside over your delibera~
tions and execute the verdicts I have explained for the sake
of order and expedition.
When you have reached a unanimous agreement as your
special verdict, you will have your foreperson flIl in, date and
sign the form, and you will knock on the door then and notifY
the marshal who will be attending you that you have reached
a verdict, and we will all be standing by to receive your ver-
dict.
If it becomes necessary during your deliberations to com-
municate with the court, you may send a note by the bailiff,
signed by your foreperson or by one or more members of the
jury. No member ofthe jury should ever attempt to communi-
cate by any means other than a signed writing, and the court
will never communicate with any member of the jury on any
subject touching the merits ofthe case otherwise than iD writ-
ing or by recalling you here in open court.
I hesitate to even mention that, because I have tried to
be careful in thoroughly explaining the law to you. Sometimes
jurors-it's an agonizing time to decide questions offact-like
to lean on the court and see ifthey can get a little BUggestion
or not. And it's entirely proper to ask questions if the court
hasn't sufficiently taken care and hasn't had the ability to ex-
plain the rules oflaw, but just because there are factual prob-
lems that bother you, don't bother the court with that.
F-Sl
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And I don't anticipate that there will be a necessity in
view of the time and care I have tried to take in explaining
the law to you and going over the form ofverdict to communi-
cate with the court, but I have explained how it can be done
if deemed essential.
In no event should you indicate until you have reached
a unanimous verdict, any difference in opinion or any numeri-
cal division of the jury, if there should be such, and the com-
munication should be sent directly in to the court without
mentioning the state of your deliberations.
Unless specific inquiry is made by the court, the verdict
which you return must represent the considered judgment of
each juror. In order to return a verdict, it is necessary that
each juror concur in the response to each question.
It is your duty as jurors to consult with one another and
to deliberate with a view to reaching an agreement. However,
after an impartial consideration of the evidence in the case
with your fellow jurors, each ofyou must decide the case for
yourself.
In the course ofyour deliberations, do not hesitate to reex-
amine your views and change your opinion if convinced that
it is erroneous. But do not surrender your honest convictio~
as to the weight or effect ofevidence solely because ofthe opin-
ion offellow jurors for the mere purpose ofreturning a verdict
unless you are convinced by a full consideration of the facts
and consideration ofthe views ofyour fellow jurors that your
judgment can concur with the judgment of others.
Remember at all times, you are not partisans. You are not
mere debators. You're judges, judges ofthe fact. Your IOle in-
terest is to ascertain the truth from the evidence in this case
and hopefully to return a meaningful and proper verdict in
accordance with the instructions ofthe court and based upon
the evidence received in open court.
There will be sent to you to the jury room, the form ofver-
diet, the original form, which is unmarked, and which will be
completed in accordance with the instructions, together with
the exhibits.
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A. INTRODUCTION
QUESTIONS WHICH MAY ARISE
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1.
2.
3.
1.
On November 6, 1986, the President signed the
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA).
This new law decrees broad reforms in the
immigration law of the United States. Among these
reforms is a requirement, for the first time, that
employers refrain from hiring aliens not authorized
to be employed in the United States and that all
employers examine certain documents with respect to
each new hire to verify emploYment authorization and
retain records of such verification process.
On March 6, 1987, the Commissioner of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS)
proposed regulations implementing the employer
verification requirements. These proposed
regulations were published in the Federal Register
on March 19, 1987.
On May 1, 1987, the final INS regulations were
issued. NOTE WELL: This new law is quite complex
and the specifics of its implementation are not yet
fully settled. This outline, prepared in a question
and answer format, is a summary of certain
provisions of the law and is not exhaustive.
TO WHAT EMPLOYERS DOES THE ACT PERTAIN? To
virtually all employers. An "employer" is any
person or entity who hires anyone to render services
for remuneration where the work is to be done in
whole or in part in the United States.
r
r
i
r
a.
b.
It includes employees working on any U.S.
vessel or aircraft "which touches at a port in
the United States •••• "
"Employees" do not include:
(1) Persons engaged for "casual emploYment of
a sporadic, irregular or incidental
nature" as domestic servants in a private
home or
G-l
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3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
(2) "Independent contractors." The term
"independent contractor" means a person or
entity who carries on an independent
business, And who contracts to do a piece
of work according to its own means and
methods and is subject to control only as
to the results it is to achieve.
Remember, however, that, though an
independent contractor is nQt an employee,
he, she, or it may easily be an employer.
ARE EMPLOYERS THE ONLY PEOPLE REOUIRED TO DO
ANYTHING UNDER THE ACT? No. Anybody who recruits
or refers anyone for emploYment for a fee is also
required to comply with the requirements of the Act
for persons actually hired on or after June 1, 1987.
ARE UNION HALLS CONSIDERED TO BE PAID REFERRAL
AGENCIES? No.
WHAT GENERALLY DOES THE ACT REQUIRE OF EMPLOYERS?
a. It requires them to refrain from hiring anyone
whom they know to be an alien unauthorized to
accept that emploYment.
b. It also requires them to obtain a sworn
statement from each new hire as to that
person's eligibility for emploYment.
c. It requires the employer to check and keep
records of certain personal documents
pertaining to the new hire which show his
emploYment authorization and identity. It
forbids certain forms of discrimination based
on national origin or citizenship.
DOES THIS LAW PERTAIN ONLY TO THE HIRING OF
FOREIGNERS? No. The requirements are the same for
all persons who are hired or referred or recruited
for a fee. This includes native born American
citizens named Smith, Jones or Reagan.
DOES THIS MEAN THAT IF I HIRE A PERSON WHOM I KNOW
TO BE A U.S. CITIZEN WITHOUT THEN CHECKING THE
RECORDS TO VERIFY WHAT I ALREADY KNOW TO BE TRUE, I
AM BREAKING THE LAW? Absolutely.
SUPPOSE I ONLY EMPLOY ONE OR TWO PEOPLE. DO I STILL
HAVE TO GO THROUGH ALL THIS RED TAPE? Absolutely.
G-2
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8. HOW SOON AFTER I HIRE SOMEBODY DO I HAVE TO HAVE ALL
OF THIS PAPERWORK TOGETHER?
r
a.
b.
c.
If hiring somebody for a duration of less than
three business days, you have to complete the
paperwork by the end of his first work day.
If the period of employment is to be three days
or longer, you must comply within three
business days of hiring.
Recruiting agencies must comply within three
business days of the hiring of the person
recruited or referred.
r
i,
r
9. WHAT DOES "HIRING" MEAN? The regulations are a
little vague on this. The INS definition calls it:
"actual commencement of employment • • . for wages
or other remuneration." Once the new hire is
actually accruing pay, the three business days are
running. You mAY perform the verification as soon
as you tell the employee: "You're hired."
10. MAY I, AS AN EMPLOYER, HIRE SOMEBODY TO PO THE
VERIFICATION FQR ME? Yes, but you are still
responsible for compliance. Recruiters can also use
the employer as an "agent" to perform verification.
In that case, the employer would send a photocopy of
the 1-9 (see Item 12, below) to the recruiter who
would keep it for the required time.
11. HOW LONG MUST I KEEP THESE RECORDS?
,..
f
r
a.
b.
The employer has to keep the record for three
years after the date of hiring or one year
after the date of termination whichever is
later.
Referral or recruiting agents have to keep the
paperwork for three years after the date of
recruitment or referral (but only for persons
who are hired pursuant to that recruitment or
referral).
12. WHAT, EXACTLY, DO I HAVE TO DO?
r
r
I
,..
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a. You, and the person whom you hire or refer or
recruit for a fee, must jointly complete a form
titled "Employment Eligibility Verification" or
"Form 1-9." (A copy of Form 1-9 (March 19,
1987, draft version) is attached. The final
version will not differ materially from this
G-3
13.
14.
draft.) The employee has to provide his name,
address, date of birth and social security
number. The employee must attest, under
penalty of perjury, that he or she is either:
(1) A citizen or national of the United
States, QI
(2) An alien lawfully admitted for permanent
residence in the United States, QI
(3) An alien who was otherwise authorized by
the Immigration and Naturalization Service
to work in the U.S.
Once the employee or recruit signs off on this
information, he must present documents which
show his identity and his employment
eligibility.
b. Form 1-9 lists various documents which can be
used to prove these facts. Form 1-9 is fairly
self-explanatory. The new hire must produce
either one document from -List A- QI one~
from both List B and List C. The simplest and
most common way to prove identity and
employment authorization will probably be to
produce a state-issued driver's license and a
social security card. Lists A, Band C have
been expanded a bit since the regulations were
first proposed and it would be logical if the
full lists were to be printed on the back of
the final version of Form 1-9. Documents
currently usable for verification are listed on
attachments to this outline. Note that there
are special provisions to cover minors who lack
the customary documents.
c. The employer is required to sign off on Form
1-9, again under penalty of perjury, attesting
that he has examined the documents noted on the
form, that the documents appear to be genuine
and to belong to the individual hired.
MAY THE EMPLOYER SPECIFY WHAT DOCUMENTS IT WANTS THE
NEW HIRE TO PRODUCE FROM LISTS A, or Band C? No.
The employee makes the choice. However, new
employees may welcome non-mandatory advice as to
which documents are easiest to obtain and produce.
WHAT IF I HAVE ALREADY PERFORMED VERIFICATION FOR MY
EMPLOYEES HIRED SINCE NOVEMBER 6, 1986, USING THE
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PROPOSED FORM I-9? For employees hired before
June 1, 1987, the INS will accept the draft Form 1-9
which was published in the Federal Register on
March 19, 1987. The final version of the form
should be used for verification on or after June 1,
1987.
15. MUST AN EMPLOYER KEEP COPIES OF THE PERSONAL
DOCUMENTS WHICH THE EMPLOYEE PRODUCES? No, the
employer is not required to keep the copies of the
documents produced, but he maY do so, and this is
recommended. However, it is recommended that the
1-9's and document copies be kept separate from the
employees' other records. The only legally
permissible use of these papers is to comply with
IRCA. Since information from the documents could be
used to discriminate unlawfully against employees by
reason of age, national origin, etc., it is safer to
isolate these documents from routine handling by
persons making personnel decisions. Let them gather
dust in a separate file. This will also make it
easier to produce them for inspection (see Item 16,
below).
16. DO I HAVE TO SEND THESE FORMS TO ANYONE AFTER THEY
ARE COMPLETED? No. You have to keep them for the
required period and produce them, upon request, to
an authorized officer of the Immigration and
Naturalization Service or the Department of Labor.
Such officers need only show their credentials and
orally request the forms. However, you are entitled
to at least three business days advance notice of an
inspection by the INS or Labor Department. If you
do not produce them after the three days, you are in
violation of the Act.
17. WHERE MUST I KEEp THESE RECORDS? Bearing in mind
the recommendation under Item 15, above, anywhere
you want.
18. SUPPOSE THE EMPLOYER DOES NOT KEEP THE I-9's AT THE
WORK PLACE WHERE THE INSPECTION WILL TAKE PLACE?
Then the employer has the option of producing the
records at the work place QI at the INS office
nearest the place where the records are normally
kept.
19. WHAT IF THE EMPLOYEE PRODUCES COUNTERFEIT
DOCUMENTS? As long as you do not know that they are
counterfeit and believe them to be genuine and as
long as they -reasonably appear to be genuine- you
are not breaking the law. Of course, if you know
G-S
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21.
from any source that the employment is unauthorized,
you may not hire the alien.
WHAT HAPPENS TO ME IF I DO NOT FOLLOW THESE
REQUIREMENTS? That depends on the manner of the
violation, how many violations occur and when they
occur. (See the discussion of the "grace period" in
Item 21, below.)
a. There are provisions for civil penalties for
violations. The penalties are different for
knowingly hiring, recruiting or referring
unauthorized aliens than for mere paperwork
violations.
(1) For knowingly hiring, recruiting or
referring unauthorized workers, the first
civil penalty is a fine from $250 to
$2,000 for each unauthorized alien. A
second violation authorizes a fine of
$2,000 to $5,000 for each unauthorized
alien. Subsequent penalties for unlawful
hiring, recruitment or referral range from
$3,000 to $10,000 for each unauthorized
alien.
(2) Paperwork violations carry civil penalties
from $100 to $1,000 for each hire made in
violation of the paperwork regulations.
b. There are also criminal penalties for persons
engaging in a "pattern or practice" of
knowingly hiring or referring or recruiting for
a fee unauthorized aliens or of continuing to
employ someone who is discovered to be
unauthorized. If convicted of such a charge, a
defendant can be fined $3,000 for each
unauthorized alien and imprisoned for up to six
months for the entire pattern or practice of
violations.
WHEN DO I HAVE TO START COMPLYING WITH THIS LAW?
The law provides for a six-month "public information
period" which ends on June I, 1987. No prosecutions
or civil penalty proceeding will be instituted
during this grace period. Although the law is not
absolutely explicit, it appears that no one will be
prosecuted or have penalties imposed after June I,
for events which occurred before June 1, in
violation of the unlawful hiring or recordkeeping
requirements. During the l2-month period beginning
June I, 1987, and ending May 31, 1988, any employer
G-6
22. WHAT ABOUT PEOPLE WHOM I HIRED AFTER THE PASSAGE OF
THE NEW LAW WHO ARE STILL WORKING FOR ME ON JUNE I.
ll..e..1?
suspected of having violated the unlawful hiring
provisions will, at first, get what amounts to a
warning citation without penalty. If any other
violations come to light which occurred after
June I, 1987, however, penalty proceedings may be
instituted. While no warning is technically
reguired for paperwork violations, it is expected
the INS will first issue warnings for this type of
violation as well. On or after June I, 1988,
anybody can be penalized for any violation without a
warning citation.
r
I
,.
,.
I
I
".
t
r
I
,..,
r
r
,.
f:
r
!
r
a.
b.
If you knew that they were unauthorized to
accept employment when you hired them, you were
technically in violation of the statute at the
time you hired them. You won't be penalized
for the actual hiring, because this occurred
during the grace period. However, the law also
forbids an employer to "continue to employ the
alien in the United States" once the employer
knows that the alien is or has become
unauthorized to work in that position. If you
knowingly continue to employ, after June I,
1987, such an unauthorized alien, you break the
law as of June, 1987, and will be subject to
penalty for that violation. Continuing to
employ an unauthorized alien hired before the
Act passed is not unlawful. However, bear in
mind that the alien may be subject to
deportation if the INS discovers him. An
attempted deception of the INS regarding such
an employee's status would be unlawful.
Employers who hired people after November 6,
1986, but before June I, 1987, will have to
inspect the necessary documents and complete
Forms 1-9 for such employees who are still
employed as of June 1. Such "grace period"
hires must complete I-9's by September I,
1987. No verification is necessary for "grace
period" hires who are gone by June 1.
r
,.
I
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23. WHAT IF I HIRED SOMEONE WHO WAS AN ILLEGAL ALIEN AT
THE TIME BUT WHO STANDS TO BE "L~GALIZED" UNDER THE
OTHER PRQVISIONS QF THE 1986 IMMIGRATION LAW? This
seems to be an exception to the general prohibition
against hiring illegal aliens. If you want to hire
an alien who says that he is illegal but expects to
G-7
be legalized under the new Act, you are strongly
urged to consult counsel regarding the specific
case. Under the new law, so-called "illegal aliens"
may be authorized to work!
24. CAN'T I JUST AVOID PROBLEMS BY STEERING CLEAR OF
PROSPECTIVE EMPLOYEES WHO APPEAR TO BE FOREIGNERS?
No. That is a good way to create problems. The
Congress was concerned that employers would shy away
from hiring persons who appeared to be foreigners or
of foreign origin in order to avoid problems under
the unlawful emploYment provisions of the Act.
Accordingly, the Congress made it illegal to
discriminate in hiring or discharge, against
prospective or current employees who are authorized
to work, because of their national origin or, in
some circumstances, because of their citizenship.
There are a lot of qualifications and exceptions to
this rule, as well as other civil rights laws which
forbid discrimination based on national origin. All
the preexisting laws are still in place and any
discrimination that was unlawful before is still
unlawful. Any policy of turning away prospective
employees because they look or sound like foreigners
or because you suspect that they may not have been
born in the United States is likely to violate one
law or the other. If any employer finds himself in
a dilemma where he is uncertain whether he can
comply with the unlawful hiring provisions and the
unlawful discrimination provisions, he should
consult counsel. NOTE WELL: There is no "grace
period" for violation of the antidiscrimination
provisions of the new law. Violations occurring
since November 7, 1986, will be actionable.
25. CAN'T I GIVE PREFERENCE TO U.S. CITIZENS OVER
NON-CITIZENS? This is a difficult question. The
new antidiscrimination law only covers employers of
four or more persons. Obviously, you must exclude
aliens who are not authorized to work (however, see
Item 23). As between a U.S. citizen and an
authorized alien who are equally qualified, the U.S
citizen may be given preference, so long as the
discrimination is based on citizenship and not
national origin (a distinction which may be
unrealistic). There are other exceptions to the
antidiscrimination provisions. If you face a choice
between a similarly qualified native u.S. citizen
and an alien or foreign-born u.S. citizen, it would
be wise to consult counsel. For most employers, a
"citizens only" policy will not be justifiable.
G-8
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26. IF I, MYSELF, AM NOT A U.S. CITIZEN, MAY I GIVE
PREFERENCE TO MY ALIEN COUNTRYMEN? No. The law is
written to also forbid discrimination against a U.s.
citizen on the basis of citizenship or U.S. national
oriain.
27. MAY I ASK A PROSPECTIVE EMPLOYEE WHETHER HE OR SHE
IS A U.S. CITIZEN?
Don't
after
hereto
r
r
r
r
r
a.
b.
That's a bad idea. You want to avoid the
implication that you prefer U.S. citizens over
qualified and authorized aliens. Ask a
prospective employee only to confirm that he or
she falls into ~ of the three permissible
categories listed at the top of Form 1-9.
Don't ask which category pertains to the
applicant unless and until that individual is
hired. Don't inspect the personal documents
until after you have decided to hire and told
the successful applicant of your decision.
This avoids the suggestion that forbidden
criteria such as age or national origin were
factors in your decision. It is all right to
advise All applicants in advance of the
documentary requirements and of the need to
provide personal documents upon hiring. You
may also provide a copy of Form 1-9 to
applicants (but be consistent in this).
get into specifics about Form 1-9 until
hiring. A uniform advisory of the type
attached might be incorporated in the
employer's standard job application forms.
A Warning: You may read or hear conflicting
advice on this point. One reason may be that
enforcement of the antidiscrimination
provisions will be handled by the Civil Rights
Division of the Justice Department while
emploYment verification will go to a new
division of the INS. The INS has informally
recommended inquiry by employers as to U.s.
citizenship. We question whether those
officials enforcing the antidiscrimination
rules will find this procedure innocuous.
Hence the above recommendation.
r
r
28. HOW ABOUT ASKING THE APPLICANT WHETHER HE OR SHE IS
LEGALLY PRESENT IN THE U.S.? Still a bad idea.
"Illegal" aliens may be authorized to work in the
U.S., because of the legalization or so-called
"amnesty" provisions of IRCA. Furthermore, the
question would only be prompted by the applicant's
G-9
29.
30.
foreign appearance or name. You might be setting
yourself up for a claim of unlawful discrimination.
DOES THIS LAW MEAN THAT I REALLY CAN'T HIRE SOMEONE
BECAUSE HE LOST HIS SOCIAL SECURITY CARD AND CAN'T
GET A NEW ONE WITHIN THREE DAYS OF THE HIRING
DECISION?
a. No, even assuming that the Social Security card
is the only means he has to prove work
authorization. He can submit a receipt for his
application for a new card (or any other
supporting document). If he does so within the
three business days, he then may produce the
new document within twenty-one days of the
hiring. What if the employee still does not
have it? You would then be in technical
violation of the law. Don't assume, however,
that the INS would ignore your good faith
efforts to comply.
b. The objective of the new law and regulations is
to stop people from hiring unauthorized
aliens. The paperwork requirements are
designed to effectuate that goal. The INS and
Labor Department are unlikely to visit every
employer on a routine basis to spot-check their
paperwork compliance. The civil penalties for
paperwork violations are relatively modest and
it seems unlikely that an employer would be
routinely penalized because he hired an
authorized worker but was slightly dilatory in
inspecting the employee's social security
card. It would be surprising if the INS used
IRCA as an instrument of harassment of U.S.
citizens, authorized aliens or their
employers. However, it should certainly be the
objective of each employer to comply with the
requirements of the Act in a timely fashion and
as rapidly as humanly possible. If an employer
has complied with the paperwork requirements by
the time his records are inspected, the
inspector may overlook the fact that compliance
took longer than three days after hiring. The
INS will be much more concerned with the
employer who ignores the new law than with one
who is obviously doing its best to comply.
IS THIS NEW LAW GOING TO BE THE CONTINUOUS AND
ONGOING HEADACHE THAT EVERYBODY TALKS ABOUT?
Probably only in the beginning. Once employers
establish a routine and employees learn to expect
G-IO
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the necessity of compliance with the statute, the
Form 1-9 is likely to become just a minor addition
to government red tape.
31. WHAT IF I GET NOTICE OF A PENALTY PROCEEDING AGAINST
ME FOR AN ALLEGED VIOLATION OF THE NEW LAW? Call
your lawyer before you do anything.
32. IS THE FOREGOING LIST OF QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS A
COMPLETE EXPLANATION OF ALL AN EMPLOYER NEEDS TO
KNOW TO COMPLY WITH THE NEW LAW? No. The forms
(and some of the regulations) are not yet final.
The INS will be distributing instructional materials
nationwide in the near future. Specific questions
always come up and counsel should be consulted when
the forms or the regulations are not clear.
G-ll
ADVISORY TO ALL APPLICANTS FOR EMPLOYMENT
If you are hired by [NAME OF COMPANY] , you will be
required by federal law to provide certain personal information
including your name, address, date of birth and social security
number. You must, upon hiring, attest, under penalty of perjury,
that you are ~ of the following
1. a citizen or national of the United States, QI
2. an alien who has been lawfully admitted for
permanent residence in the United States, QI
3. an alien who is authorized by the U.S.
Immigration and Naturalization Service to
work in the United States.
If you are described by category 2 or 3, you will, upon
hiring, be obliged to disclose your alien number or admission
number issued by the Immigration and Naturalization Service and
the date of expiration (if any) of your emploYment authorization.
All persons hired will be required to produce for the inspection
and copying of the employer one or more documents listed on the
attached Form 1-9 "EmploYment Eligibility Verification." Upon
hiring, you must, within three business days, produce either one
document from List A QI one each from Lists Band C. Do not
submit a completed Form 1-9 or produce any listed documents until
you are told that you have been hired. If you do not have the
necessary documents upon hiring and need extra time to obtain a
new or replacement document, tell the personnel manager of this
fact immediately upon your hiring. An extension of the three day
limit can be arranged.
G-12
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list C
Emplo)menllolog.b.lny
o Ori~in~1 5""31 Sceurny Sumber Carol (olher
Ihan a card ."u,na II is 1101 uhd fur
cmp/oymenl'
e A birth ~';,ficl\e ilsued b)' Sllle. counly. or
mUIIICir31 aUIII"my beanng a se.1 or olher
cenlliulion
e Unc&rired I:IOS Employmenl Authuri131ion
Srccify form
._-----------
._-----------
Sllle...... -
Name (l'rlnl or Typel
Olle (Monllli O'YI Year)
C,ly
I
LiSl8
Idenlny and
Expi,.riOll DIIf, (if lUlyJ
o A Slate issued dri...f. liecnK or 1.0. urd
..ilh a pholo~raph. or inlormAI;oll. includ,na
name. KA. d..e of "'inh. heighl, .eighl. and
color 01 .)·e•.
(Specily Slate ...l -J
o U.S. Military C~rd
o Olher (Spccify documenl and inuing
aUlhoral)')
._----------
AddrallSln:cl ,....rne &lid I'oun'bcr)
,al.""" tol, TaAhSL4TOI ell. rlt.cATI{)f\(11 ,~,.l"IIII., ,...,.._ ",....u. t ,.,._-", .. fir' ",.,.,.., ..
• u.. ., I tfllllI, aU IN _e.n. u .. M' -'OIW.
-Li£lA.
Idenlil)' and Employment E1i.ib,loly .
o l:lIiled Slales Pa..""rt
e Ccni!ic~le of Ullilcd SI31n Ciliun.hip
£MPLOYl\IENT ELIGIBILITY VERIFICATION
Name: (Pnlll Of l)'pc) Lul f,nl Middle Maldell
~"raa: SI... Na.mc &Ild Number CilY SUlC ZIP Code
Dale of 8,nll (MoIlIII: DIY/ Year) I SOCial Secunty Number -
e Ccniliult of "3Iur~liulioll
Si&n.lul1:
e VIIt&pir.d forcia" pa.sport ..ilh all~ched
Employmelll AUlhorillliOIl
e Alien R.,is,,"ioll CAl" .. ilh rhololr~ph
I anne.U pnulllJ 0'",,;uP)', cJw"-_lUt ''''.c._eda. rridtltfto(idCftlily au""pI07-1 cliCibililY arc rmuilM aod relltt 10Ia'.' ala a.a.. Ihal
federal law id. fOf ImprisoD_ urd/Of r'lM fOf allY falM lIal....",.. or _ 01 falw docu__ in C'lHIJMCtiOll .ilh IIIio ClOnilicalc.
I an5.lIftd" pmaJlJ of per)u". Ulall a_ (eNd< a bol"
e A Ciliull or ft&liollai 0' IIIe Ulliled SlaltS.
e All ahelllawfully admllled for permallelll residellCC. (Aliell Number A ).
e All a1iell auilloriled by Ihe Immiaulioll &lid Narunliulioll ScM/ice 10 ..ork ill Ilie UllilCd Slales. (Aliell Number A 1•
., Admw,oll Number capiralioll of cmpl"ymelll aUlhonulIolI. if any )
[] EMPLOYEE INFORMAliON ASD "[RlflCAnON: (To be eompleled and s.ianed by employee.)
,------------
Eq""iott 0." (II ..yJ
IJ E!ttPLO\'£R REnEW AND n.JlIflCATlON: (To be compleled and .ianed by cmployer.)
[limine OftC documCll1 from IhoK in Lisl A alld check Ihe COITCCI bo~. e! eumine one documenl (rom Lisl 8!!1!! one frum Li" C ~nd check Ihe corrtcl bo~....
Pro"ide Ihe O«WrJUll IdeNifiCGlIDll ...·UIIIM ano £zpillJlioll Ollr., lor Ille document checked .n III~I column..
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ClRTlnCATlON:. allnl. ullder ......"y 01 perjur"lhal' h..t ...min.d III. docum.nl. pr_nl.d by Ih. abu.. ind"idual.lhallh., appear 10'" C.IIUIIlt. tria" 10
II>t 11\d'.idua' nallMd. and Illallht indi.idual. 10 lbe ""' 01 my kllowl.dl'," aUlhoti,ed 10 .onln Ih. l:niled Sla.tS.
Sia"alu..
Fo"" '·9 (OJi06/111
OMO So. IIIS-OOOO
It'R D:lc. 87-5839 filed )-11-47; 10:08 uml
.l&.LINO COD[ &ItO-to<
I Name ("nlll or T)pc) Tille
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U.S. D(panm.nl of JUI"CC
Immia:ulioll and "'atuul'lI"un SCf\it."t
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Employment Eligibility Vuilication
NOTICE: Authority forcollcctinl tbe informalion on thisform ia in Title a, United States Code, Section 1324A. h will
be used to verify the individual's eligibility for employment in the United StateS. Failure to praent thia form
for inspection to orficcn of the Immigration ucl NatiOllality Service or OcpanlDCnt of Labor within the
time period specified by regulalion, or impropercompletaon orrctention ohhis form may be. violation ora
USC f IJ24A and may result in a civil money penalty. .
Section I. Employee's/Preparer's instructioas lor ee.pletill,tlais Iona.
IIISt",et;olU /M tJr~ ~"'PIOYH,
All employees, upon being hircd, must complete Seeton I or this form. Any person hired after Noycmber 6.
19116 must complctc thiS form. (Forthe purpose of complction of this form thc lerm -hired- applies to those
employed, recruitcd or rcferred for a fcc.)
All cmployecs must print or type their complete name, address. date of binh, aftd Social Security Number.
The block which correctly iftdicates the employee's immiptaon"atus must be checked, If the second block is
checked. the cmployee's Alien Rcgistr:ation Number must be provided. If the third block ia checked. the
employee's Alien Registr:atioD Number or Aclmiuion Number must be provided, as well as the date of
expiration of that status, if it ellpircs.
All employccs must sign and date the form.
IlIUtIWtioluJM tlt~prqHJnr oJ tlt~/onrt, i/ IlOl tIw myHDya
If the employee is assisted with completing this form. the penon usistin, must~ythe form by lipin, it.
and printing or typing their complctc name and .draa.
I
I
I
1·
-·""I'
I
I
(Fo'thcpurposcofcompletionofthisform.thctenn-cmploycr-appiiaIOClDploycnandlbOlCwbon:cnaitorrd'crforafee.)
Employers Im&St complete this sectaon byuaaaiaiqevideftccofidentitJ ucl employment authorizatioo. and:
• checkin, the appropriate boll iD Usc A ., bolla ia botb Lisu 8111C1 C;
• ruordin,the document icleatiflCalioa aumber .. ellpitation ..... (if any);
• .n:cordinl the type or form if DOt specifICally idcatiflCd ia the list:
~ si,ninl the ccniflCalion scctioa.
NOTE:E""'~.. rapOIIribkJor nwriIM"""'-'fti,-.,,-I upinIt_ oJ_,
""Ploy"'" utltGris........."....,IItq tIGin,. COIII ..,.,YJIWfIL
Copies ofdocumentation praeftted by aD individual for the purposeofaaablishing ideatity and employment
elilibility may be copied and retained for the purpose orcomplyin, witb the rcquiremcnu orthis form and no
other purpose. Any copies of documenwioll made for this purpose should be maintained witb this form.
Employers may photocopy or reprint &his fonn., • ncc:cuar,. for their usc.
RETE,...·TION OFRECORDS,
Aftercompletion ofthis form. it must be retained by the employer durift,the period beginninl on the date or
hirin, and endin,:
• three years after the date or such birins. or;
• one year after the date the iftdividual', employment 1I terminated, whichever is later,
.~
U.S. Dcpanment of Justice
Immigration an.! :'I/.uurali,atlon Scr",cc
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LIST A - DOCUMENTS ACCEPTABLE TO SHOW
IDENTITY AND EMPLOYMENT ELIGIBILITY
1. United States Passport.
r
r
r-
I
r
,..
r
I
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r
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2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Certificate of U.S. citizenship (INS Form N-560 or
N-56l).
U.S. Certificate of Naturalization (INS Form N-550 or
N-570).
Unexpired foreign passport which either:
a. Bears an unexpired stamp which reads "processed
for 1-551. Temporary evidence of lawful admission
for permanent residence. Valid until [future
datel. Employment authorized." or
b. Has attached an INS form 1-94 (a small white slip
of paper) bearing an unexpired employment
authorization stamp. (This 1-94 constitutes
authorization only for employment consistent with
the limitations and restrictions appearing on the
form).
Alien registration receipt card (INS Form 1-151) or
resident alien card (INS Form 1-551) if it contains a
photograph of the person presenting it.
Temporary resident card, (INS Form 1-688).
Employment authorization card (INS Form I-688A).
G-1S
LIST B - DOCUMENTS ACCEPTABLE TO ESTABLISH IDENTITY ONLY
1. For individuals at least 16 years old:
a. A driver's license or identification card issued
by the state containing either a photograph of the
bearer or a physical description consistent with
the bearer's appearance.
b. A school identification card bearing a photograph
of the bearer.
c. A voter's registration card.
d. A U.S. military 10 (which will have a photograph
of the bearer) or a draft record.
e. An ID card issued by a federal, state or local
government agency.
f. A military dependant's ID card.
g. A Native American tribal document.
h. A U.S. Coast Guard merchant mariner card.
i. A driver's license issued by a Canadian government
authority.
2. For individuals under age 16 who are unable to produce
another identity document:
a. A school record or report card.
b. A clinic, doctor or hospital record.
c. A daycare or nursery school record.
Note: If a minor under 16 is unable to produce one of the
foregoing documents to prove identity, his parent or legal
guardian may complete the "preparer/translator certification"
appearing on the Form 1-9, signing that portion of the form. In
the place for the minor's signature, the parent or legal guardian
must write "minor under age 16". In this case the employer
writes, in the space marked "document identification #, under List
B on the Form 1-9, the words "minor under age 16".
G-16
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LIST C - DOCUMENTS ACCEPTABLE TO ESTABLISH
EMPLOYMENT AUTHORIZATION ONLY
A Social Security card, unless there appears on its
face the words "not valid for employment purposes".
2. An unexpired re-entry permit (INS Form I-327).
r
3.
4.
An unexpired Refugee Travel Document (INS Form I-57l).
A certificate of birth issued by the Department of
State (Form FS-545).
".
f
r
r
r
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5. A Certification of Birth Abroad issued by the
Department of State (Form DS-1350).
6. An original or certified copy of a birth certificate
issued by a state, county or municipal authority
bearing a seal.
7. An employment authorization document issued by the
Immigration and Naturalization Service.
8. An Native American tribal document.
9. A United States citizen identification card, (INS Form
I-197).
10. Identification card for use of resident citizen in the
United States, INS form I-179.
G-17
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Policies and Testing Aspects
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DRUGS AND ALCOHOL IN THE WORKPLACE:
Policies and Testing Aspects
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Drugs and Alcohol in the Workplace: Policies
and Testing Aspects
Richard C. Stephenson
Stoll, Keenon & Park
I. The Problem.
A. Extensive use of drugs and alcohol - the most common
health hazard in the workplace.
B. Work-related problems directly caused by drug and alcohol
abuse are translated into economic losses to employers:
1. Decrease of job safety caused by inability
to operate equipment in a safe manner and
inattention to detail.
2. Increase in on-the-job accidents resulting
in increased injuries and workers' compensation
claims.
3. Productivity decreases due to drug and alcohol
abusers being more likely not to complete
assignments in a timely and quality manner
and being more likely to be absent or tardy.
4. Low morale of drug and alcohol abusing
employees and their co-workers.
5. Greater use of health care programs and insurance.
6. Greater theft in the workplace.
II. Developing a Drug and Alcohol Abuse Policy.
A. Components of the Policy:
1. Education of employees concerning the consequences
of drug and alcohol abuse;
2. Supervisor training;
3. Drug testing; and
4. Rehabilitation referrals.
B. Considerations in Developing Policy:
1. Whether and to what extent substance abuse
is a problem for the specific employer.
H-l
2. Reduction of policy to an easily understood
written document.
3. Dissemination of the policy as widely as
possible.
4. Differentiation between applicants and incumbent
employees.
5. Description of prohibited substances very
broadly.
6. Description of prohibited conduct specifically
and completely.
7. Differentiation between alcohol and drugs
as necessary and rationalization for the
differentiation.
8. Written consents to testing to be executed by
applicants and employees if testing is part of
the policy.
9. Supervisory training on the policy and on
recognition of symptoms of drug and alcohol abuse.
III. Testing
A. The significant difference between alcohol and
drug tests: drug tests cannot measure impairment
or determine with any accuracy the elapsed time
since the use of a drug.
B. Alcohol tests - alcohol intoxication is normally
measured as Blood Alcohol Concentration (BAC)
expressed as a percentage.
1. .05 to .10 is the range of commonly accepted
presumption of impairment.
2. May be measured from blood, urine or breath
samples.
C. Drug tests.
1. Screening tests:
a. Enzyme Multiplied Immunoassay Technique (EMIT),
b. Radio Immunoassay (RIA),
c. Fleuroscence Polarization Immunoassay (FPIA), and
d. Thin-layer Chromatography (TLC).
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2. Confirmation test: Gas Chromatography/Mass
Spectrometry (GCMS).
Taylor v. O'Grady, 669 F.Supp. 1422, 1430 (N.D. Ill.
1987) (approved the EMIT/GCMS chemical analysis as
highly accurate and reliable).
However, in Jones v. McKenzie, 628 F.Supp. 1500, 1503
(D.D.C. 1986), the Court noted that the EMIT test does
not indicate when marijuana was ingested or whether it
was ingested by active use or as a result of passive
inhalation.
r
r
I
D. Testing Procedures.
1. Opportunity prior to testing for employees
to list in writing all drugs taken in the preceding
thirty days with an explanation of their use.
2. Vigorous chain of custody protocol for test samples
with appropriate steps taken to prevent adulteration
or exchange of test samples.
r
r
3. Testing to be performed by a reputable independent
laboratory.
4. Information regarding test results should
be restricted on a "need to know" basis unless
the express written consent of the tested employee
has been obtained to make broader dissemination.
2. Whether the individual is an employee or
only an applicant for employment; and
1. Whether employer is a private or public employer;
r IV. Legal Aspects of Drug and Alcohol Testing.
A. Significant Factors in Determining the Outcome
of Drug and Alcohol Testing Litigation:r
r
r
r
t
3. The criticality of the job in question in
terms of the potential harm that could result
from the assignment of a substance abuser
to the position.
4. Whether testing policy and procedures recognize
and preserve, to the extent possible, the privacy
interests of employees.
H~
Public vs. Private Employer.
Public employers.
Due to the implication of state action and
consequent constitutional limitations (right
of privacy and the right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures), public
employers are much more constrained than
private employers.
Under circumstances indicating a reasonable
suspicion of substance abuse.
In critical positions and
McDonnell v. Hunter, 612 F.Supp. 1122 (S.D.
Iowa 1985), aff'd, 809 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir.
1987) (state prison could legitimately require
drug testing of prison applicants but could only
legitimately require the testing of incumbent I
employees upon reasonable suspicion of drug use) ••
( 1 )
( 2 )
Public employers may test applicants
for critical positions where safety is
very important or where zero tolerance
for drugs or alcohol is implicitly job-related.
Until recently it appeared that public employers
could only test incumbent employees:
a.
b.
2.
1.
B.
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American Federation of Government Employees
v. Dole, 670 F.Supp. 445 (D.C. 1987) (government's
random drug testing of even incumbent employees
in critical positions was approved where the Court
found that the testing plan reflected a high degree
of concern for employee privacy interests).
Taylor v. O'Grady, 669 F.Supp. 1422 (N.D. Ill. 1987)
(while the Court enjoined the Cook County Department
of Corrections from implementing its compulsory drug
testing program under which every employee was tested
annually without notice or reasonable suspicion, it
noted that the government in a proper circumstance
could avoid the requirement of probable cause by a
c. However, some very recent cases suggest that under
appropriate circumstances public employees in ~
critical positions may be subjected to even random I
tests without reasonable suspicion of substance abuse.,
I
.
1'.-.%
III
I
I
I
I
I····i2
r
!
i
;
r
r
r
I
r
r
r
i
t
r
r
I
showing that "a careful balancing of governmental
and private interests suggest that the public
interest is best served by a Fourth Amendment
standard of reasonableness that stops short of
probable cause").
Jones v. McKenzie, 2 IER Cases 1121 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(held a public school system drug testing program
to be valid without a requirement of reasonable
suspicion where the employee's duties have a direct
impact on the physical safety of children, testing
is part of a routine employment-related medical
examination, and the test used has a nexus to the
employer's safety concern).
O'Connor v. Ortega, 107 S.Ct. 1492, 1504 (1987) (In
this case, which did not involve drug or alcohol
testing, the Court in a footnote expressly left open
the issue of "the proper Fourth Amendment analysis
for drug and alcohol testing of employees").
3. Private employers.
a. No definitive reported cases on the issue of testing
of applicants or incumbent employees by private
employers.
b. Since state action is not normally involved in such
testing, it would appear that, in the absence of
contractual rights to the contrary or circumstances
which give rise to a cause of action for violation
of the common law right of privacy, private employers
should be able to test either applicants or incumbent
employees on even a random basis regardless of the
criticality of the position.
American Federation of Government Employees v.
Weinberger, 651 F.Supp. 726, 737 (S.D. Ga. 1986).
(in dictum, the court gratuitously expressed its
opinion concerning the legality of private employer
testing on even a random basis without the necessity
of individualized suspicion).
c. However, the non-approving language used by the
court in Weinberger and language used in dictum in
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers,
Local 1900 v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 121 LRRM
3071 (D.D.C. 1986) (referring to proposed measures
by a private employer, including urine and blood
drug tests, as "draconian", "drastic" and
"hysterical") suggest that while courts cannot
articulate a legal reason why private employers
should not be free to conduct random drug testing
of even non-critical jobs without individualized
suspicion, courts are disturbed by the concept.
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The Common Law Right of Privacy.
McCall v. Courier-Journal and Louisville Times, Ky.,
623 S.W.2d 882 (1981).
Kentucky has recognized a common law right of privacy
for about sixty years.
Kentucky has adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts
(1976) definition of invasion of privacy.
One who intentionally intrudes,
physically or otherwise, upon the
solitude or seclusion of another or
his private affairs or concerns is
subject to liability to the other
for invasion of his privacy, if the
intrusion would be highly offensive
to a reasonable person.
The right is not subject to concrete definition but
instead depends upon the facts in each case.
Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 652B (1976).
In determining whether the right has been violated,
it is necessary to balance the interests of the two
parties.
I
J
II
d
I
I
~
a
d
I
i
j
I
II
I
IThere are no Kentucky cases involving the "intrusion
into seclusion" type of invasion of privacy but there
is little question that alcohol and drug testing coull·
under certain circumstances, be so offensive as to .
constitute an invasion of the privacy of an employee.
The portion of the restatement definition most
applicable to drug and alcohol testing is Section
652B:
Perry v. Moskins Stores, Inc., Ky., 249 S.W.2d 812
(1952).
Gregory v. Bryan-Hunt Co., Ky., 174 S.W.2d 510
(1943).
b.
b.
a.
a.
Brents v. Morgan, Ky., 299 S.W.2d 967, 970 (1927)
("the right to be let alone, that is, the right of a
person to be free from unwarranted publicity, or the
right to live without interference by the public
about matters with which the public is not necessarily
concerned" ) .
2.
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Because both private and public employers are potentially
at risk from common law tort actions for invasion of privacy,
prudence suggests that employers restrict drug and alcohol
testing as follows:
A. Public Employers.
(1) Applicants - test only for critical positions where
safety is very important or where zero tolerance for
drugs or alcohol is implicitly job-related.
(2) Incumbent employees - test only for critical
positions and under circumstances indicating a
reasonable-sllspicion of substance abuse •
B. Private Employers.
(1) Applicants - test as desired without regard to
criticality of position or individualized suspicion
of substance abuse.
(2) Incumbent employees - test only employees who
occupy critical positions or as to whom reasonable
grounds exist to suspect work-related substance
abuse.
c. Public and Private Employers - insure that testing
procedures for applicants and incumbents are the least
intrusive and least offensive that can be devised and
recognize to the maximum extent possible the privacy
rights of individual employees .
H-7
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I. Introduction
r
r
r
1
A.
B.
Generally, an employer has a duty to provide its
employees with a safe place to work. This duty is
imposed by the common law, and more recently by state
and federal statutes, which have codified and grown out
of the common law.
A current major concern to employees and employers
alike relates to the harmful nature of the working
environment itself: specifically, the threat to an
employee's health which is posed by the health and
habits of his fellow employees.
Communicable diseases pose one such threat, as
employees come in contact during the working day
and typically spend large amounts of time togeth-
er.
Pollution of the very air breathed by employees
with tobacco smoke generated by co-workers poses
another serious threat to the health and well-be-
ing of employees and the harm is not confined to
the employees themselves:
r
r
r
1.
2.
a.
b.
a.
Chief among fear of contagion is the present
HIV virus, responsible for AIDS.
TUberculosis has in the past been a concern,
although modern diagnostic measures and
treatment have abated this problem to a large
extent.
Employers face problems which impact unfavor-
ably on the balance sheet.
r
~
I
r,
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
Rising health insurance costs.
Increased employee absenteeism.
Higher maintenance cost on equipment.
The threat of litigation.
I-I
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3. The problem of workplace safety and health has
been regulated to some extent by federal and state
legislation (e.g., OSHA).
SMOKING IN THE WORKPLACE
Cause for Employer Concern
Concerns over smoking in the workplace are threefold:
health, safety, and economics.
A. Health
Aside from the not inconsiderable harm smokers do to
themselves, the current focus is on the harm done to
non-smokers.
1. They are forced to breathe smoke emanating direct-
ly from burning tobacco ("sidestream" smoke).
2. They are forced to breathe smoke exhaled into the
environment by tobacco users ("mainstream" smoke).
a. Both contain high concentrations of many
known toxic and carcinogenic agents. [1]
3. December 1986 Surgeon General Report[2] stated
unequivocally that the inhalation of smoke from
other people's cigarettes causes lung cancer and
other diseases in healthy non-smokers.
a. Exposure to tobacco smoke in the workplace
poses the most serious and pervasive threat
of harm to non-smokers because they spend
relatively large amounts of time at work.
4. Physical harm to non-smokers
a. About 5000 non-smokers die each year from
lung cancer caused by involuntary smoking. [3]
b. Also adversely affects people with heart
diseases.
c. May affect fetuses in pregnant women.
d. Evidence suggests there may not be a "safe"
level for such exposure. [4]
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! 5. Physical discomforts
r a.
b.
Large percentages of non-smokers have diffi-
culty working near smokers.
Irritating and noxious effects of involuntary
smoking affect eyes, nasal passages, lungs.
B. Economy,.,
r
1. Disease and lost productivity due to smoking cost
the nation $65 billion a year, $43 billion in lost
productivity, and $22 billion in health care
expense. [5]
r
a. Employers incur significantly increased costs
when they permit smoking in the workplace.
b. A smoking employee:
iii. uses health care system 50% more;
Employers incur increased costs of maintain-
ing and repairing equipment damaged by
smoke. [8]
r
r
r
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r c.
i.
ii.
iv.
v.
wastes 6% of his working hours with the
smoking ritual;
takes 50% more sick leave;
imposes greater maintenance cost on the
employer to meet air standards[6]; and
costs the employer $5,000 per year per
smoker in additional costs. [7]
Safety
b.
a.
r
r
r
I
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1.
2.
Bans on smoking altogether are not unusual in
industries where combustible substances or other
hazardous materials are present. [9]
Protection of employees from fire or other
safety hazards.
It is relatively easy for an employer to
unilaterally impose a smoking ban or restric-
tions on smoking in hazardous areas.
A high rate of accidents among smokers is attrib-
uted to smokers' preoccupation with the smoking
ritual, and consequent inattention to the job.[10]
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A. states
Legislation
1. Public Places
Laws that designate specific no-smoking
areas or give non-smoking employees
specific rights.
iii.
ii. Laws that provide some guidelines but
give employers discretion in determining
how controls are implemented.
i. Kentucky only restricts smoking in
elementary and secondary schools
(KRS 438.050), and prisons (KRS 196.245).
b. Typical workplace smoking laws:
i. Laws that require employers to adopt,
implement and post written smoking
policy but don't spell out the specif-
ics.
a. Most states have enacted legislation to
restrict smoking in "public places", (taxis,
supermarkets, theaters, elevators).
b. Kentucky has no restriction for pUblic
places.
c. A state-by-state analysis chart is attached
as Exhibit A.
Federal
2. Workplace
a. state laws may cover either both private and
public employers, only private or pUblic, or
specific groups, such as retailers, educa-
tional institutions.
B.
II.
1. Non-smokers employed by the federal government are
protected against involuntary exposure to tobacco
smoke in the workplace.
a. However, recognizing smokers exist in the
workplace, agencies have the right to desig-
nate areas for smoking.
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III. Legal Remedies
Judicial Relief Sought
,..
r,
r A.
b. Regulations controlling smoking in government
service administration controlled buildings
are contained in 41 CFR Part 101-20.109-10.
r
1. Where legislation fails to address an important
health issue such as smoking in the workplace,
people naturally turn to the courts for relief.
B. Legal Theories Available
r-
"
r
....
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a.
b.
Challenges of smokers and smoking in the
workplace have enjoyed considerable success
in obtaining jUdicial relief under a variety
of legal theories.
Litigation by non-smokers against employers
will most likely become increasing common in
the future •
Common Law Claims
Employers have a common law duty to provide a
safe and healthful workplace and therefore
might be expected to protect the rights of
non-smokers to breathe smoke free air.
r
r
r
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i. The landmark case involving non-smokers'
rights to a smoke-free workplace is
Shimp v. New Jersey Bell Telephone Co.,
145 N.J. Super. 516, 368 A.2d 408
(1976). In this case, plaintiff was
allergic to cigarette smoke, and suf-
fered severe throat, nasal and eye
irritation caused by employees smoking
at desks situated in her work area.
Plaintiff filed suit claiming her
employer had a common law duty to
maintain a safe and healthful and
workplace and that the presence of
tobacco smoke was a breach of this duty.
The court held that employees have a
common law right to a safe and healthful
work environment, and employers have a
concomitant affirmative duty to provide
a safe work environment.
aa. The court also took note of the
fact that the company had a rule
that cigarettes could not be smoked
b.
c.
around the equipment. The court
felt that a company which had shown
such concern for its equipment
should have at least as much
concern for its human beings.
ii. In order to prevail under a common law
theory, plaintiff-employee must demon-
strate clearly through scientific
evidence that tobacco smoke has a
deleterious effect on non-smokers in
general.
The Missouri court of Appeals has also held
that an injunction is appropriate to prevent
harm to an employee from tobacco smoke in the
workplace.
i. Smith v. Western Electric Co., 643
S.W.2d 10 (Mo. ct. App. 1982), recog-
nized the well-settled duty of an
employer "to use all reasonable care to
provide a reasonably safe workplace" for
its employees. The court also held that
"smoking in the work area is hazardous
to the health of employees in general
and plaintiff in particular." Isl. at
23.
But see Gordon v. Raven Systems & Research.
Inc., 462 A.2d 10 (D.C. 1983). Plaintiff was
terminated when she refused to work in an
area containing tobacco smoke. While the
court recognized the common law duty of an
employer to provide a reasonably safe
workplace, this did not impose upon the
employer the duty to conform his workplace
"to the particular needs or sensitivities of
an individual employee." Isl. at 15.
i. The court distinguished this case from
Shimp because Gordon failed to present
evidence on the harmful effect of
tobacco smoke on non-smokers in general,
whereas the plaintiff in Shimp had
presented voluminous evidence on the
general harmful effect to non-smokers
from tobacco smoke.
ii. To prevail on a common law theory, a
non-smoking plaintiff must demonstrate
that tobacco smoke is harmful to both
himself, and to non-smokers generally.
r
r,
d. Smith v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of New
Jersey, No. C-3617-81 E (N.J. Super. ct.
1983). Following similar reasoning, the New
Jersey Superior Court denied the request of
an employee hypersensitive to smoke to force
an employer to implement broad smoking
restrictions, stressing the needs of both
smokers and non-smokers must be balanced.
The court criticized Shimp as "too sweeping"
and "well beyond what is necessary to insure
a safe working place."
2. Common Law Negligence Theories
3. Worker's Compensation Claims
,..
!
r
r
i,
a.
a.
McCarthy v. State of Washington. Dept. of
Social and Health Services, 1 IER Cases 1233
(Wash. ct. App. 1986). A non-smoking employ-
ee who developed pulmonary disease after
being exposed to her co-workers' smoking sued
her employer for negligence. Holding for the
employee, the court found the employer
"negligently failed to provide the worker
with a safe and healthful place of employ-
ment."
Employee's Perspective
,..
j
r
r
r
r
i.
ii.
iii.
Employees exposed to smoking in the
workplace and SUffering harm therefrom
have successfully won worker's compensa-
tion benefits as "emploYment related
injury."
KRS 342.620(1) defines "injury" as:
any work related harmful change in
the human organism, arising out of
and in the course of emploYment
including damage to or loss of a
prosthetic appliance, but does not
include any communicable disease
unless the risks of contracting
such disease is increased by the
nature of the emploYment. "Injury"
when used generally, unless the
context indicates otherwise, shall
include an occupational disease.
KRS 342.620(2) defines "occupational
disease" as:
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a disease arising out of and in the
course of the employment.
b. Employers' Perspective
i. Employer immunity from common law suits.
aa. The exclusive remedy provisions of
a workers' comp act may immunize
employers by barring employees by
bringing a civil action against an
employer for personal injuries
sustained in the course of employ-
ment.
The employee's sole remedy is
administrative compensation.
bb. Is the immunity absolute or quali-
fied?
cc. In McCarthy v. Dept. of Social &
Health Services, 46 Wash. App. 125,
730 P.2d 681 (1986), plaintiff's
worker's comp claim and SUbsequent
appeal were denied by the workers'
comp board. She then filed suit
under the negligence theory, and
the trial court dismissed her
action based on immunity conferred
by the Workers' Compensation Act.
The Appeals Board reversed, stating
private actions are barred only
when the harm sustained is within
coverage of the Act. Since the
claim was denied, and therefore not
compensable under the Act, McCarthy
could sue her employer under the
negligence theory.
But note: Equitable relief is
still available to the employ-
ee because exclusive remedy
provisions apply only by their
terms to common law actions.
Disability Claims
a. Allergy to tobacco smoke entitled a federal
worker to disability payments.
i. In Parodi v. Merit Systems Protection
Board, 690 F.2d 731 (9th Cir. 1982), a
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smoke sensitive employee developed
asthmatic bronchitis following transfer
to an office occupied mainly by tobacco
smokers. She began missing work. Her
doctor advised a leave of absence, and
the employee requested disability
retirement. The court held the employee
disabled by a "disease which limits the
environment in which she can work" and
ruled the employer must either provide
the workers with "suitable emploYment in
a safe environment" (~, in a smoke-
free workplace), or consider her dis-
abled and entitled to disability pay.
UnemploYment Compensation Claims
a. Employees who claimed they were forced to
quit due to cigarette smoke in the workplace
have had varied levels of success.
r
I
r
i.
ii.
Alexander v. Unemployment Insurance
Appeals Board, 163 Cal. Rptr.411, 104
Cal. App. 3d 97, a court allowed bene-
fits where claimant said allergy to
cigarette smoke in the workplace forced
her to quit.
McCracklin v. Employment Development
Dept. and Butler Service Group. Inc.,
205 Cal. Rptr. 156, 156 Cal. App. 3d
1067 (1984). An employee not allergic
to cigarette smoke who quit only as he
found it unpleasant and offensive, was
awarded benefits. The court stated the
employee need only fear for his health
and safety to recover unemploYment
benefits.
iii.
r
r
r
r
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6.
But ~, Rotenberg v. Industrial Commis-
~, 590 P.2d 521, 42 Colo. App. 161
(1979), and Rockstuhl v. Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania. Unemployment Compensation
Board of Review, 426 A.2d 719, 57 Pa.
cmwlth. 302 (1981), where unemploYment
benefits were denied employees who
claimed they were forced to quit due to
cigarette smoke in the workplace.
Constitutional Rights
a. Although the united states Supreme Court has
never directly ruled on this issue, federal
1-9
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courts have held there is no constitutionally
protected right to breathe air free from
tobacco smoke.
i. In Gasper v. Louisiana Stadium & Exposi-
tion District, 418 F.Supp. 716 (E.D. La.
1976), aff'd, 577 F.2d 897 (5th Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1073
(1979), plaintiffs claimed a constitu-
tional right to smoke-free air based on
the First, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth
Amendments to the constitution. The
court held that there were no such
constitutional rights.
ii. In Kensell v. State of Oklahoma, 716
F.2d 1350 (CA 10, 1983), the court
rejected the employee's claims that the
employer's failure to provide a smoke-
free work area "assaulted him," inter-
fered his ability to think, and violated
his rights under the First, Fifth, Ninth
and Fourteenth Amendments.
iii. Rossie v. State of Wisconsin/Dept. of
Revenue, 1 IER Cases, 1028 (Wis. ct.
App. 1986), a state court of appeals
held that a Wisconsin statute prohibit-
ing smoking in all but certain designat-
ed areas had a reasonable basis and did
not deny equal protection of the law in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Handicap Claims
a. The Federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and
similar state statutes require that certain
employers accommodate "handicapped persons."
i. A non-smoking employee sensitive to
smoke may qualify as a "handicapped
person." If so, he may be able to
invoke the statute to obtain a smoke-
free workplace, as the statute entitles
him to "reasonable accommodation" for
his handicap.
ii. However, the statute only protects
students and employees of federal grant
recipients, employees of federal con-
tractors, and employees of the federal
government. However, even indirect
3: -10
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iii.
iv.
federal funding may trigger the applica-
tion of this statute.
The definition of "handicapped individu-
al": "any person who (1) has a physical
or mental impairment which sUbstantially
limits one or more of such person's
major life activities, (2) has a record
of such an impairment, or (3) is regard-
ed as having an impairment."
Two cases have considered whether a
non-smoker can qualify as a handicapped
person under the act.
aa. Vickers v. Veterans' Administra-
tion, 549 F.Supp. 85 (w.O. Wash.
1982). The court held that a smoke
sensitive employee of the VA was a
"handicapped person" within the
contemplation of the statute, as he
was "unusually sensitive to tobacco
smoke" and that this hypersen-
sitivity did in fact limit a major
life activity -- plaintiff's
capacity to work in an environment
not completely smoke-free. However,
the court denied the relief sought
as the evidence showed the VA made
successful attempts to significantly
reduce tobacco smoke in this
plaintiff's workplace.
bb. BYt see Gasp v. Mecklenberg County,
42 N.C. App. 226, 256 S.E.2d 477
(1979), where an unincorporated
association brought an action
against the county on behalf of a
class of all persons harmed by
tobacco smoke present in the pUblic
facilities. They sought handi-
capped status for the entire class
under both the Federal Rehabiliation
Act of 1973 and a North Carolina
statute protecting handicapped
persons. The court denied handi-
capped status to the class as it
was too broad a class of persons.
r
r
r
b. Kentucky
i. KRS 207.130, the Equal Opportunities
Act, defines a physical handicap as "The
I-II
ii.
physical condition of a person whether
congenital or acquired, which consti-
tutes a substantial disability to that
person and is demonstrable by medically
accepted clinical or laboratory diagnos-
tic techniques."
KRS 207.150, while affording protection
for a handicapped person, specifically
states that a handicapped person is not
entitled to accommodation for his
handicap.
aa. "This subsection shall not be
construed to require any employer
to modify his physical facility or
grounds in any way, or exercise a
higher degree of caution for a
handicapped individual than for any
person who is not a handicapped
individual."
8. Breach of Implied Employment Contract
a. The employee irritated by tobacco smoke may
claim that his implied contract of employment
includes healthy working conditions.
i. Hentzel v. Singer Co., 188 Cal. Rptr.
159, 138 Cal. App.3d 290 (1982). The
court upheld the employee's claim that
he was terminated because he could not
tolerate cigarette smoke in his workplace
as employer's violation of an implied
contract of employment. I
IV.
ii. But~, Bernard v. Cameron & Colby Co•.
~ 2 IER Cases 78 (Mass. Sup. Jud. ct.
1986), where the court dismissed the
employee's allegations that there was an
implied term of contract requiring the
employer to provide her a smoke-free
work environment, as the employee failed
to provide sufficient evidence that the
implied term she sought was "fixedly
desired" by both parties.
Unionized Workplace
A. No Duty to Bargain
1. Where well-established safety or health principles
are involved, management can control or ban
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r-, smoking altogether without negotiating with the
union. [11]
a. For example, refineries, chemical plants, or
other facilities where serious property
damage or loss of life could result from
smoking.
Duty to Bargain
r-
I
r
i
r
B.
1.
b. Also food preparation areas and plants that
produce processed food.
However, in less hazardous areas, such as offices
and non-production facilities, the NLRB has
consistently held that a change in smoking rules
constitutes a change in working conditions.
a. Johns-Mansfield Sales Corp. v. International
Ass'n of Machinists. Local Lodge 1609, 621
F.2d 756 (CA. 5 1980), the court held the
collective bargaining agreement denied the
employer, a manufacturer of asbestos prod-
ucts, the right to adopt a rule prohibiting
all smoking on company property and providing
for disciplinary sanctions for violation of
the rule, even where the employer acted in
recognition of the significantly increased
danger of lung cancer to its employees who
smoke.
Arbitration
In unionized workplaces, disputes over the crea-
tion and enforcement of smoking rules often are
resolved through arbitration.
b. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Pennsylvania
Labor Relations Board, No. 2167 C.D. (Pa.
cmwlth. ct. 1980, 1983). A county work rule
banning smoking by public employees at work
stations was struck down, affirming a Penn-
sylvania Labor Relations Board ruling that a
no-smoking policy could not be imposed
without first bargaining with the employees'
union.
r
r
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a. Generally, arbiters uphold the employer's
right to impose and enforce "reasonable"
smoking restrictions to safeguard both life
and property.
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3.
3.
Safety
a. Gladieux Food Services. Inc., 70 La. 544.
The discharge of an employee for smoking in a
restricted area was just, an arbitrator
decided, as he was smoking in a critical area
(aircraft fueling site).
b. Olin Corp. 81 La. 644. A chemical manufac-
turer's discharge of an employee for a single
act of smoking in an unauthorized area was held
proper, where no smoking area was clearly marked.
c. But see, Converters. Ink and Ink Workers, 68
La. 593. Discharge was held to be too severe
a penalty for an employee who worked in an
area containing explosives, where the employ-
ee was an inveterate smoker, whose lighting
of a cigarette was an "unconscious" action.
Extension of Existing Restrictions
a. Schien Body & Equipment Co •. Inc., 69 La.
930. Extending its no-smoking rule, an
employer posted a notice prohibiting on the
job smoking by employees in nearly all areas
of the workplace. A group of employees, both
smokers and non-smokers, protested the
employer's unilateral imposition of the rule.
The arbitrator decided the employer's action
could not be justified on grounds of either
health or business needs.
b. BYt~, Sherwood Medical Industries, 72 La.
258, where an employer's revision of a
smoking rule that eliminated smoking in
locker rooms, rest rooms and hallways, and
restricted smoking to the lunchroom during
rest and lunch periods, was upheld as a
reasonable exercise of management's reserved
right and was done for a "legitimate business
interest and purpose."
Test of Reasonableness
a. Morelite Equipment Co., 88 La. 777. Follow-
ing a fire caused by a discarded cigarette,
the employer issued new regulations severely
restricting smoking, stating the need to
prevent fire hazards and maintain workers'
safety. The union questioned whether the
regulations were reasonable. The arbiter
held unilaterally banning smoking at work
1-14
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Adopting a Smoking Policy
stations for safety reasons was "not unrea-
sonable".
,.
1
,.
i
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!
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v. Company Policy
A.
i. Most arbiters agree that employers have
the right to establish "reasonable"
rules and regulations, with or without
union concurrence, so long as the rules
are not discriminatory in application
and do not conflict with the collective
bargaining agreement. [12]
Recommendations
r
1
r
r
,..
r
r
r B.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
During the last five years there has been a
significant increase in the number of companies
adopting a smoking policy.
Survey of the case law indicates that non-smokers
wishing to clear the air have effective legal
remedies at their disposal.
There is no recognized basis in law that one has a
right to smoke in the workplace.
This has serious ramifications for employers that
fail to protect their employees from involuntary
smoking in the workplace.
In addition to incurring significantly increased
operating costs for permitting such smoking, these
employers will pay a substantial price if an
employee is harmed and begins litigation against
the employer.
Get a commitment from top management to the
policy development and enforcement.
If there are relevant industry standards or
state or local laws, insure that any policy
developed complies with them.
Where there are unions, get them involved at
an early stage.
b.
a.
c.
1. Employers should develop a company policy regard-
ing smoking in the workplace.
2. The following guidelines should be followed: [13]
r
r
r
i
r
r
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a.
I.
II.
d. Smoking policies may need to be tailored to
specific facilities and even parts of facili-
ties.
e. Involve a cross-section of the community's
work force in formulating the policy.
f. A survey of employees' attitudes and smoking
habits should be taken.
g. Any policy developed should be circulated
throughout the company.
h. The policy should be enforced consistently.
AIDS IN THE WORKPLACE
Introduction
A. Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome ("AIDS"):
1. AIDS poses a serious threat to the economic and
social well-being of the entire country, and is a
serious health hazard of national proportions.
2. However, its impact on the workplace is especially
severe.
An employee with AIDS can cause fear and
panic among fellow employees.
b. An employee with AIDS can expose his employer
to liability for discrimination.
Medical Background
A. AIDS is a syndrome caused by the Human Immunodeficiency
Virus ("HIV").
1. HIV enters bloodstream, attacks body's immune
system, and destroys body's ability to ward off
otherwise non-life threatening diseases.
a. Transmitted through exchange of blood or
semen from one infected to one who is not. [14]
b. No evidence AIDS can be spread by non-sexual
social contact. [15]
c. Cannot be spread by breathing, sneezing,
coughing, shaking hands, hugging, or sharing
toilets, food, or utensils. [16]
Death occurs in 85% of patients within two years
of diagnosis. [17],..
I,
2.
a. Victims are divided into three categories.
Those with ARC (AIDS Related Complex).
i. Those who test positive for anti-bodies
but show no symptoms.
ii. Those with AIDS.
iii.
,..
t
,..
r aa. Those with ARC have some symptomsof AIDS, but don't meet the defini-
tion, as they don't have one of the
secondary diseases associated with
AIDS.
In Kentucky, as of July 1987, there were:
d. Average AIDS patient is hospitalized 168 days
at a cost of $147,000 per patient. [18]
The Center for Disease Control ("CDC") reports 1.5
to 2 million in the USA are currently infected
with HIV.
One million test positive for antibodies.
38,000 cases of AIDS have been reported.
178,000 to 370,000 have ARC.b.
b.
a.
a.
c.
900 - 1000 people infected with the HIV
virus. [19]
82 cases of AIDS reported. [20] Total has
reached 110 on January 12, 1988, as reported
by ABC News.
victims of AIDS
3.
5.
4.
,..
r
r
r
,..
,.
f
,.
I
,.
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a. 73% are homosexual and bi-sexual men •...
I
...
!
!
b.
c .
17% are intravenous drug users.
The remainder are hemophiliacs, blood trans-
fusion recipients, infants of infected
mothers, prostitutes, sex partners of those
at risk. [21]
r
,...
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III. Labor and Employment Law Issues
A. Employment Discrimination
1. Adverse employment decisions affecting persons
with AIDS may be actionable under federal and/or
state law.
2. The Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. Sec.
701, et ~)
a. Forbids discrimination against handicapped
individuals in employment decisions.
b. Applies to federal contractors and employers
who receive federal financial assistance.
3. The Rehabilitation Act defines a handicapped
individual as a person who (1) has a physical or
mental impairment which substantially limits one
or more major life activities, (2) has a record of
such an impairment, or (3) is regarded as having
such an impairment.
a. Because the breakdown of an AIDS' victims
immune system may be considered a physical
impairment that limits a major life activity
(employment), AIDS may be a handicap under
the Rehabilitation Act.
i. Note: Even those who do not have AIDS,
but who are "regarded" as having the
disease, may be protected under this
statute.
b. In Arline v. School Board of Nassau County,
772 F.2d 759, U.S. (1986), the
Supreme Court ruled that the plaintiff, who
suffered from the contagious disease of
tuberculosis, was a handicapped person as
defined by' the Act.
c. New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children.
Inc. v. Carrie, 466 F.Supp. 478 (E.D.N.Y.
1978), aff'd, 612 F.2d 644 (2d Cir. 1979),
held that children with Hepatitis B (an
infectious disease generally transmitted only
through blood to blood contact) were handi-
capped persons within the meaning of the Act,
and that their removal from their regular
classroom was a violation of the Act.
c. In Thomas v. Atascadero Unified School
District, No. 886-609 AHS, Slip Ope (D.C.
I~18
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KRS 207.150 prohibits handicap discrimination in
emploYment.
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e.
a.
b.
Cal. Nov. 17, 1986), a child with AIDS was
barred from attending kindergarten after he
bit a classmate. The court ruled that AIDS
is a protected handicap under the Rehabilita-
tion Act and that the child must be allowed
to return to school absent any showing that
he posed a risk of transmission.
Shuttleworth v. Broward Co. Office of the
Budget and Management Policy, Florida Commis-
sion on Human Relations, FCHR No. 85-0624
(Dec. 11, 1985), AIDS was held to be a
handicap under the Florida Human Rights Act.
The county's justification for discharging an
employee who had AIDS was rejected on the
grounds that no evidence exists to show that
AIDS is transmitted by normal, casual
workplace contact.
People v. 49 West 12th Street Tenants Corp.,
No. 43604/83 (N.Y.S.Ct.), a New York trial
court held AIDS to be a protected "disabili-
ty" under New York's human rights law, where
tenants of an apartment cooperative attempted
to evict a physician because he treated AIDS
patients in the building.
In Chrysler Outboard Corp. v. Dept. of
Industry. Labor and Human Relations, 14 FEP
Cases (BNA) 344 (Wis. Cir. ct. 1976), the
court held the employer's refusal to hire a
job applicant who had acute lYmPhocytic
leukemia was a violation of the Wisconsin
Fair EmploYment Act. The court held that the
employer failed to prove the applicant was
presently unable to perform, and that the
risk of future absenteeism and/or higher
insurance costs are not legal basis on which
to discriminate.
Kentucky statute explicitly excludes persons
with communicable diseases such as AIDS from
protection.
No cases to date have challenged this stat-
ute.
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B. Testing of Applicants and Employees
1. ELISA (Enzyme-Linked Immunosorbent Assay) test is
used first, followed by confirmatory western blot
test.
2. Voluntary or mandatory testing is strongly dis-
couraged.
a. CDC says it's unnecessary and unwarranted as
AIDS cannot be transmitted by casual contact.
b. The Surgeon General says it is not necessary,
it's unreliable, and cost-prohibitive.
c. Neither of the two blood tests used are
capable of detecting infection by the HIV
virus.
i. They can only detect the presence of
AIDS antibodies.
ii. The presence of antibodies may mean the
person will develop ARC or AIDS, ~
successfully repel the virus. [22]
d. AIDS may be a protected handicap under the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and therefore any
tests, screening out handicapped individuals
is banned as discriminatory. [23]
3. Kentucky statues are silent on testing.
a. No case law regarding the legality of testing
job applicants or employees for AIDS antibod-
ies.
5. Duty to Bargain
a. Where there is a collective bargaining
agreement there may be a duty to bargain over
implementing an AIDS testing policy.
i. Section Sed) of the Labor Management
Relations Act prohibits an employer from
making unilateral changes with respect
to "wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment."
ii. The NLRB has held plant rules governing
discipline, safety and health may be
"mandatory subjects" of bargaining.
I-20
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aa. See, California Cedar Products, 123
LRRM 1355: See, Electri-Flex Co.,
2138 NLRB 713 (1978), enf'd. 624
F.2d 1103 (7th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 447 U.S. 924 (1980 held:
unilateral requirement that employ-
ees wear safety glasses violates
the Act. Medicenter. Mid-South
Hospital, 221 NLRB 670 (1975)
requiring all applicants and
employees to submit to polygraph
tests is a mandatory subject since
it is a change in the employer
investigatory methods, substantial-
ly varying the mode and character
of proof on which job security may
hinge.
6. Constitutional Restrictions on Testing
r
r-
i
a. The right of privacy and the freedom to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures
may be impacted in the case of pUblic sector
employees.
In Caruso v. Ward, 506 N.Y.S.2d 789
(1986), random standardless drug testing
of tenured police officers was struck
down as violative of the Fourteenth
Amendment, in the absence of "reasonable
suspicion".
i.
ii. But see, Patchogue-Medford Congress v.
Board of Education, 1 IER Cases (BNA)
1315 (N.Y. 1986), and McDonnell v.
Hunter, 809 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1987),
where the public welfare was held to
outweigh the individual's expectation of
privacy.
Pre-Employment InquiriesC.
,.,
r
r
t
1. As testing for AIDS may be prohibited, an employer
may want to A§k a prospective employee whether he
has ARC or AIDS.
,....
I
a.
b.
However, if AIDS victims are protected under
anti-discrimination laws, employers probably
cannot directly ask this question.
Under EEOC Guidelines, it is prohibited to
inquire into the nature or severity of a
handicap. [24]
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2. Permissible Questions
a.
b.
c.
Inquiries as to any reasons, medical, physi-
cal, or psychological, as to why the job
applicant could not perform the job for which
he is applying.
Inquiries as to reasons for previous termina-
tions from employment.
Inquiries as to any prolonged absence from a
job.
3. physical Examinations
a. Employers may condition job offers on the
results of physical examinations as long as:
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
all entering employees must do so;
specific job related conditions require
it;
the results are not used to discriminate
against an otherwise qualified individu-
al.
But Note: The use of the ELISA test for
AIDS, since it is used only to screen
for AIDS, would be a violation if AIDS
is found to be a protected handicap.
D. Invasion of Privacy Issue
1. Kentucky Sexually Transmitted Disease Control
Confidentiality Act of 1986, KRS 214.400 et seg.,
specifically includes AIDS.
a.
b. However, medical personnel are concerned because
they are prevented from informing the spouse
or family of one testing positive for AIDS.
2. Defamation
a. It would appear prudent for employers to
restrict access and disclosure of medical
information concerning AIDS in the work force
to avoid defamation suits.
r
r E. Sexual Preference
1. Whether an employer may discriminate on the basis
of sexual preference has impact on the AIDS issue.
a. Although Title VII does protect from discrim-
ination on the basis of "sex", it has been
held that "sex" does not include "sexual
preference" as an impermissible classifica-
tion.
See, Smith v. Liberty Mutual Insurance
Co., 569 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1978); and
Sonner v. Budget Marketing, Inc., 667
F.2d 748 (8th Cir. 1982).
i.
a. As a majority of AIDS sufferers are homosex-
ual or bi-sexua1 men, discriminating against
that category may have the effect of discrim-
inating against AIDS victims.
Sexual preference or sexual orientation is not a
protected category under Title VII of the civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e ~ seg.
2.
r
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F. OSHA and AIDS
Private employers whose business affects inter-
state commerce are obligated under the Occupation-
al Safety and Health Act to provide a safe and
healthful workplace.
Regulations under OSHA provide protection for
employees who refuse to work because of a reason-
able apprehension of death or serious injury,
coupled with a reasonable belief that no less
drastic alternative is available. Marshall v.
Whirlpool, 445 U.S. 1 (1980), upholding 29 CFR
1977.12(b) (2) (1979).
r
r
2.
a. OSHA's protection applies to occupational
injury or illness, which is defined as a
"personal injury or illness arising from work
situations."
However, one who refuses to perform his task
for fear of contracting AIDS from a co-em-
ployee or customer would probably not be
protected.
r
a,
i. Although such individuals could not be
disciplined for refusing to work, they
r
f
r
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G.
would still be sUbject to replace-
ment. [25]
ii. An employee may have the right to demand
that the employer supply him with
protective equipment. [26]
3. There are at the present time no OSHA standards
which have been promulgated concerning AIDS.
a. However, it appears that an employer does not
violate the general duty clause under OSHA
when it allows an employee with AIDS to
work. [27]
Union considerations
1. A group of employees who refuses to work with an
AIDS victim co-employee, or who seeks his removal,
may be engaged in a "protected activity" within
the meaning of Section 7 and 8(a)(1) of the Labor
Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 157,
158 (a) (1) •
a. Resulting discipline may constitute an unfair
labor practice.
b. However, if fears of contagion are unreason
~, and workers petitioning constitutes
prohibitive discrimination, it is DQt a
protected activity. [28]
2. Section 507 of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 143,
requires a union to have an "ascertainable objec-
tive basis" for a health or safety related job
action (~, strike).
a. Difficult to prove, as no evidence AIDS is
transmitted casually.
3. Collective bargaining agreements may afford
protection from discrimination or discharge on the
basis of AIDS.
a. Grievance and arbitration procedures must be
observed.
b. ~, state of Delaware Dept. of Corrections,
86 LA 849 (Gill., 1986), where the arbitrator
balanced the prison guards' need to know
which inmates tested positive for AIDS
against the assurances of confidentiality
given the prisoners. The Department was
d
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directed to seek an inmate's consent to waive
confidentiality, or administer a new test
without promising it.
In Re: Nursing Home, 88 LA 681 (Sedwick,
1987), concerned an employee in a nursing
home who was discharged because he had AIDS.
Discharge was improper in view of the employer's
policy to suspend employees who have communi-
cable diseases until such time as they no
longer have the disease.
~, State of Minnesota. Dept. of Correc-
tions, 85 LA 1185 (Gallagher, 1985), where
the grievant, a prison guard, was discharged
for disobeying a direct order to conduct "pat
searches" of inmates because he feared he
would contract AIDS. Several inmates were
known to have AIDS. He was suspended and
later discharged. The arbitrator ordered
grievant reinstated, where the evidence
showed educational material on AIDS provided
grievant by employer actually enhanced the
fear of casual contact with AIDS victims.
H. Personal Service Workers
1. Several employer groups face unique problems,
including personal service workers such as hair-
dressers, food service workers, health care
workers, teachers, and prison guards.
a. AIDS guidelines for the health care industry
have been developed by the CDC, OSHA, and
AHA.
r
!
i.
ii.
Requirements for wearing protective
gear.
Take care when handling needles, sharp
instruments.
iii.,.
I
r
r
r
r
2.
3.
strict adherence to infection control
guidelines.
KRS 217.370 prohibits any person with "any conta-
gious or venereal disease" to work in or near the
preparation, manufacture, sale, or distribution of
food.
School employees may face similar problems with
children who are AIDS victims.
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AIDS and Worker's Comp
1. There have been no reported cases of AIDS to the
Kentucky Workers' Compensation Board to date.
Termination
1. An employer terminating an employee solely on the
basis that he has AIDS or has tested positive for
AIDS may be held to have violated state and
federal handicap discrimination statutes.
a. The probability that the disease will make
the employee unable to perform his duties in
the future is not a valid cause for dismiss-
al. [29]
b. However, if the employee's work performance
has deteriorated and his ill health inter-
feres with his ability to do the job, then
termination or a leave of absence may be
permissible.
2. Insubordination
a. Employees who refuse to work with an AIDS
afflicted fellow employee may be terminated
for insubordination. (see, Sec. G, Union
Considerations, infra.)
b. However, the employer should give the employ-
ee a chance to become educated on AIDS prior
to termination.
3. Application of ERISA
a. The EmplOYment Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 1001 et ~, may
protect employees with AIDS against dis-
charge.
i. Sec. 510 prohibits an employer from
discharging an employee "for purposes of
interfering with the attainment of any
right to which he may become entitled"
pursuant to an employee benefit plan.
aa. However, since the employee's
attainment of rights may mean
vesting of benefits, once the
benefits are vested the employer's
actions in terminating cannot be
1-26
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said to interfere with the employ-
ee's attainment of those rights.
Employer Defenses
Health Care Coverage Costs
Fear of Contagion
However if AIDS is found in the future
to present a significant threat of
infection to co-workers, then the
contagion defense would prevail.
See, Shuttleworth, supra.i.
ii.
b.
a. Employers have sought to justify actions
against employees with AIDS by asserting the
fear of contagion defense (See, Shuttleworth
v. Broward County Office of Budget and
Management Policy, supra, where the employer
justified its discharge of an AIDS victim by
asserting this defense).
If AIDS is indeed considered a handicap and
no evidence of casual transmission is discov-
ered, the contagion defense will fail.
2.
1.
r
r
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a. An employer may try to justify its action of
discharge or refusal to hire an AIDS victim
based on economic reasons.
i.r
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However, if AIDS is considered a handi-
cap, this defense will not prevail as
increased insurance costs have been
rejected as legal reasons to refuse to
hire the handicapped. Sterling Transit
Co. v. FEPC, 28 FEP Cases 1351 (Cal. ct.
App., 4th District, Div. 1, 1981).
Employee Attendance
4. Non-Acceptance by Co-Workers or CUstomers
".
!
r
r
j
a.
b.
a.
An employee with AIDS may be expected to miss
more days of work.
Extremely poor attendance may justify medical
leave.
In Mantolete y. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416 (9th
Cir. 1985), the court held exceptions to the
Rehabilitation Act's non-discrimination rule
r
IV.
are narrowly construed. The handicapped
individual must present more than merely an
"elevated risk" to the other employees or
customers to justify discrimination based on
a handicap. The employer must demonstrate
that the employment creates a "reasonable
probability of substantial harm."
i. The non-acceptance defense would fail
under the same theory that the contagion
defense is rejected. See, Sprogis v.
United Air Lines. Inc., 444 F.2d 1194
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991
(1971), where this type of defense
rejected in a sex discrimination case.
ii. Until evidence is discovered which
supports transmission by casual contact
the non-acceptance defense will fail.
5. Futility to Invest Training Time
a. Where significant time and money is involved
in training an employee, some employers
contend AIDS victims will not live long
enough to justify the investment.
i. This argument may be attacked on the
grounds that a significant portion of
individuals who test positive for AIDS
will not develop the disease.
6. Risk of Future Injury (Safety)
a. Lewis v. Ford Motor Co., 29 FEP Cases 570
(Min. Super. ct. 1979). If the evidence
shows the applicant has the present ability
to physically accomplish the job duties, the
employer must establish to a reasonable
probability that because of the complainant's
physical condition, employment in the posi-
tion sought would be hazardous to the health
or safety of the complainant or others. If
this cannot be established, then the defense
fails and the employer is not justified in
discriminating against the applicant.
Management Guidelines[30]
A. Be familiar with applicable state and federal statutes
regarding discrimination on the basis of physical
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handicap, as well as any statutes or regulations
concerning communicable diseases in general.
Establish a corporate policy on AIDS, taking those
statutes and regulations into consideration. In
Kentucky, that policy might include:
1. A decision not to screen applicants or current
employees for AIDS.
As fear of contagion may lead to improvident employee
behavior, management should consider adopting an AIDS
education program for all employees.
Employers should keep all employee medical records
concerning AIDS strictly confidential. These records
should be be disclosed outside the company, and only
within the company to employees with a "need to know"
such information.
A decision as to what specific pre-emploYment
inquiries should be made: this may depend on the
job requirements and/or what industry is involved
(e.g., health care).
A decision whether a physical examination should
be required of job applications: if implemented,
then must take in All applicants, and results must
not be used in a discriminatory manner.
5.
3.
2.
4. Establish a policy regarding termination or any
adverse emploYment actions with respect to AIDS
victims. Any such action should not be taken
unless the employer cannot reasonably accommodate
the individual and if the individual can no longer
perform his or her job duties. The employer's
inability to conform should be well documented.
In a unionized setting, employers should discuss
any AIDS policy with the employees' collective
bargaining representative.
Once a policy is established, employers should imple-
ment by educating and training managers and supervi-
sors. Appropriate personnel actions and emploYment
discrimination should be discussed.
E.
D.
c.
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SMOKING IN THE WORKPLACE
SMOKING CONTROLS AT A GLANCE:
WORKPLACE PROVISIONS
(State Laws, Regulatiou, aDd Executive Orden)
IERM 511:215
Provisions AL AK AZ Aft CA CO cr DE DC FL GA HI lD IL IN IA KS
Co"'rac.
Public Employen x x x x x x x x x x x x x
Private Employers x x x
1')'Pe er CoDinl
Slete Law x x x x X x X x x x x x
Reculation
Executive Order x x x
Pro.lou/llequlr.....DLa
WritteDIPOIted Smokina Policy/Rules :l x x X x
Sien Pomna x x x x x x x x x x
Smokini·Pennitt«! Are.. x x x x x x x x x x x x x
Smoke-Free Areu Speci&ed° x x x x x
Control Smoke with Exiltin. Ph)'lical Barriers/
Ventilation System. x x x x x
Must Reuonably Accommodate Smokers x x x x x
Non-Smoken' Ri.hLa PrevaiJ in Disputes x
No Employee Diac.iplinelDiacharpl
DilCrimination for Smokin. Complaint :l
PenaltiwCi"il Remediel for NOllCOmpliance x :l x X X X X X
IERM 511:216
[Smoking Controls. Workplace Provisions]
SAIo'~ WORKPLACIi:
.;;1
I
Provisions KY LA ME MD MA MI MN MS MO MT NB NV NH NJ NM NY NC
Co".race
Public Employen x x x x X X X X X X x
Private Employers x x x x x x
Type 01 Control
Slete Law x x x x x x x X :l
Re1rIllation #
Executive Order x x
ProvlalOD./llequire....nLa
Written/POIt«! Smokin. Policy/Ruin x x x x X X x
Sien POllina x x x x x x X :l
SmokillC·Pennitted Areu x x x x x x X X X X x
Smoke-Free Areu Speci&ed° x x x X X X x
Control Smoke with Exiltilll Physical Barrien/
Ventilation Systems x x x :l
Muat Reaaoubly Accommodale Smoken
Non-Smoken' Ri.hle Pmail in Disputes x x
No Employee DilCiplinelDildlarpl
DilCriminatioD for Smok/III Complaint x
PenaltiWCivil Remediel for NOIICOmp1iance • x x X X :l X
i
;1
~r:;:1
Ii
s~
; [Smoking Controls, Workplace Provisiona]
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II PREFACE
The trial of a wrongful discharge case has been called a
David-Goliath struggle, a "little guy" vs nthe establishment"
encounter. There is plenty of emotion and "theatre n in the trial.
Defense counsel has much ammunition by way of documents,
'well coached witnesses, large staff, and is usually well prepared.
Plaintiff's counsel may have a just and righteous cause. But to
prevail there is plenty of hard work and preparation, which
needs to be done to prevail. Having "gotten to the jury n the
plaintiff has a chance to tell his story to a sympathetic audience,
made up for the most part of employees or former employees.
Counsel for the plaintiff needs to be skillful in the presentation
of the case in chief, in handling cross examination, experts,
documents, and demonstrative evidence. If counsel does his
homework chances are there will be a favorable verdict.
J-l
§12:06. Jury Selection (Voir Dire).
The plaintiff wants jurors who are sympathetic to employ-
ees, tolerant of human fraility, and free of a proemployer bias.
Although the formal purpose of voir dire is to find out.
whether the potential jurors have any relevant prejudices, voir
dire also provides an exceptional opportunity to educate the jury
about the decisions the juror will face during the upcoming
trial.! The attorney should try to focus the juror's thinking on
the issues of fairness and the dilemmas faced by your client e.g.,
"passively" accepting arbitrary reprimands without challenge in
order to keep the job, being forced to choose between obeying a
J-2
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superior and disobeying the law. If there are negative facts in
your client's case, you may use the voir dire to create a favorable
climate so that the jury will not prematurely reject your client's
claims.
Ask questions which relate to the major theme of your case,
e.g.:
1. Have you ever worked for an employer that had a handbook
setting forth the rules and regulations which governed how
terminations should be made?
2. Did the employer use progressive discipline and warn
people before fIring?
3. Have you or any family member ever been fired without
cause, without the employer stating a reason for the
dismissal?
4. Have you ever filed a written grievance or complaint at
work? Please explain. Were you ever punished in any way
by the Company or any supervisor for complaining?
One goal of the advocate is to obtain a jury which is both
sensitive and sympathetic to the type of issues which tire being
presented. For example, if the case involves an older employee or
a long service employee, it is often advantageous to have older
jurors. They are more empathetic with the concerns of job
security and employability. Younger jurors sometimes have a
more cavalier attitude towards employment, i.e., they are more
confident about their future.
On the other hand, if an underlying issue is fairness,
younger jurors may have a heightened sense of fairness. Many
young persons expect that employers ought to give notice, ought
to give employees a chance to improve their performance, and
that fair play is required in the workplace. Older jurors
sometimes have accepted a deference to authority and are often
accustomed to following orders and accepting injustice.
Members of any group that is a minority subjected to
employment discrimination, such as Blacks, Jews, or Hispanics,
are likely to be sympathetic to a victim of arbitrary treatment by
a corporation.! Uneducated persons, laborers, intellectuals and
upper class housewives tend to side with the underdog. Jurors
J-3
J-4
who can identify with defendant's principal witnesses by similar
age, experience, or ethnic group, should be avoided.
If information exists about the jury panel, plaintiffs
counsel should study the list of potential jurors prior to the day
of jury selection. Executives, supervisors, persons identified
with management, owners of businesses and others with the
authority to hire and fire should be excluded. People who work
for law enforcement agencies, accounting rums, and other
~
institutions which tend to be "law and order" minded should be
excluded where plaintiff is accused of an act of alleged dishones-
ty or violation of a rule. Women, union members, and govern-
ment workers tend to favor an employee in a dismissal case.
Caution must be exercised in inferring values from occupa-
tions. A person's life experience or lifestyle may be a more
accurate indicator about that person's inclinations than where
the individual works or what job he or she does.
All things being equal, jurors tend to vote in accordance
with their biases, predilections, views and feelings formed over a
lifetime.
The voir dire examination gives counsel an opportunity to
size up the potential jurors. Counsel should ask open-ended
questions which permit the jurors to talk freely and reveal their
personality and biases.2 When counsel inquires about their prior
employment experiences and their relatives' jobs, prospective
jurors will often give clues about their attitudes towards
plaintiffs case. Watch body movement and facial expression.
Listen carefully to voice inflection. The body language of a
prospective juror and nonverbal clues can provide immediate
information about a juror's reaction to your client, your theory
of the case and the authority of the court. Use your observations
of nonverbal communication as just one more source of input.
Generalizations may be useful in many instances, but they can
also be misleading. Do not be rigid or inflexible in your analysis.
The decision about which prospective jurors to strike must
.be based not only on a combination of all the inputs about them
but also on anticipation of which jurors the employer will want
to eliminate.' Usually each side alternates in exercising its
peremptory strikes. You must constantly keep in mind who will
be left on the jury. Also be sure to weigh who will be the next
TRIAL 112:08
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potential juror to be seated in place of the one challenged. You
.are forced to gamble based on the best information available. It
is wise for counsel to consult with the client and to have at least
one associate in the courtroom to confer with regarding which
juror(s) to challenge.
Be sure when challenging for cause or when making
peremptory challenges to be polite and diplomatic so as not to
offend any of the other jurors. ~
Voir dire is the first time the juror will hear any informa-
tion about the case. Voir dire is also when the jury will have its
first look at the parties and counsel. Both plaintiff and
plaintiffs counsel should strive to make a good first impression.
1 See generally Blue & Saginaw, Jury Selection/Strategy ~d Science.
2 For a detailed discussion on conducting the voir dire see Blue &
Saginaw, Jury Selection/Strategy and Science, ch 4.
aFor a detailed discussion of challenges, see Blue & Saginaw, Jury
Selection/Strategy and Science, ch 2.
II. PLAINTIFF'S CASE IN CmEF
§ 12:07. Opening Statement.
Numerous studies show that many jurors make up their
minds about a case right after opening statements.1 Thus, it is
essential that you immediately create in the jury a desire to find
for the plaintiff employee. To reach this stage of the case, the
"law" has been the focus. Now, the ·facts" become dominant.
The human dimension-the feelings, the incidents, the unfair-
ness..;..becomes the pivotal issue. While the facts will usually
determine the outcome, they must not remain cold and dry.
They must come alive for the jury and make the jury want to
fmd for the employee.
The jury looks to the lawyer to provide an overview-to
present a picture which makes sense and provides a plausible
explanation for the wrongs which occurred. Such a picture will
allow the jury to develop a feel for the case, to sort out the
evidence, to fill in the gaps. This will bring order to the massive
amount of evidence the jury is about to hear. If the opening
statement has performed its real function, then the jury will
J-5
J-6
Development of Image
listen selectively and remember those facts which fit the theory
of the case that it wants to accept.
A very effective method to use for your opening statement
is to develop an image, a concept of the case which packages t~~
essential facts into a meaningful metaphor. This concept is most
easily developed by brainstorming methods-immerse yourself
in the facts, then sit quietly and let images emerge without
censorship or criticism. The various images should then be
submitted to colleagues or friends to test whether the image is
too superficial, too complex, too patronizing or too incredible.
Once you have adopted a case concept or image, you must
select three or at most four major points to emphasize to the
jury. No human can absorb a great deal of detail upon flrBt
hearing.
Although jurors bring their own predispositions to the
courtroom, their mental slates are blank as far as the facts of the
case are concerned. You therefore need to paint the outline of a
picture, giviug the jury ce:tain themes to which thEY CB.6'"l anchor
the facts as they are introduced. Your themes should be simple
so that they are easily understood and remembered. Your
themes should also enable each juror to answer the question:
How does this witness' testimony fit into plaintiffs theory and
image of the case?
The plaintiff's counsel should be sure to emphasize those
issues on which he or she is sure of winning. Common themes
include:
1. It is unfair to fire employees who have devoted their entire
adult lives to a company;
2. It is unfair to fire employees who are performing the duties
of their positions; and
3. It is an assault on human dignity to summarily deprive
individuals of their livelihoods.
Since the plaintiff has the burden of proof, plaintiff's
cOUDsel speaks first. The opening must be well organized and be
stated in positive terms. Although technically the opening
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statement is not an argument to the jury and is supposed to be a
statement of what one expects to prove, the opening statement
should be forceful and spoken with a controlled intensity.
Counsel should try to set the tone of the entire case in the
opening statement. If there ·were key employer comments in
depositions or documents, counsel may refer to these "smoking
guns" which convey the employer's callous and cruel attitude
towards either this particular employee or employees in general.
If the termination was handled in a particularly shabby or
insensitive manner, counsel should make the jury aware of it
during the opening statement. If the employee was fired
abruptly, or escorted out of the plant by the security guard, or
given notice of termination without any severance pay shortly
before Christmas, or the discharge involved termination of
medical insurance, these circumstances should be set forth
because they add color to the facts.
Plaintiffs counsel must exercise caution not to state facts
the plaintiff will not be able to prove. If counsel overstates
plaintiffs case, both counsel and plaintiff will lose credibility
with the jury. The defendant may also become entitled to a
curative instruction that no evidence was introduced on a
particular fact initially set forth by counsel. Thus, there is a
continuing tension which is confronted by all plaintiffs counsel:
Counsel wants to use the opportunity to influence the jury as to
why the plaintiff should prevail but at the same time counsel
does not want to claim more than will actually be delivered by
the evidence.
Mechanics of Opening Statement
The opening statement should appear extemporaneous.
The best way to make it appear extemporaneous is preparation
and practice. It must not be memorized. It should not be read. If
you have rehearsed the opening statement several times, you
will know the essence and you will feel the case. The three major
points and the few essential details will fit naturally into place.
A note card containing an outline of the key points should
suffice as a prop for your memory.
J-7
J-8
To increase your comfort level, rehearse before a mirror or
try it out in front of a live audience consisting of office
associates or family. Another tool is to videotape your opening
argument. It will enable you to see 'yourself and adapt according-
ly.
Communicate with the jury. Let them know that you
understand your case, that you care about your case. It may help
you relax if you free yourself from the podium. Show the july
that you can open up to them. This can convey to the jury that
your case can also open itself and withstand scrutiny. You can
discreetly approach your client when discussing the plaintiffs
case and approach the jury when discussing its decisions and
responsibilities. Although you must be cautious about emotion-
alism, you should humanize the situation facing the jury. The
employer's attorney will usually follow an ft analytical ft approach.
You want to personalize this dispute. This will enable the jury to
feel the outcome.
It is often appropriate, and in some courts necessary, to
preface statements of facts with ftthe evidence will show ... ft
Usually it is better not to qualify, and thereby weaken your
version of the fscts. Find out the latitude which the particular
judge will afford to counsel by checking with colleagues.
Counsel's credibility ""ill be at stake throughout the trial.
Be sure that you are somewhat conservative as to what you
expect to show. If you do not ftdeliver ft what you promise in the
opening statement, your case may be in trouble. Do not ignore
the weak portions of your case, which you know defendant will
stress. Raise them yourself and at the same time rebut, explain
and answer the arguments which they suggest. You can usually
explain the context. Anticipating and rebutting defendant's
arguments will take the sting away and dilute any damage
defendant can inflict upon your principal claims.
It is important that counsel show respect for the judge, the
opposing counsel, and for all persons in the courtroom. None-
theless, do not hesitate to tell the jury that the defendant is a
scoundrel, if in fact you Can prove it.
Lawyers often neglect the subject of damages. The opening
statement provides you a good opportunity to develop plaintiffs
theory of damage calculation. It is not necessary to give an
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amount, but counsel should stimulate the jury to listen to the
evidence of suffering, and loss of income which you will show.
In summary, counsel should show the jury sincerity and
belief in the plaintiffs case from the very beginning. Use
opening statement as the vehicle to make the juror trust you and
your version of the case.
lOne study reports that in 80% of cases, jurors decide issue of liability at
end of the opening argument. H. :(,<alven & H. Zeisel, The American Jury
(1966). A more recent 'survey disagrees, stating that only a minority reached
their final decision after the opening statement and a large part of that group
were probably influenced more by their own biases. Hughes & Hsiao, Does the
Opening Determine the Verdict, Not in Most Cases It Appears, Trial
Magazine (ATLA 1986).
See generally Julien Opening Statements.
§ 12:08. Witness Preparation.
Few attorneys will enter a courtroom without being fully
prepared. The same principle must be applied to your client and
other witnesses.
In some situations witness over-preparation has a negative
connotation. It is referred to as "sandpapering" witnesses so
that they alter their testimony by lying, becoming vague, failing
to remember key facts or "misremembering. n These characteri-
zations describe extremes and conduct that professionals should
avoid. It is, nevertheless, essential that a witness be properly
prepared for the courtroom setting. To reduce the witness'
anxiety, counsel should describe the physical aspects of the
courtroom and explain the mechanics of taking the oath and
talking to the jury.
During preparation for direct examination, counsel must
insure that he or she has learned everything important which
the witness knows about the case. Counsel should clarify that
witnesses understand both the questions as well as the limita-
tions on the type of questions counsel can ask on direct
examination. For example, attomeysare not permitted to ask
leading questions on direct examination-except for preliminary
areas of inquiry. In addition, counsel should educate the
witnesses about ambiguity. Pre-testimony preparation affords
witnesses an opportunity to articulate answers, and while
J-IO
Cross Examination
Witnesses are usually· extremely nervous concerning the
questions they will be expected to answer on cross-examination.
The fear of cross-examination can often be neutralized by
maintaining tnithful responses, to experiment with phrasing
responses differently, outside the pressures of the courtroom.
Much of the testimony provided by a witness is peripheral
to the key issues in the -case. Let the witness know those
portions of his or her testimony which matter and those which
do not. Explain to the witness that you are trying to recreate a
picture for the jury. The jury knows very little about the facts of
the case, and.many facts which the witness takes for granted are
not part'of the jury's experience. It is particularly valuable if the
witness has a mental picture of the situation to which he or she
is testifying. Sense impressions will bring an immediacy,
accuracy and credibility to the testimony. It is particularly
important that you explain to the witness the difference
between an observation and a conclusion. The witness may
nonetheless be entitled to express his or her opinion about
certain observations.
Witnesses often become confused because they cannot
remember all of the details of an incident. Be sure to explain to
witnesses that it is not necessary to remember the exact details,
but that the substance of the conversation or of the incident is
usually sufficient. Remind the witness that it is perfectly
appropriate to delay before responding to a particularly difficult
question. The delay will be.understood and will not appear
significant.
If the court asks questions, the witness should be sure to
answer the questions fully because the jury usually has a greater
interest in questions asked by the court and will be impressed
with a solid answer.
An unprepared witness will sometimes leave an unintended
or false impression with the jury. The unprepared witness often
becomes involved with the personality of the cross-examining
attorney and may attempt to placate or even argue with the
cross-examiner.
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simulating cross-examination. If cross-examination is, done
aggressively, the actual examination will often seem easy by
comparison. If you are a particularly aggressive cross-examiner,
and you need to maintain rapport with the witness, you may
want to consider having a colleague conduct the mock cross-
examination. This will minimize any transference of hostility
that might be generated by an aggressive simulated cross-
examination.
As a general rule, witnesses should be advised against trying
to discern the context of the cross-examiner's questions and the
purpose or motive behind the questions. It often interferes with
concentration and a long delay in answering might appear
suspicious.
Counsel should prepare the witness for defense questions
which are intended to cause the witness to become angry or
confused. The best advice to witnesses is to stand firm on what
they know is the truth. Although the court will control
questioning to some extent, the witness must recognize that
courts will give a significant amount of latitude before deeming
the line of questioning too heavy-handed.
The witness should be prepared to give sufficient responses.
Counsel should explain to the witness that there will be an
opportunity on redirect examination to supplement answers.
It is often important to remind witnesses that certain words
mean different things to different people. The cross-examiner
will often deliberately exploit the ambiguity of words to create a
false impression. If there are certain key words like "contract" ,
inform the witness that a contract can be oral or written or
implied. Similarly, if the witness is asked whether the contract
was for a defmite time period, the unprepared answer might be
"no" because there was no promise of employment for six
months or a year or two years. With preparation, however, the
witness will appreciate that the duration could be described by
explaining that the employee would not be terminated unless
and until he had received oral and written warnings as well as a
probationary period thereafter. Although a particular time was
not set forth, the specific conditions remove the sense of
indefiniteness.
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112:09. Order of Witnesses; Examination Tactics.
The general rule is to start with a strong witness and to end
with a strong witness. The images presented at the beginning
and end of your case are most readily remembered. This is true
for your case in chief as well as for each witness. Usually the
first witness should be the plaintiff. You are trying to promptly
convey to the jury the impact of the decision upon him or her
and to present to them the reality confronting your client at the
onset. However, there are some occasions when plaintiff should
. testify last so he can listen to all the prior testimony. He then
can clarify any inconsistencies, inaccuracies and any confusion
caused by prior witnesses. These are cases where there are many
eye witnesses who will corroborate plaintiffs observations or
recollections.
Sometimes the plaintiff is neither an articulate, nor an
intelligent person. He is simply unable to give the jury
Another way of coping with ambiguous words is to have the
witness contemplate what he or she means by certain words.
Then if the cross-examiner asks whether the witness has
reported all of his or her "income," the witness may feel free to
respond with "Not as I derme income." While the differences
can be elaborated on in redirect examination, clarity is im-
proved if the witness can adopt definitions which are commonly
accepted by jurors.
It is particularly important in preparing expert witnesses,
that you recognize and discuss any potential defects in their
analysis and or presentation of data. Experts are often scholars
or academics with habits of qualifying their words, or who
emphasize the limitations caused by the assumptions they had
to make. It is common for experts to overlook the virtues and
justification of their appraisals and emphasize what they did not
do. It is usually necessary to remind the expert that in speaking
to lay persons, he or she should emphasize the strengths, not the
limitations of their approach.
It is not necessary for you to review with the witness all the
testimony that will be presented, but you should thoroughly
explore the key facts so as to be aware of all the information
upon which the witness may testify.
TRIAL 112:09
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important background evidence. The jury may need this basic
iriformation at the start before it can absorb detailed testimony
about the incidents and episodes in question. If background
information is essential to understanding subsequent testimony
and you want to save your client for the last witness, make your
first witness a coworker or former employee who can fairly
present the background evidence. You can use this witness to
introduce basic documents and explain the. company's mode of
operation and personnel practices.
Extreme caution must be exercised in calling awitness
favorable to the employer at the beginning of the case. If at all
possible, do not start with such a witness. It can set the wrong
tone for your case. The witness favorable to management may
be well prepared and can create a momentum adverse to your
client. You want a witness who starts the story with evidence
and feelings that are supportive of your client.
Counsel should instruct plaintiffs witnesses to talk to the
jury, not to you, not to the judge, not to the audience and
certainly not to the other attorney. Let your witnesses know
that the jurors are the only persons who matter. If it becomes
necessary to remind the witness of the real audience, preface
some of your questions with •please tell the jury what your
supervisor said to you.· .
The plaintiffs testimony is the most important part of the
case. He should be knowledgeable and forceful, without being
argumentative and angry. Counsel should give him some
latitude so he can tell his own story in his own way. However,
Counsel should control the stream of testimony by frequent
questions. If necessary counsel should interrupt plaintiff if he is
going too far afield. Plaintiffs testimony usually breaks down
into major components: (1) background; (2) job history and
achievements; (3) the incidents in question, his version of the
facts concerning the allegations of poor work performance
and/or misconduct; (4) evidence of misconduct and negligence
on the part of the company, e.g., failure to investigate, discrimi·
nation, or mismanagement; .and (5) damages.
Concerning other witnesses, if there is any doubt as to how
coworkers, former employees, and other possible corroborative
witnesses will testify, do not call them as witnesses. Do not risk
J-13
J-14
§ 12:11. Hostile Witnesses.
Usually you will have to call one or more of defendant's key
personnel as witnesses in your case in chief. You should not call
a defense witness as your own unless you have deposed him
previously and can lead him into the answers you want.
having a witness who may look bad on cross examination. It is
better to present a few strong witnesses than a larger number of
weaker witnesses.
Avoid overtrying the case. Put on your testimony with
dispatch and efficiency. Keep a moderately fast pace which
continues to build momentum, and then rest.
§ 12:10. Sequestration of Witnesses.
Plaintiff's counsel' should be vigorous in invoking the
evidentiary rule that witnesses be excluded from the courtroom
when they are not testifying. Under the Federal Rules of
Evidence the court shall order witnesses excluded so they cannot
hear the testimony of other witnesses.1 This rule was based
upon the well known phenomenon that a witness who hears
prior testimony may modify his or her testimony to avoid
inconsistencies.
The plaintiff and any party to the case are specifically
permitted by rule to be present. In addition, a corporation is
entitled to have present a designated officer or employee as a
representative of the company. Although the language of the
rule appears to be mandatory, and is commonly granted by the
court, many judges view the sequestration of witnesses as a
matter within the court's discretion. Counsel should be prepared
to cite authority in his or her jurisdiction to support invocation
of the rule.
As with other rules, there are exceptions here too. Of prime
importance is an exception for expert witnesses whose presence
is essential.2 These experts may base their expert testimony on
facts presented by the other witnesses in the courtroom.
Plaintiff's expert witness can also listen to the opposing expert
called by defendant.
• Fed Rules Evid 615.
133 Federal Procedure Lawyer'. Edition pp 418-419.
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Reasons for Calling Hostile Witnesses
There are several reasons why you require company~wit-
nesses:
1. Often only they can supply essential elements of the case
needed to avoid a directed verdict.
2. They may have made statements damaging to defendant in
depositions which will help your case. They may be able to
identify and clarify "smoking gun" documents upon which
you are counting to win the case. You can not rely on cross
examination when they appear as defense witnesses, be-
cause you cannot be sure defendant will call them.
3. Occasionally the plaintiff is too uneducated and inarticulate
to give certain vital background information concerning the
company's operations and facilities which the jury needs to
know at the start of the trial.
Examples of information only an employer representative
can supply are:
1. The company's policy of uniform adherence to its employee
har.dbook and regarding the handbook ElB binding upCln
employer as well as employees.
2. The policy and practice of discipline, e.g., utilization of
progressive discipline and a "just cause" standard in similar
cases.
3. The employer's decision making process concerning the
plaintiffs discharge and the extent of the employer's
investigation of the matter.
4. Statistics concerning the employer workforce.
5. Information regarding current wages and fringe benefits.
In some cases plaintiff wants to show a pattern and practice
of discrimination against a class, e.g., Blacks, employees over 55,
or women. In discrimination cases, plaintiff often will have to
rely on a company official to identify statistical information
about the make up of the current workforce compared to those
laid off, average ages, a comparison of the percentage of
minorities hired and terminated, etc. This information will have
been previously produced in answers to interrogatories but will
have to be identified and explained by a live witness.
J-15
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Also it may be necessary to compare plaintiffs job evalua-
tions and appraisals with other employees' records which are
worse. In addition, in age discrimination cases, a company
witness is needed to identify the preferential treatment given to
young people. who were given the transfer opportunities in lieu
of layoff denied to the plaintiff.
Since the date of termination, the employer may have given
across the board salary increases, or awarded overtime regularly
or instituted new pension or insurance benefits. In order to
prove damages, it is necessary to place this data, including
average annual earnings of employees doing comparable work,
before the jury via a company representative.
In "lure-away" cases plaintiff attempts to prove fraud by
showing the employer deceived him at the time of recruitment
as to the truth concerning the company's intentions and the
company's financial condition. It will be necessary to call
company witnesses to give evidence on these points.
The personnel director is one obvious choice as a witness.
He is familiar with plaintiffs employment history. He has
knowledge concerning the discharge decision. He is cllstodian of
the personnel files and earnillgs records of other similarly
situated employees. Plaintiffs direct supervisor is another
possibility.
Rule 611(c) of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that
"when a party calls a hostile witness, an adverse party, or a
witness identified with an adverse party, interrogation may be
by leading questions" . Be sure your choice qualifies, by virtue of
his position or hostility, as a witness you can call "as on" cross-
examination and ask leading questions. If you have a choice,
select the least attractive and least personable of the possible
witnesses.
There can be great advantages in calling defense witnesses
as your own. You, rather than defense counsel control their first
appearance before the jury. If you have taken their depositions
and are well prepared, you can control and structure the
testimony so they and the employer will look very bad, so bad
that when they reappear much later as defense witnesses, it will
be too late for defense counsel to rehabilitate its case. Occasion-
ally you can surprise the defense team by calling the employer
TRIAL f 12:11
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representative who is sitting at counsel table as your first
witness. He will not have the advantage of having listened to the
entire case. Hopefully defense counsel will not have had time to
prepare him for testimony.
§ 12:12. -Subject Matter of Testimony.
Handbook Case
~
In a "handbook" case, plaintiff's claim for wrongful dis-
charge arises from written representations of job security set
forth in a policy manual. There may be a written statement that
employees shall not be fued without just cause. Usually there are
written rules setting forth serious offenses punishable by
discharge. There are other rules which list reprimand as the
most appropriate penalty and require corrective and progressive
discipline prior to discharge. Plaintiff must establish that these
rules are more than mere guidelines, but are binding statements
of employer policy. Plaintiff must prove that the employer
meant to outlaw arbitrary dismissals and establish standards of
fainless governing discipline C8&es. In sum, plaintiff must show
the existence of an employment contract and that the agreement
forbids unjust discharge. The employer witness should be able to
help.
The personnel director should be called to answer a series of
precise questions establishing the agreement as follows:
1. The company has always tried to be fair and reasonable in
the handling disciplinary matters.
2. The company does not condone arbitrary and capricious
discharges.
3. The handbook sets forth rules and regulations binding on
employees, supervisors, and top management.
4. The company's policy is to utilize progressive discipline.
5. The company's policies are designed to rehabilitate and
correct.
6. The handbook establishes corrective progressive discipline.
7. . Verbal and written warnings are required.
8. Discharge is used only as a last resort.
J-17
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In some jurisdictions ft consideration ft must be shown as a
basis for enforcement of promises in a handbook. It may be
necessary to establish that the purpose of the handbook is to
improve employee productivity and the morale of the workforce,
thus producing a benefit for the employer.
Past Practice
112:13. -Examination Tactics.
Usually the "as-on cross-examination" testimony should
not be lengthy. Keep in mind that defendant will probably recall
the witness as part of its defense. You do not want to waste all
your ammunition. Only ask what is necessary to establish your
case. Proceed in a rapid fire manner, eliciting a series of ·yes·
answers;
In most discharge cases the· plaintiff will attempt to show
discrimination. Counsel will show that other similarly situated
employees were not disciplined or were given a lesser penalty.
An employee witness usually will have to be called to reveal this
information. A typical question would be: Isn't it true that Bill
Smith had sales totally only $200,000 in 1983? He was not
fired?· He was not even issued a letter of reprimand?
Investigation and Decision Making
Often the employer did not conduct a careful and thorough
investigation of the facts. Sometimes key witnesses were not
questioned. Very Httle t.ime may have been spent in dpcision
making. There may have been no consideratiQn of a lesser
penalty or of a transfer to another position. Only an employer
representative can provide the testimony on these matters.
In public policy and other cases where the plaintiff is
showing·the stated reason is pretextual, it may be important to
freeze the employer's witnesses' version of the facts early on,
particularly when you can show them to be obvious liars.
Therefore, it may be important to call an employer witness first
to force him to state the reasons for the discharge as set forth in
documents and depositions, which you can show to be fabrica-
tions or at least at variance from the real reasons.
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You must be careful to confme the questions to narrow
.areas which cannot possibly hurt the plaintiff. After you have
finished your examination of the employer's witness, defend-
ant's counsel has several options: (1) he may choose not to ask
any questions, saving all the questioning of his witness until the
defense case in chief; (2) he may only ask a few questions
designed to clarify any major misunderstandings or admissions,
saving the bulk of his testimony for the time when the witness is
recalled as part of defendant's case; (3) he can ask many detailed
questions and introduce evidence in areas usually covered as
part of defendant's case; or (4) he may ask permission to ask
questions beyond the scope of cross-examination, requesting
that for expediency the witness should testify only once. If
defense counsel conducts a lengthy examination, you must
recross. You must use many of the questions you had reserved
for the cross-examination of the witness when he appears as
part of the defense case. You do not dare call a key defense
witness as part of your case unless you are well prepared for such
a possible scenario.
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§ 12:14. Visual Evidence.
Most people recall evidence presented in a visual manner.
Thus, if any portion of the employee's case can be presented in a
visual fashion, its effect on the jury will be substantially
increased. In personal injury cases, the damage awards were very
small until Melvin Belli and others introduced demonstrative
evidence. The same principle is true in employment cases. For
example, if the case involves a large number of employees of a
protected group who were terminated, prepare a chart identify-
ing all the employees or list them on a blackboard. Place their
ages or race alongside their names, draw lines through the older
or Black employees indicating that they were "hit" or struck
from the work force. Leave untouched the list of white or
younger employees with their corresponding ages. Illustrate the
contrast of the group which gets the privilege of retention. If the
plaintiff was ·put out to pasture,· demonstrate visually the
office where the plaintiff had been located and to where he or
she was transferred as part of the demotion process. If the
plaintiff's staff was reduced, identify and list the employees who
J-19
J-20
were on the plaintiff's staff and draw a line illustrating their
departures.
Invariably the presentation of damages should be set forth
in a visual manner. Through either expert or lay witnesses
counsel should develop charts that can be used as exhibits and
may be taken to the jury room for deliberations. At a minimum,
counsel should use a blackboard to set forth the figures by
categories which illustrate the damages suffered by the plaintiff.
If the employer's personnel rules provide for progressive
disciplinary procedures, this information should be photograph-
ically enlarged and used as an exhibit. As cross-examination
proceeds, counsel can ask management to identify these progres-
sive disciplinary procedures as a policy of the corporation, and
to illustrate which procedures were given and which were not
given to the plaintiff. Similarly, if there are memoranda
containing truths or words which depict stereotyped attitudes,
enlarge the documents, so that the objectionable words or
truths-the smoking guns-can be "burned" into the minds of
the jurors. Consider asking the management witnesses to
identify &l.d physically initial the statements they were respon-
sible for making. If none of the managers is willing to take
responsibility for the exact statements, counsel might dramatize
this absence of responsibility by identifying those portions
which were not the words of a particular manager but were
attributable to management. This will show the lack of personal
accountability and illustrate the headless corporate "beast."
Most expert witnesses will be prepared to articulate verbally
the methods of their analysis and the data underlying it.
Counsel must insist that this verbal analysis be supplemented
by a visual display, e.g., a chart that exemplifies the wage
differential between the income the employee would have earned
had he remained at his present job and the income he actually
earned. A few graphs which illustrate the disparity will be easily
remembered by the jurors. If the case involves complex statisti-
cal analysis, the expert must be made to portray the complicated
analysis in a visual manner that is simple and readily under-
stood. Counsel must be careful not to overdo visual evidence and
to keep in mind the principle that "less is more."
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Generally, charts cannot be shown to the jury until the
information thereon has been admitted into evidence. Some-
times charts and graphs may be used in questioning witnesses or
closing argument, even if they have not been previously
identified as exhibits. If they contain summaries of evidence or
conclusions which can be reasonably drawn from the evidence,
they can be exhibited to the jury, even if they do not go to the
jury as trial exhibits.
III. CROSS-EXAMINATION
§ 12:10. Purpose of Cross-Examination.
The purposes of cross examination are threefold:
1. discredit the witness, so the jury will disbelieve and dislike
him;
2. limit and minimize the harm and adverse impact of his
testimony; and
3. improve y~ur own case.
In direct examination the witness is the "star." Cross examina-
tion is an opportunity for the lawyer to •star. ~ By leading
questions, counsel .can dominate the scene. Counsel can show
his or her sincere belief that there has been an injustice. The
leading questions give an opportunity to articulate and hammer
away at the themes, images, and theory of the plaintiffs case.
Cross-examination should be planned in .advance. At a
minimum counsel should .list in 'writing several general areas of
questioning that must be covered in all events. Some lawyers
have each and every question planned in advance with precision.
There, of course, should be some flexibility. .
Plaintiffs case will generally be damaged by defense
testimony. Every case· has imperfections. Remember, to prevail,
Plaintiff only has to produce a preponderance of the evidence.
Much of the evidence is bound to favor the employer. Do not
expect miracles on cross-examination. At best you should
attempt to neutralize and soften any blows received.
t 12:16. Cross-Examination Strategy.
Cross-examination of employer witnesses can be difficult.
First of all, they are generally likable, attractive, intelligent,
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Thorough Preparation
Control of the Witness
Successful examination of employer witnesses requires
complete mastery of the facts. Plaintiff's counsel must have all
the names, dates and events at his fmgel' tips. You must spend
much time going over and over the depositions, documents, and
other evidence. Thorough preparation will give counsel the
confidence and ability to control the cross-examination, extract
favorable answers, and defuse the witness.
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shrewd, articulate and resourceful. Successful managers and
personnel directors appear to be open, sincere, and truthful. The
jury will generally like them as people.
In addition, they will be well coached by defense counsel.
Prior to trial there have been numerous meetings among
company personnel to review and orchestrate the company's
case. Company witnesses will have carefully read their deposi-
tions and the important documents of the case. COD;Jpany
executives depend on the company for their livelihood. They are
extremely loyal to the company. Emotions and bitterness run
high in a hotly contested discharge case. Company personnel
want to win. It is unlikely they will voluntarily say anything to
hurt the company or help the plaintiff. Because of their intimate
knowledge of the company's business, its practices, and the
details of the case, they start with a great advantage.
The time honored rule for cross examination is "never ask a
question unless you know what the answer will be or it makes no
difference." This rule should be followed in wrongful discharge
litigation. The best way to ensure you will know the answer, is
to find it in depositions or documents. The safest approach is to
cross examine pursuant to a previous deposition, documents,
and answers to interrogatories. Any variation by the witness will
enable you to impeach as follows:
1. Isn't it a fact that on ,19- you were deposed in my
office?
2. There, you were asked a series of questions about this case?
r
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3. You answered these questions under oath before a court
reporter and notary public?
4. You were asked the following question?
5. You gave the following answer?
6. Your answer today was different, was it not?
7. Your memory was better then, was it not?
Prior to trial you should file the original signed deposition
with the court so that it is available for the witness to examine
while he is on the witness stand. You should have the important
pages and line numbers of the deposition at your fingertips so
there will be no wasting of time.
All questions should be asked in such a manner as to require
a "yes" answer. Do not give the witness any room for hostile
elaboration. If the answer is unresponsive, ask the judge to
require the witness to answer yes or no.
From the start, establish control over the witness by
pointing out immediately, inconsistencies between his trial and
deposition testimony. Then, he will be reluctant to answer
incorrectly since he knows you can impeach him. He will soon
respect your knowledge of the case and his prior deposition. He
will be forced to answer nyes n because any other answer will be a
lie or unresponsive. The jury will then accept your version of the
events.
Short, crisp questions which go directly to the point are the
best. Your goal is limited: to elicit only that information which
helps your case. Do not ask open-ended questions that allow
management witness to be unresponsive and obfuscate the
important facts.
Invariably, the worst question to ask is, "why?" If the
answer is obvious, let the question remain unasked. If it's not
obvious, let the question haunt the jury, rather than risk the
damaging explanation.
When you obtain an admission helpful to your case, let the
answer linger. Do not hurry on. If appropriate, repeat the
answer. Sometimes, if you merely continue looking at the
witness, the silence will make his answer echo in the jury's
mind. If you didn't hear the answer clearly, repeat it to ensure
that you (and the jury) hear it right.
J-23
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There is great temptation to ask "one more question" to
seal the case shut. Typically, it backfires. A classic story
involves an attorney who succeeds in making a witness admit
that he did not actually see the defendant bite off the plaintiffs
nose: Giving in to the temptation not to leave well enough alone,
the attorney asks, "Then just how do you know that he bit the
nose. 11 The witness's reply was succinct, "Because I saw him spit
it out. 1I
§ 12:17. Sample Lines of Questioning.
Typically, good evaluations and appraisals can be used:
1. Isn't it true that plaintiff was rated as an "excellent" overall
employee on , 19-?
2. He was rated "excellent" in 5 different categories and
11 good" in 3 other categories?
3. His excellent rating was only six months prior to his
discharge?
4. The evaluation was true when it was written?
5. The signatures on the evaluation attest that it was reviewed
and approved by various supervisors?
Where the documents and depositions make certain facts
absolutely clear, they should be emphasized and stretched out so
as to embarrass defendant. For example:
1. At the time of his layoff plaintiff was never once considered
for any other job?
2. There was not one bit of discussion concerning the
possibility of a transfer or demotion?
3. There was no discussion among top management concern-
ing any lesser penalty other than dismissal?
4. Prior to this case it was the company's practice to always
consider employees who are subject to layoff or dismissal,
for other positions or penalties?
5. For example, Smith was transferred in layoff in 19-?
6. Jones was penalized by a written warning in 19-?
7. Neither Smith nor Jones were fired?
8. There was no attempt to get plaintiff's side of the story by
interviewing him concerning the alleged misconduct.
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9. The company never interviewed the following potential
witnesses? (List the employees by name and ask a separate
question for each.)
Other typical lines of cross-examination are:
1. Review of plaintiff's accomplishments:
(a) "Isn't it true that he never missed a day in the last two
years of his employment?"
(b) Isn't it true plaintiff got a merit bonus of 5% in--
19-?
2. Comparison of plaintiff's record with others: Isn't it correct
that in the Smith case, there was a written warning given
for the same offense for which plaintiff was fired?"
3. Appeal to principles of fairness:
"Isn't it correct that plaintiff was
(a) never given any written warnings that she would be
fired?
(b) never given oral warnings that her work was unsatis-
factory?"
4. Elaboration of company policy: "Isn't it true that the
company policy as expressed in the employee handbook
states that employees will be fired only as a last resort?"
Cross-examination of the employer decision-maker who
determined to discharge plaintiff should stress the following
areas:
1. The witness has no personal knowledge concerning miscon-
duct or performance and is relying on hearsay from others.
2. Company rules were not followed.
3. The investigation was limited and short in time and scope,
i.e., various witnesses were not questioned and various
documents were not examined.
4. Other employees similarly situated were treated differently.
5. There were conflicting reasons given for dismissal of
plaintiff.
6. There are conflicts in the version of events testified to by
other witnesses.
J-25
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7. There was a personal impermissible motive unrelated to the
merits.
8. The manner of dismissal was humiliating and degrading.
f 12:18. Tips for Questioning Employer Witnesses.
It is important to prepare two or three "zingers" carefully,
well in advance of trial so you are sure that you can inflict some
damage upon an adverse witness.
If the defendant's witness is an attractive personality, it is
wise not to keep him on the witness stand too long. The more he
talks, the more the jury may grow to like him and trust him.
Conversely, if defendant's witness is making a bad impression,
then you can take your time in the examination. Do not risk
going over again and repeating testimony that damages your
case, for fear of further damage, unless you are hurt so badly
that further harm Will not really matter.
Be careful with iemale employer officials. No one likes to
see an aggressive, "smart," male lawyer browbeat a' woman.
Most people have a lot of respect for female supervisors and
executives who have risen to important jobs.
Also be careful in cross-examinatiorl of chief eXE:cutive
officers. Often they are not familiar with the details of the case
and sometimes you can obtain damaging admissions from them.
However, these technical triumphs may be Pyrrhic victories.
CEOs are usually articulate people. They are charmers. They are
smart. They know how to .be evasive. They will exude an
attitude of fairness.' Usually, it is best to try to hurt them by
pointing out some clear lies they have told and get them off the
witness stand before they have time to recover.
Avoid unnecessary intimidation and browbeating of ·the
witness. Let him finish his answer. Do not berate him. Do not
attempt to belittle him.. Do not use rough tones of voice. Do not
adopt a IIsmart aleck II attitude towards the witness. Avoid
making the witness look like the underdog. Do not conduct the
examination so the jury will sympathize with the witness. A
skillful technical impeachment of the witness by use of cleposi-
tions may impress your fellow .lawyers but it may go over the .
head of the jury or even offend the jury if they feel you have
taken advantage o(him by use of "lawyer tricks." .
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On the other hand when you catch the witness in a big lie
.over an important point or when his answer reveals an immoral,
or cruel attitude, do not hesitate to show your own righteous
indignation. Be respectful to the witness, but when he says
things that deserve the disrespect of the jury, you can show your
own displeasure. When the witness is evasive and by his voice
and answers reveals himself to be a liar and a bad person, there
is no reason for the lawyer to maintain an oyerly respectful
posture. .
There are some lawyers who feel that the most effective
cross-examination is not through the use of leading questions,
but by letting the witness reveal the truth on his own, by the use
of skillful questions. Some jurors do not like lawyers who always
·put words in the mouth of the witness" and who appear to be
testifying themselves.
The seeds for successful cross-examination are sown during
discovery. If you keep pressing to obtain all relevant documents,
you will obtain the tools to impeach at trial. Plan your
depositions with trial in mind. Conduct a lengthy and thorough
deposition. You can obtain the answers which will help control
and demolish the witness, when you cross-examine him.
Although discovery enables you to be prepared, your prior
discovery will not anticipate every development during trial.
You must know your case so thoroughly that you can adapt
spontaneously to these surprises. In criminal cases, parties do
not have formal discovery. Counsel relies on investigation and
the "rule of probabilities,· i.e., they assume that what probably
happened did in fact happen, and ask their questions according-
ly.
Ifdefendant's witness does not hurt plaintiff's case in direct
examination, then plaintiffs counsel should ask no questions, or
only a very few. There may be other occasions where the better
tactic is to decide against any cross-examination. For example,
if your opponent's witness has a story that is blatantly
implausible, quietly gaze at the witness, look to the jury with
slig,ht sarcasm and say to the judge "Your Honor, we have no
questions for this witness." If the witness.has so confused and
complicated the testimony that he has befuddled the jury, cross-
examination may bring clarity to the situation. Sometimes the
J-27
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Content
§ 12:20. Closing Argument.
The closing argument is advocacy at its best.! Jurors look
forward to closing arguments. There is not only an indication
that the end is near, but also an anticipation of impassioned
advocacy. Although the·content of the summation will vary with
the particulars of each case, it is critical that the closing
arguments include the following focus:
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IV. REBUTTAL AND CLOSING ARGUMENT
§ 12:19. Rebuttal.
Rebuttal testimony rarely is necessary. Where there has
been full discovery, plaintiff will have anticipated the major
defenses and presented his rebuttal as part of his case in chief.
Assuming that plaintiff has held up well on cross-examina-
tion, it is risky to put him back on the stand on rebuttal. There
is little time for preparing plaintiff. He may not be ready for
defense counsel's inevitable cross. Defense counsel probably will
have lots of ammunition stored up by now, and will be ready
with questions he forgot to ask when plaintiff testified on direct-
examination. This will be the jury's 18st look at the plaintiff. If
there is an uncertainty on how he will perform, it is best not to
display him on rebuttal. On the other hand, where there is new,
surprising, and damaging testimony on points not covered by
plaintiff in the case in chief, it is absolutely vital that plaintiff
be called to rebut and contradict this new evidence.
jury will disregard confusing testimony, rather than expend the
energy to sort it out. Another benefit of foregoing cross-
examination is that it limits your adversa..-y's opportunity to
clean up or clarify the testimony on redirect.
Remember the plaintiff generally cannot expect to win the
case through brilliant cross-examination. Cases are usually won
on the strength of the testimony of your own witnesses. Cross-
~ examination at best should be used to neutralize adverse
testimony.
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1. connect the key facts with the organizing theory;
2. connect the jury instructions with the plaintiffs theory of
the case;
3. simplify the complexity of the factual testimony into the
major themes first" set forth in the opening argument; and
4. present a summary of the damages, visually if at all
possible.
In closing argument, the advocate must communicate a
fmn belief in his or her client's cause. There is no room for
ambivalence or academic qualification. As the employee's
attorney, right and fairness will often be on your side. Do not be
afraid to articulate these principles. It is not necessary to
become excessively emotional in order to convey an impassioned
feeling or conviction-tell the jury why your client should win-
why your theory of the case makes more sense then the
employer's theory.
The advocate must also convey credibility. Even though no
single jury member will remember all of the testimony, it is
critical that trial counsel stay close to the record. Collectively,
the jury will remember the critical testimony. The task of
plaintiff's counsel is to revive the memory and connect it up to
the theory of the case. Counsel must not elaborate on facts
which have not been the subject of testimony. The jury will
frequently receive instructions from the court that what counsel
says is not testimony. If counsel brings up new facts, the jury
will often disregard the substance of his theory. Believability is
also enhanced if counsel has all of the key exhibits organized
and readily available for use during the closing argument.
A closing argument should offer a summary of the facts and
should enable the jury to visualize what happened. The closing
argument should fill in the final gaps of the picture created
during the opening argument. Since the juror may have had a
positive experience with his or her employer, it is important to
emphasize that these are the facts of a specific case without
expressly asking the jury to stand in the shoes of the plaintiff.
This is, however, the real purpose of the closing argument: to
enable the jury to feel or to step into the experience of the
plaintiff.
J-29
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The closing argument should have a beginning, a middle
and an end. The opening line should be addressed to grabbing
the jury's attention, not to apologizing about the case or in
expressing appreciation. Although it is appropriate to express
appreciation to the jury for its patience and impart.iality, there
is no need to detract from your power by the routine thank-you
at the beginning. Work displays of appreciation into your
argument. Express confidence in their impartiality during a
discussion of direct fact disputes or weak points in your case.
As with the opening argument, the central metaphor and
principles of the major theme(s) should be emphasized. The
theme is the thread which connects the opening argument, the
testimony, and now the summation. The theme must be a
concept which is acceptable to the jury and which motivates the
jury to find for the employee. The theme might be the
community's interest in fair play, or the need for the jury to
send a message that discriminatory conduct will not be tolerat-
ed, or the importance of human dignity and the humiliation of
stripping a person of his employment without good cause, or the
dedicated loyal service of the employee.
Counsel should not be afraid to use silence and pauses to
emphasize the key themes as well as the evidence which
supports those themes.
In closing argument counsel should be forceful and positive.
Counsel should state "The evidence clearly demonstrated that
. . ." rather than •I believe the evidence showed", or •In my
opinion.· This is the occasion to reason with the jury and show
them what is significant about the facts and the existence or
absence of evidence.
It is rarely desirable to restate the testimony, entire details
and all, of each and every witness. The duty of plaintiffs counsel
is to simplify the case, to boil it down to its major themes:
simplify, simplify, simplify. Rather than reiterate the testimony,
the focus should be on the strength of facts which have already
been proven from the witness stand. Remind them of the source
of the key facts.
A common defense tactic is to trap plaintiffs counsel into
addressing each and every argument raised during summation~
TRIAL
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There is little virtue in trying to address each and every
'argument the defense counsel will make. Make it your case by
expressing your strengths.
Arguing Damages
A clear, concise and visual communication of the damages
, claimed is critical during the closipg argument. Counsel should
identify the psychological effects of the discharge, discussing the
changes in the employee's life, family and other relationships,
and reputation in the community. Many times understatement
is as effective as a dramatic portrayal.
In the absence of a stipulation to the amount of damages,
you must justify the demand for money damages. To supple-
ment your verbal declarations use exhibits which identify the
lost wages and benefits, both present and future, as well as any
liquidated or punitive damages ifavailable. At a minimum, use a
blackboard to project the figures into the jury's visual memory.
If mitigation of damages is an important issue, counsel
must sympathetically describe the plaintiffs efforts to find
employment as well as the inherent problems faced by the
plaintiff in securing employment. For example, elderly job
applicants in the labor market often experience discrimination.
No matter how great their efforts to find employment, it
remains difficult. Similarly, employees who are terminated after
providing long-term service to one employer often face suspicion
and doubt. Abrupt termination often implies serious or egre-
gious misconduct. Counsel must try to create the image of few
openings, very few interviews, and no job offers.
Integration with Jury Instructions
Counsel can gain further credibility during the closing
argument by integrating his or her arguments with the key jury
instructions. While explaining the decisions which face the jury,
it will give added force to counsel's arguments when the judge
gives the promised instruction. For example, you could state •As
the court will instruct you later, you must decide credibility; you
must decide whether to believe the plaintiff or the management'
J-31
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witness; you must decide whether age made a difference in the
employer's decision.· Finally, counsel should clearly communi-
cate to the jury what the juror's response should be on each and
every interrogatory to insure that the jurors who'want to rule for
the plaintiff will make the correct entries.
Summary
Closing argument is the .fmal opportunity to persuade the
jury. You've already given them the reasons and enough facts. It
should end on a note which makes the jury want to rule for your
client. .
Then leave it up to the jury ~nd put your trust in them.
I See generally Stein Closing Argument.
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